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ABSTRACT 
 
 
From the industrial revolution to the emergence of the so-called knowledge economy, history 
has shown that economic development has taken place unevenly across regions. National 
economies are a complex mix of varying types of geographical configurations which in turn 
involve varying economic systems, infrastructure, and human capital. In this context recent 
literature in regional growth and development has highlighted how crucial it is to analyse 
socio-economic phenomena through the lens of spatial concepts such as density, distance, 
neighbourhood, and agglomeration. This dissertation emphasizes this fact in three interrelated 
studies that have analyzed the spatial aspects of income and human capital inequalities in 
Pakistan. 
The first study investigates the evolution and trend of earnings income distribution in 
Pakistan between 1993 and 2006—a period characterised by macroeconomic reforms and a 
decent average GDP growth rate. Specifically, it shows the extent to which changes in the 
returns to human capital have contributed towards changes in earnings inequality across 
Pakistan. The second study utilizes exploratory spatial data techniques to analyze the extent 
of spatial clustering of economic inequalities, growth and development across Pakistani 
districts between 1998 and 2006. The final study then investigates for the first time income 
convergence across Pakistani districts between 1998 and 2005 using spatial and non spatial 
econometric techniques. 
The main empirical findings from the first study reveal that the returns to low levels of 
education have declined while the returns to higher education levels have increased.  
Moreover these returns are much higher for females as compared to males. It has also been 
shown that earnings inequality has consistently remained higher within provinces as 
compared to inequality between them. Finally this study demonstrates that females in general 
and rural females in particular are most sensitive to policies that can affect earnings 
inequality and labour market outcomes in Pakistan. The findings from the second study 
demonstrate how neighbouring districts share each other’s development levels, confirming 
that economic geography does matter for regional inequalities, growth, and development 
across Pakistan. Finally, the convergence analysis carried out in the third study, demonstrates 
that conditional convergence may be observed across Pakistan once spatial effects have been 
taken into account.  
In summary, this dissertation contributes to the literature and policy debate on economic 
inequalities and convergence in developing economies and in particular to district level 
research in Pakistan, by applying counter factual regression analysis and spatial econometric 
techniques for the first time to Pakistani data. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“The bottom line is that Pakistan made little social progress for given rates of per capita income and 
growth relative to comparator groups, lowering the welfare of the population compared to that under 
more broadly based development. Pakistan is an interesting illustration that growth alone is not 
enough for broader development under circumstances of high social polarization. It may help us 
understand why economic growth is not always reliably associated with social and institutional 
progress”. 
The Political Economy of Growth without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan 
(William Easterly, 2001) 
 
1. Motivation 
Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s economic growth trends have been paradoxical. One 
of the reasons for this is that the periods of high growth have not resulted in the improvement 
of its human development indicators. With a population of over 170 million people, Pakistan 
is the 6th most populous country in the world. The United Nations projects that by 2050, 
Pakistan’s population is expected to double to about 350 million people making it the world’s 
3rd or 4th most populous country. Currently the country is also experiencing a demographic 
transition representing an increase in the population of the working age group 15 to 64 years 
only (also known as demographic dividend). It has been claimed that “up to 40 percent  of the 
success of the East Asian Economic miracle can be attributed to the fact that the region took 
advantage of its demographic dividend” (Bloom; Canning, Sevilla, 2002:45). In the case of 
Pakistan, whether this opportunity of a demographic dividend can be translated into the 
country becoming a regional or a global power crucially depends on the characteristics of its 
population. By 2050, it has also been estimated that the size of the potential workforce will be 
approximately 221 million and Pakistan will lose its opportunity to take advantage of this 
demographic dividend if it is unable to invest in its human capital and provide employment to 
this emerging workforce (Nayab, 2007; Cohen, 2008).  
At the same time, with the existing political insecurities, the country has become unattractive 
for its existing human capital supplies. It suffers from a constant brain drain and the large 
diaspora of highly educated Pakistanis throughout the world has reduced incentives to 
contribute towards the growth and development of the country.  Moreover the current 
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education system in Pakistan is in a truly deplorable state. Out of an estimated population of 
180 million, 25 million children do not go to school. This implies that roughly 1 out of 10 
children out of school in this world is now a Pakistani (Education Emergency Report, 
Ministry of Education, Pakistan (MOEP), 2011). Under these circumstances, there exists a 
grim chance that the government will be able to achieve the millennium development goals 
on education by 2015. It has also been estimated that the economic cost of not educating 
Pakistan is the equivalent to the economic cost of one flood every year, with the difference 
being that this is a ‘self-inflicted disaster’  (MOEP, 2011:16). Consequently today, human 
capital enhancement strategies matter more for Pakistan as compared to any other time. These 
strategies are required not only to realize its potential demographic dividend but also to 
increase educational enrolments, raise educational standards, reduce the disincentives for 
human capital migration, ethnic polarization and the extent of elite domination in the society. 
They are needed to achieve sustained increases in economic growth and development, 
improve quality of governance, and to raise standards of civil society awareness in order to 
combat extremist and violent elements currently influencing the population. 
Furthermore, like most developing countries today, Pakistan faces the daunting 
challenge of overcoming its unequal regional growth. Administratively, Pakistan is divided 
into 4 provinces which comprise of 113 districts, 420 sub-districts and 48,344 villages. The 
spatial concentration of economic activities (particularly services sector activities) together 
with human capital abundance in Punjab, have resulted in it achieving the status of the most 
privileged province of Pakistan in terms of public investments in social sector developments. 
With increasing agglomeration of manufacturing and research and development activities in 
the ‘core’ areas of Punjab and some parts of Sindh, it can be expected that localized human 
capital investments could lead to further geographic stratification of the population and result 
in widening the existing regional human development disparities.  
In the background of the above mentioned challenges, Pakistan’s potential labour 
force struggles with unequal opportunities for human capital development and employment 
across its regions. These inequalities become aggravated at a regional level as institutional 
sources of education and employment are unequally dispersed throughout the country. This 
calls for attention towards studying intra-country regional differences not only in order to 
identify the most neglected subgroups of the population in terms of literacy, innovation and 
employment, but also to assist in the development of policies that can alleviate these issues of 
income and human development inequalities. 
11 
 
Economists have pointed to a number of causes of regional disparities such as 
institutional ineffectiveness, governance issues, sluggish technological diffusion, endowment 
disadvantages, and the penalty of remoteness from core areas. This dissertation focuses on 
regional differences created by human capital and earnings inequalities in particular. By 
utilizing standard econometric tools along with exploratory and spatial econometric data 
analysis techniques, this project aims to investigate the link between human capital, economic 
inequalities, regional growth, spatial heterogeneity, and spatial dependence between Pakistani 
provinces and districts. 
 
2. Economic Growth in Pakistan (1990-2010) 
Most emerging market economies faced a stiff economic environment in the decade of the 
1990s. Countries such as Mexico, Turkey and Argentina met chronic structural problems that 
poisoned their domestic currencies, eventually resulting in extremely high twin deficit levels 
and damaged socio-economic systems. In fact mid 1990s were characterised by failed 
episodes of structural adjustment and privatization programs, and poor stabilization regimes 
and in 1997, the East-Asian financial crisis took place. Under these international economic 
and financial developments, problems for Pakistan increased as it faced possible economic 
sanctions after its first successful nuclear testing in 1998.  This resulted in a shattered 
confidence of international and domestic investors in the domestic market and the State Bank 
of Pakistan resorted to freezing of foreign exchange bank accounts as it feared capital flights. 
This situation completely reversed with the advent of the 9/11 incident as it led to an 
increased flow of remittances for most developing countries including Pakistan. The fiscal 
year 2002-03 witnessed a sharp recovery in economic growth as Pakistan experienced a 
severe decline in its GDP growth rate in 2001 due to catastrophic drought conditions at the 
domestic front coupled with the world economic down turn in the after math of the 9/11 
incident.  In South Asia, Pakistan was the only country that achieved more than 5 percent 
growth in 2002-03 which demonstrated its resilience to external shocks (Ahmed, 2005).  
The second half of the 2000s was an eventful period for Pakistan in terms of 
economic and political developments. In 2005, Pakistan was amongst the fastest growing 
economies in the world (see Table 1). Workers’ remittances increased by 323 percent from 
$0.98 billion in the year 2000 to $ 4.17 billion in 2005, and Pakistani rupee gained strength as 
the balance of payments situation improved. The year 2005 also marked beginning of an 
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inflation era particularly, double digit high food inflation which put an extra-ordinary burden 
on the fixed income and other poorer segments of the population. In 2006, despite the 
massive destruction caused by a catastrophic earthquake and its related expenditures, in 2006 
the economy of Pakistan continued to gain further traction. However, price hike for essential 
food items continued indicating ‘a future domestic food crisis’ coupled with a high negative 
growth rate of 8.4 percent of electricity and gas distribution marking the beginning of an 
“energy crisis” in Pakistan.  
An unstable domestic law and order situation, soaring oil, food and other commodity 
prices, softening of external demand and an international financial crisis made the fiscal years 
2007-08 and 2008-09  rather difficult for the Pakistani economy as it witnessed rising 
inflation, a growing fiscal deficit, an energy supply crisis, and widening trade and current 
account deficits. Intensification of security challenges internally and on the borders with 
Afghanistan in 2009 have exacted an extremely high cost on the economy not only in terms 
of direct costs of fighting the war against terrorism but also in terms of reduction in 
investment flows and market confidence since 2001 (Pakistan Economic Survey 2009). 
During 2009-10, a total of 1,906 terror attacks were recorded in the country according to the 
National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior and its cost amounted to about 6 
percent of GDP in 2009-10. As a front line state in the global “War against Terror”, official 
estimates suggest that there has been a loss of 43 billion US dollars to the economy between 
2001 and 2010 (see Table 2). 
Despite the various above mentioned economic and political challenges at the national 
and international level, Pakistan has maintained a fairly decent average GDP growth rate of 
4.6 percent over the past two decades (see Figure 1).  Although, the growth in real GNP 
persistently decelerated during the 1990s—as it declined from an average of 5.7 percent in 
the 1980s to an average of 4.2 in the first half of the 1990s and 3.5 percent in its second half, 
it again rose to an average of 5.1 percent in the 2000s. While many low income countries 
were stagnating, a considerable reduction of the number of people below the poverty line 
over the years is a plausible achievement. On the human capital front, Pakistan’s domestic 
professional elite is at par with those in the industrialized world. It also has an educated and 
entrepreneurial Diaspora that run small businesses in various countries throughout the world, 
skilled workers in the Gulf States, and high ranking official in almost all international 
organizations (Easterly, 2001). Pakistan was also amongst the few countries that depicted 
positive growth rates even during the peak of the global credit crunch in 2008-09.  
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3. The Paradox of Growth 
Yet Pakistan has performed quite poorly when one observes its social sector development 
indicators over the years. In 2010, Pakistan ranked 125th out of 169 countries in the Human 
Development Index (HDI) rankings, keeping its place in the medium human development 
category as defined by the annual UNDP Human Development Report. Despite the level of 
its economic growth, it has always stayed even below the average HDI value of South Asia 
(see Table 3). It must be noted that the Human Development Index only provides part of the 
picture of a country’s socio-economic development since it does not take into account the 
status of political participation and gender inequalities in that country. With the current trends 
of political instability and gender biases, perhaps Pakistan’s performance would be even 
worse highlighting the fact that an exclusive pursuit of economic growth is inadequate to 
ensure human development1. 
         Although Pakistan’s level of total public expenditure has been quite comparable to 
international standards, but within that the actual amount of expenditure on social sectors has 
been very low throughout its history (Joekes et al, 2000). Until recently for its level of 
income, Pakistan’s indicators like infant mortality, and female primary and secondary 
enrolment rates were among the lowest in the world (Easterly, 2001). In 2010, Pakistan 
ranked the lowest in the categories of Adult Literacy Rate (for both sexes), and expected 
years of schooling of children in South Asia (World Bank, 2010). Pakistan is also more 
politically unstable, more corrupt, more violent, less democratic, and “less respectful of 
human rights” (as demonstrated by various indices) when compared with countries that have 
similar income levels. (Easterly, 2001:3).  
Despite declining absolute poverty trends, inequalities in income, consumption, and 
human development conditions have also continued to rise. It has been widely demonstrated 
how inequality threatens a country’s poverty reduction capacity and its sustainability of 
growth (World Bank, 2006). By excluding a proportion of a country’s population (e.g. poor, 
elderly, women, illiterate, disabled etc), it constricts human potential through which 
“entrepreneurship, innovation, investment and productivity growth can occur to sustain GDP 
growth” (Hussain, 2008:4). Health and education in particular have been extremely neglected 
social sectors as demonstrated by low levels of public expenditures on them (Joekes et al, 
                                                        
1 It should also be noted that the current rankings were estimated before the catastrophic flood came in July 
2010. The flood directly affected 20 million people mostly by destruction of property, livestock, and 
infrastructure including hospital and school buildings. 
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2000). This gross neglect of human capital has been amongst the major causes that have 
prevented Pakistan from developing into a knowledge-based economy. As many as 11 
National Education Commissions were held between 1947 and 1993, but education has 
remained “unabashedly elitist”. (Easterly 2001:19). Pakistan’s levels of literacy, high school 
enrolment rates, and schooling quality have been amongst the lowest in the South Asia 
indicating its significance in government policy (see Table 4). Although the literacy rate has 
increased from 46 percent in 1999 to 56 percent in 2010, the gender gap remains high and the 
total population still consists of more than 50 million illiterate adults (Economic Survey of 
Pakistan, 2010). Regional human capital disparities have worsened even more after 
Pakistan’s direct involvement in the war on terror as educational attainment for “virtually a 
whole generation of school-going age in the affected areas of NWFP and FATA has been 
jeopardized or severely undermined” (Economic Survey of Pakistan 2010:7).  
         In the next section, this chapter analyzes this paradox of Pakistan’s growth in a 
historical context to highlight how political developments (particularly political instability) 
over the years have jeopardized the social development process in the country. 
 
3.1 Political developments in Pakistan—A historical account  
When the British left the subcontinent after agreeing to divide it into two independent states 
in 1947, Pakistan inherited a heavy baggage of unresolved social, economic and political 
issues. Neither the British nor the Pakistani leaders were certain of the newly created state 
boundaries, the composition of a highly multi-ethnic population that it consisted of, and the 
type of development policies it would have to pursue (Naseem, 2008). As Pakistan lost its 
founder—Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and its first Prime Minister—Liaqat Ali Khan within the 
first 4 years of its creation, the country faced a leadership dilemma since the very beginning. 
Within its first decade, 7 Prime Ministers changed between 1947 and 1958.  
Two major divisions emerged during the first decade. While the first was based on 
geography, between West Pakistan (Pakistan) and East Pakistan (Bangladesh), the second 
was between the Army and the Civil Service—the two public elite services of Pakistan 
(Naseem, 2008). Pakistan’s military—in particular the Army—has always remained an 
influential institution and its most important interest group. It has power over the country’s 
politics, foreign policy and over the years it has also begun to dictate its economic policies 
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(Zaidi, 2005). Pakistan had two military regimes lasting for 14 years in its first 25 years since 
independence. Ironically, military regimes in Pakistan have always been characterized with 
more political stability as compared to civilian regimes. Direct military intervention in 
Pakistan’s democratic system started when the Army staged its first coup in 1958 and 
General Ayub Khan began his decade long military rule. 
The Ayub regime (1958-69) is mainly characterized by a period of economic growth, 
inequality, and increased dependence on economic and military assistance from the United 
States.  A highly regulated policy framework for import substitution led industrialization in 
the consumer goods sector emerged in 1960s. This policy was combined with tariff 
protections for manufacturers of consumer goods and import controls on competing imports 
enabling the emergence of an industrial elite class that made large profits without having to 
achieve high levels of efficiency. In addition to these protectionist measures, exporters were 
offered incentives such as tax rebates, tax exemptions, and accelerated depreciation 
allowances which enabled the rich industrial elite to make large amounts of profits without 
having to worry about international competitiveness, improving efficiency, and diversifying 
production into high value added goods (Hussain, 2003). 
Moreover in order to secure a power base, the government transferred rents to the 
industrial elite via subsidies and tariff manipulations. From then onwards, the ruling elite 
became accustomed to seeking rents from the government which started to increase 
Pakistan’s economic burden from a very early stage (Ibid). The 1960s policy of concentrating 
national income in the hands of the upper income groups was based on the assumption that 
since the rich tend to save a larger proportion of their income, higher national savings could 
be achieved through unequal income distribution. While the policy of distributing income in 
favour of the elite was successful it failed to raise domestic savings over time. As noted by 
Griffin (1972), 15 percent of the resources that were annually generated in the rural sector 
were transferred to the urban industrialists. Out of these transferred resources, 63 to 85 
percent “went into increased urban consumption” (Hussain, 2003:38). The requirement of 
foreign aid shot up as the savings from elite incomes proved to be inadequate.  The debt 
servicing burden rose as the interest rates on loans increased. In 1960-61 debt servicing as a 
percentage of foreign exchange earnings was 4.2 per cent and it increased to 34.5 per cent by 
1971-72. Its magnitude continued to rise for the next three decades and by the year 2000, it 
stood at 40 per cent (Ibid). 
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Although land reforms and industrialization helped to achieve rapid economic growth, 
by the end of the 1960s, vast regional income and sectoral disparities had emerged. Small 
groups of elite families not only dominated industry, banking, and insurance sectors of 
Pakistan but also exercised considerable power over government agencies that sanctioned 
industrial projects. It has been noted that 46 per cent of the value added in the large scale-
manufacturing sector originated in firms that were owned by only 43 families (Hussain, 
2003). While a monopolistic class of industrialists emerged, the majority of Pakistan’s 
population experienced an absolute decline in its living standards as real wages in the 
industry declined by 25 percent between1960-67 (Griffin & Khan, 1972). By 1971-72 rural 
poverty had deteriorated to the extent that it has been estimated that 82 percent of rural 
households were unable to provide 2100 calories per day to each household member 
(Naseem, 1977).  
 
This period also marked the beginning of worsening regional disparities not only 
between East and West Pakistan then but also within (today’s) Pakistan. Infrastructure 
development and facilities were markedly different between provinces as the relatively well 
endowed (with infrastructure facilities) provinces of Punjab and Sindh were able to attract a 
larger proportion of industrial investment.  Another cause of rising intra-country regional 
income disparity came from the differential impact of developments in the agriculture 
process, the so-called ‘Green Revolution’. Regions with larger areas of irrigation systems 
benefitted more from the mechanization of agriculture processes and the adoption of high 
yielding seed varieties. Again Punjab and Sindh disproportionately benefited more from it as 
compared to Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (previously known as North West Frontier Province) and 
Balochistan. Studies have shown that due to the use of large farm machinery and expensive 
seeds, the Green Revolution favoured large, well established farmers over the small and 
medium sized ones. Moreover, land ownership also remained concentrated in the hands of 
few landlords. In 1972, 30 per cent of total farm area was owned by large landowners 
(owning 150 acres and above).  These two features led to an economic polarization of the 
population and landlessness in rural Pakistan (Hussain, 1988). Wealth continued to be 
concentrated in the hands of big landlords while incomes of the poor peasantry –most of 
which with smaller areas of land and unable to buy more—declined. Moreover the poor 
peasant’s dependence on the big landlord intensified as the latter became the former’s source 
of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers etc). Although the high agriculture growth rate from 
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the Ayub Era could not be sustained in future, the inequality enhancing mechanisms that 
emerged continued to persist over the next 4 decades (see Table 5). 
 
Next came the Bhutto era (1973-1977) which was characterized by widespread 
nationalization. While it was aimed at constraining the powers of the small group of 
industrial elite that had emerged in the 60s, it actually increased size of public sector and 
widened the ‘resource base of the regime for the practice of traditional form of power through 
state patronage’ (Hussain, 2003: 41). Although Bhutto initiated pro-poor labour intensive 
programs such as the National Development Volunteer and the People Work Program to 
generate employment for the educated unemployed and the rural poor, both the programs 
could not be sustained due to budgetary constraints. The financial constraints had been 
caused by large sums of budget being directed towards non development expenditures such 
as the military to win the confidence of the military and to run the national industries that 
were running on losses.  
 
However the decreasing GDP growth rates and growing debt servicing burden from 
the Bhutto era were unable to have a crippling impact on the Zia regime (1977-89) because of 
a) increased financial support from the west particularly due to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role, and b) increased remittances from the Middle East due to its 
consumption and construction boom. These developments helped ease budgetary pressures, 
balance of payment pressures and also social pressures by benefitting about 10 million people 
that too from the lower middle and working class (Hussain, 2003). Despite the rise in GDP 
during the Zia regime, investments in social and economic infrastructure remained 
inadequate. As the Afghan War ended and financial assistance from the western allies 
stopped, the Pakistani economy plunged towards an economic recession in the 1990s.  
 
As many as 8 Prime Ministers changed in a short span of 11 years between 1988 and 
1999. During the 1990s political instability, corruption and a worsening law and order 
situation adversely affected the already declining GDP growth rate. It was a period of 
institutional degradation as political instability, corruption and the law and order situation 
worsened. To finance their rising unproductive expenditures, successive governments chose 
to reduce development expenditure which reduced from an average of 7.4 per cent of GDP in 
1973-77 (Bhutto regime) to only 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1997-2000 (last Nawaz Sharif 
Regime). As the GDP growth rates declined—from 6.3 percent in 1980s to 4.2 percent in 
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1990s—employment growth rate also remained at low levels. A study in 1987 had already 
argued that in the decade of 1990s, Pakistan would be unable to sustain the high GDP growth 
rate of the preceding 3 decades due to structural constraints originating from infrastructure 
deterioration, slow export growth and low rate of savings (Hussain, 1988). Problems of 
employment aggravated, growth rate of labour productivity fell and real wages in both 
agriculture and industry declined in the 1990s. An NHDR/PIDE (2001) survey reveals that 
slower economic growth rates combined with declining employment elasticities and real 
wages during the 1990s had important consequences for poverty aggravation. Increasing 
number of families working in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, were pushed into 
poverty as “second family members of households on the margin of poverty could not get 
adequate wage employment” (Hussain, 2003:46). Inequality levels also rose as Pakistan’s 
Gini coefficient increased from 26.85 in 1992-93 to 30.19 in 1998-99 (Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, 2001). 
 
In 1999, Pakistan again came under a military regime when General Pervez 
Musharraf staged the 4th military coup in Pakistan’s history. It was a politically stable period 
mainly due to the fact that Musharraf was not only the head of the state but also the de facto 
head of the government. While this period has been lauded internationally for its 
extraordinary performance in the macroeconomic sphere, income disparities across different 
segments of the population and regions continued to widen. Domestic critics attribute the 
macro-economic success to debt rescheduling done in the last years of the Nawaz Sharif 
regime, increased remittances after 9/11, and the increased aid flows Pakistan received by 
being a front line partner in the international war against terror (Naseem, 2008).  
 
This section attempted to shed light on the trends of increasing poverty, inequality and 
tendency for loan dependence in Pakistan in a historical context. Throughout its history, 
Pakistan’s main motive of adopting adjustment programmes has been to obtain short term 
foreign liquidity by the IFIs and other donors and “not for the desire for longer term structural 
change” (Hussain, 1999:9). Moreover, Hussain (2003) concludes that economic policies 
initiated in the Ayub regime (1960s) induced vast social and regional disparities for the rest 
of Pakistan’s history. Structural constraints and institutional degradation continued as 
successive governments engaged in resource allocation based on political patronage instead 
of economic efficiency. Rising budget deficits that rose from the Bhutto regime increased 
even more during the Zia regime as state funds were allocated for unproductive political 
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activities instead of investing them in human capital or institutional upgrading. Hence 
irresponsible governance accentuated the already existing poverty, inequality and 
employment issues.   
 
Easterly (2001) demonstrates that over the years Pakistan grew much more than other 
countries that shared its initial level of income, but achieved more or less the same amount of 
social progress or even less. The study also compares countries that grew at the same rate as 
Pakistan regardless of the initial income levels and concludes that other moderately growing 
countries achieved higher rates of social progress than Pakistan which had higher levels of 
growth than them. While Pakistan’s case demonstrates how per capita income growth is 
possible even when it is not accompanied by human capital accumulation (as measured by 
enrolment and educational attainment statistics) on the other hand, it also highlights how 
economic growth cannot always be associated with social and institutional progress (Easterly, 
1999 & 2001; Pritchett, 1999; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). Currently the country is 
experiencing a multi-faceted crisis with economic and financial dimensions coupled with 
deploring human conditions. This has been exacerbated by its status as a front line state in the 
so called war against terror and frequent natural disasters such as the floods of July 2010. 
This section has demonstrated how the absence of far sighted economic management 
policies, lack of domestic ownership and capacity, political instability, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, regional inequalities, budget misallocations away from productive 
development projects and towards non productive projects have jointly contributed towards 
the failure of various well intentioned government and donor led development programs. 
Moreover, when regional disparities combine with political and ethnic issues they aggravate 
political and social instabilities even more (Burki et al, 2010). In this context, there is an 
immediate requirement of re-evaluating Pakistan’s growth strategy that also takes into 
account spatial dimensions of development and focuses on the strengthening of institutions 
(Haque, 2006).  
 
4. Growth, Distribution and Space 
This section establishes the place of this dissertation in the current literature on regional 
economic inequalities (Chapters 2 and 3) and convergence (Chapter 4), and presents the 
issues which form its foundation.  
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4.1 How does income inequality affect economic growth? 
On a theoretical level the relationship between inequality and growth is ambiguous hence the 
actual impact of inequality on growth has always remained an empirical question. The 
‘classical’ economic approach asserts that inequality enhances incentives for increased 
efficiency, growth and capital accumulation in various ways. For example since different 
classes in a society have different propensities to save, inequality in income distribution may 
increase the rate of savings and capital accumulation leading to accelerated growth (Kuznets, 
1955; Kaldor, 1956). Moreover, inequalities may signal opportunities to people to improve 
their position in the income distribution by taking risks and innovating in their 
entrepreneurial activities (Siebert, 1998; Bell and Freeman, 2001). Wider income inequalities 
can be helpful in the sense that they may signal strong incentives to work effort, innovation 
and skill development. Hence very low levels of income inequality may actually weaken the 
incentive to invest in human capital, and thereby adversely affect economic growth prospects 
(ILO, 2008). 
However relatively recent research has demonstrated that inequalities are actually detrimental 
for economic growth through various channels (Leoni and Pollan, 2003; Canadas, 2008): 
1. Unequal distribution of income leads to a pressure for redistribution through 
distortionary taxes which in turn reduce growth (Knowles, 2001). 
2. Rising inequalities increase fertility levels which can negatively influence human 
capital investments and eventually growth (Knowles, 2001). 
3. Usually the poor entirely depend on their initial wealth to undertake important 
investments, and due to imperfections in the credit and insurance markets they may be 
unable to invest in profitable projects (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 
1993; Aghion et al, 1999; Levine, 2004). Imperfections in the capital markets also 
reduce investments in human capital thereby reducing growth (Knowles, 2001).  
4. In polarized societies, the rich may influence economic policies in their favour 
neglecting the middle and lower income groups. This rent seeking often distorts 
resource allocation in an economy and not only threatens growth but also a society’s 
social cohesion and political fabric.  (Leon, 2007; Grossman, 2003; Easterly, 2001; 
Barro, 2000; Benabou, 1996; Alisina and Rodrick, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; 
Perotti, 1993; Bertola, 1993). 
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5. Inequality and corruption are highly interrelated as unequal distribution of wealth and 
income creates incentives for certain high-income groups to intervene in the political 
process and democratic governance (You and Khagram, 2005).  High degrees of 
inequality provide richer groups with sufficient resources to offer bribes even to the 
highest ranking officials in the government. In this context it has been noted that the 
cost for richer individuals not bribing is much higher in societies with high levels of 
inequalities as compared to the more equal ones. This is because a competition 
merges within the rich class of who is able to bribe more to successfully evade taxes 
and avoid those actions that may be harmful to their personal businesses (Glasear, 
Scheinkmann and Shleifer, 2003). When political power arises from excessively large 
income and wealth inequalities, it enables the rich to protect their interests via anti-
competitive measures (such as receiving licenses for monopolies) by exercising their 
political influence on economic policies. Such mismanagement not only leads to 
inflation inducing distortions and prevents the introduction of new technology; they 
also reduce consumer welfare and eventually economic growth (Scarpetta and 
Tressel, 2002). 
6. Wealthy households have a combined adverse effect on the allocation of public 
resources. It has been noted that wealth decreases the opportunity cost of lobbying 
and increases the chance that like-minded people will get together and influence 
government activity (Zhang, 2008). For instance the wealthier elite lobbies often 
divert public spending away from education. When public spending on tertiary 
education is higher than on primary or secondary education, children from poorer 
households have lesser chances of obtaining secondary education which is a pre 
requisite to university education. It has also been noted that the richer segments of the 
society obtain public contracts for construction for their own companies or influence 
public expenditure by granting subsidies to specific industries or goods which they 
deal with or consume (ILO, 2008). 
7. Differences in distribution of income and public goods, and opportunities related to 
education, distribution of land and assets, and political influence imply a narrow set of 
opportunities in society which decreases the productivity of resources (Bourguignon, 
Ferreira, and Menedez, 2003; Ferreira, 2001; Sen, 1992). Such inequalities can also 
lead to increased political/ social conflict, crime and other illegal activities that 
prevent investment and weaken property rights. If inequalities are very high, the poor 
may attempt to engage in riots and revolutions threatening the stability of political and 
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government institutions (Rodriguez, 2000; Banergee and Duflo, 2000; Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996). Resources are wasted as the poorer 
segments of a society engage in riots instead of devoting their energies to productive 
activities (Canadas, 2008).  
8. Inequalities negatively influence social capital such as civil society networks that 
facilitate contracts and help in maintaining social stability (Caramuta, 2005; Nan, 
2000; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Kawachi et al, 1997). 
 
Moreover, income inequality can have different effects in the short and long run, and on 
urban and rural areas (Partridge, 2005; Forbes, 2000). For the case of the U.S. a positive 
relationship has been estimated between inequality and growth in the urban areas, while the 
contrary has been found for rural areas. Fallah and Partridge (2006) shows that this 
relationship is different for urban and rural areas because factors such as agglomeration 
economies and labour specialization intensify market rewards and attract more skilled labour 
and generate growth in cities. However in rural areas greater income inequality weakens 
social cohesion due to lack of anonymity and in turn economic growth (Canadas, 2008; 
Fallah and Partridge, 2006). 
All in all it has been widely accepted that reducing income inequality can foster long 
term economic growth by enabling more individuals to participate in an economy to their 
maximum potential. More equal societies provide wider employment opportunities, increased 
access to borrowing, greater product consumption and an investor friendly environment 
(Gehring and Kulkarni, 2006).  
4.2 How do human capital inequalities affect economic growth? 
A separate branch in economic literature highlights the role of human capital in explaining 
the relationship between inequality and economic growth. Various studies have demonstrated 
that in most parts of the world the process of local growth is heterogeneous (see Paci and 
Usai, 1999, 2000; 2001; Castella and Domanech, 2002 for case studies on Italy). Although 
not seen as crucial, the role of human capital is important since the distribution of income is 
mainly driven by the distribution of human capital across or within countries. Golmm and 
Ravikuman (1992), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) or Galor and Tsiddon (1997) are among 
those few who present models in which the sources of inequality are driven by inequalities in 
human capital distribution. There exists a dyadic relation between human capital 
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accumulation and inequality with both affecting each other. It has also shown that human 
capital inequality negatively affects economic growth rates not only through inefficient 
resource allocation but also through reduced investment rates (Bird-Sal and Londono, 1997; 
Lopez et al. 1998).  
Since policy makers have realized the importance of distribution of human capital and 
its externalities, the creation and distribution of these benefits calls for increased assistance at 
the regional level. Lucas (1988), Nijkamo and Poot (1998), Martin and Sunley (1998) have 
emphasized the importance of human capital in fostering regional growth. Human capital 
investment (expenditures) in health, education and training have all been acknowledged as 
generating externalities that increase the quantity and quality of regional labour force. 
However, this empirical work on public investments in human capital often overlooks spatial 
interaction among regions. Most regions are highly interconnected through family networks, 
transport, trade, migration and regional labour markets. They often exhibit a high degree of 
interaction due to which unemployment and other human capital issues may be highly 
spatially correlated (Molho, 1995; Acemoglu, 2001)2.  
It is also being argued that human capital levels are diverging (Berry and Glaeser, 
2005) and its concentration is likely to continue to occur in certain regions only (Florida, 
2002a, Berry and Glaeser, 2005). Proximity and distance play an important role in inequality 
literature because it has been noted that countries with a lower market access may also have 
lower education levels. As a result some authors have shown that the already peripheral 
countries in the world may continue to become remote over time (see Redding and Schott, 
2003).These results indicate that policies aimed at increasing growth should focus not only on 
education but also on region wise distribution of human capital enhancing infrastructure and 
institutions that can cater to a larger section of the population.  
4.3 Economic growth, income and human capital inequalities in the light of New 
Economic Geography literature 
Although the new endogenous growth theory emphasizes the role of knowledge spillovers in 
macroeconomic growth, it tends to neglect the regional dimension. Recent evidence suggests 
that knowledge spillovers tend to be spatially bounded or localized. It has been shown that 
regions are not isolated but are a part of a core-periphery system. Disregarding of interactions 
                                                        
2 See Zhang et. al. (2006) and Karlson and Haynes (2002) for a review of spatial perspectives on regional labour 
markets. 
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between individual regions in the system can lead to an adverse impact of regional policies 
(Baldwin et al, 2003 and Midelfart et al, 2004)3. Therefore, economists have turned their 
attention towards the so-called new economic geography and spatial patterns of inequality 
and the dynamics of geographic income disparities have come back under the lime light 
(Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al, 1999; Krugman and Venebles, 1995; Ottaviano and Puga, 
1998; Puga and Venebles, 1997, 1999; Darlauf and Quah 1999; The World Bank—World 
Development Report, 2009). The acceptance of new economic geography and agglomeration 
is represented by the application of mechanisms such as clusters, innovation networks, 
knowledge externalities and other similar spillovers (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Moulaert 
and Sekia, 2003; Henry and Pinch, 2006). This according to some authors has stimulated a 
new wave of so-called ‘third wave’ regional industrial policies (Benneworth and Hospers 
2006; Larosse, 2004; Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999) which aim to promote knowledge based 
growth through regional technology exchange and innovation policies (Hospers, 2006; 
Charles, 2003; Lagendijk and Hassink, 2001).  
With this increased interest on regional development issues and enhancement of spatial 
data, empirical analysis the use of spatial econometric techniques has also gained popularity 
(Arbia, 2006). Studies such as Quah (1996) and Moreno and Trehan (1997) have 
demonstrated how geographical spillovers and physical location are just as important as other 
macroeconomic factors in growth studies. Spatial externalities model social interaction that 
introduces dependence among the agents of a social system (Anselin, 2003a; Arbia, 2006). 
Among the various kinds of spatial externalities, international and regional level studies have 
confirmed the existence of a positive spatial correlation between knowledge spillovers of 
human capital, Research and Development, and other types of training activities and 
economic growth (Feldman, 1994; Anselin et al, 1997). Further more from the findings of 
Nelson and Phelps (1966) to Benhabib and Spiegal (1994), studies have shown that 
economies located closer to a technology leader benefit more and grow faster4. Recent results 
have also revealed that human capital has a positive and a significant effect on total factor 
productivity growth when interacted with the distance to the technology leader usually 
measured in terms of income per capita (Pede, Florax and L.F de Groot, 2006). This is 
because technology is also spatially bounded, and is not completely exogenous and freely 
                                                        
3 For surveys on the effectiveness of regional policy see: Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) and Ederveen et al 
(2002) 
4 Other studies that examine the links between human capital, development and growth include Bils and Klenow 
(2000) and Mankiw et. al (1992). 
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available in a region (Lawson and Lorenz, 1999; Jaffe et al, 1993). The application of spatial 
econometric methods to study regional convergence has also demonstrated how previous 
studies were incomplete without taking spatial interdependence between regions into account 
(Fingleton and Lopez-Bazo, 2006; Rey and Montouri, 1999). 
 
5. Objectives and Research questions 
This dissertation was motivated by the need for an analysis on the spatial aspects of 
income and human capital inequalities at lower geographic aggregation levels in Pakistan.  
As it will be demonstrated in the literature reviews of the upcoming chapters, with the 
exception of a few, most existing studies on earnings/income inequality and regional growth 
in Pakistan have not explicitly considered spatial analysis. In the light of the recent 
development in the fields of spatial econometrics and new economic geography, the overall 
objective of this dissertation is to re-examine previous findings on regional convergence and 
economic inequalities particularly those associated with the returns to human capital across 
Pakistan by employing standard econometric and spatial econometric techniques.  
Specifically, this dissertation attempts to address the following main research questions 
which also constitute the basis of the research carried out for it: 
1. To what extent does education explain changes in earnings inequality? 
2. How have the dynamics of earnings inequality changed in the last two decades? 
3. Can spatial clustering of income and average education levels explain inequality in 
income and education attainment across Pakistani districts? 
4. Has regional income converged across Pakistani districts? 
 
6. Outline of the study 
This dissertation consists of three main substantive chapters broadly based on the themes of 
returns to human capital and earnings inequality, spatial analysis of inequalities in income 
and human development conditions, and regional convergence of per capita income across 
Pakistani districts. 
Specifically, the overall aim of Chapter 2 is to analyze how changes in earnings 
inequality in Pakistan can be attributed to changes in education levels and the returns to it. In 
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order to do this it first studies the dynamics of earnings inequality between 1993 and 2006 by 
calculating, comparing and decomposing some General Entropy Indices and Gini coefficient 
of earnings inequality within and across the provinces. It extends this analysis by 
complementing it with regression based approach to analyzing inequality decomposition. 
Moreover, since differences in gender play a vital role in labour force participation, labour 
supply, and wages, it takes into account the role of gender differences among returns to 
individual characteristics by investigating earnings inequalities due to gender differences. 
Finally, it identifies the contribution of changes in the structure of earnings and socio-
demographic characteristics to earnings inequality in Pakistan using counterfactual analysis, 
and highlights the effect of unequal human capital characteristics of individuals on their 
earnings over time. One of the empirical findings of this chapter is that of rising income 
inequality within provinces. This finding led towards a deeper investigation of convergence, 
income, earnings and human capital inequalities at a geographic aggregation level lower than 
the commonly used provinces i.e. districts. District level analysis is beneficial because it 
allows for a better exploitation of the geographical characteristics of socio-economic data, 
and a deeper analysis of the spatial effects such as regional spillovers and spatial regimes. 
With this finding the dissertation shifts its focus towards carrying out a spatial analysis of the 
evolution of income inequalities and varying human development levels across 98 Pakistani 
districts. 
Chapter 3 therefore investigates whether spatial clustering of income and average 
education levels can explain the distribution of income and education across Pakistani 
districts. By employing exploratory spatial data analysis techniques it describes and illustrates 
spatial distributions and identifies spatial outliers of human development levels in Pakistani 
districts in general and district wise differences in income and average education attainment 
levels in particular. One of the main findings of this chapter is that the distribution of district 
wise income inequality and education levels does indeed exhibit a significant tendency for 
similar levels of inequality in income and education levels to cluster. The detection of 
significant spatial effects implies that districts should not be viewed as independent 
observations as commonly done in regression analysis, and calls for the utilization of spatial 
econometric techniques that explicitly model this fact.  
In the light of the above mentioned findings from Chapter 2 and 3, Chapter 4 
investigates for the first time regional convergence (absolute and conditional) of per capita 
income across Pakistani districts between 1998 and 2005 using spatial and non-spatial 
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techniques. Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation. It summarizes its main findings, discusses 
its limitations and possible future extensions to it, and presents policy recommendations that 
emerge from this dissertation in a political economy context. 
In summary, this dissertation contributes to the literature and policy debate on 
economic inequalities, convergence and growth in emerging market economies. As it will be 
demonstrated in the literature review sections of Chapter 2 and 3, there is dearth of literature 
on inequality and growth in Pakistan that takes spatial phenomena such as agglomerations 
and regional spillovers into account. Therefore the goal of this dissertation is to reconsider 
existing research on inequalities and growth in Pakistan by taking spatial effects explicitly 
into account. Its empirical findings contribute to policy debate on economic inequalities, 
convergence and growth in South Asia, and  in particular to district level research in Pakistan 
by applying counter factual regression analysis and spatial econometric techniques for the 
first time to Pakistani data. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1. Comparative Real GDP Growth Rates (%) 
 
Region/Country 2000-
01 
2001-
02 
2002-
03 
2003-
04 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
          
World GDP 4.7 2.3 3 4 5.3 4.9 5.4 4.9 -1.3 
Euro Area 3.5 1.4 0.8 0.5 2 1.4 2.6 2.6 -4.2 
United States 3.8 0.3 2.4 3 3.9 3.2 3.3 2.2 -2.8 
China 8 7.3 8 9.3 9.5 9.9 10.7 11.4 10.7 
 
South Asia          
India 5.4 4.2 4.4 7.5 7.3 9.2 9.2 9.2 4.5 
Bangladesh 5.9 5.3 4.4 5.4 5.4 6.3 6.7 5.6 5 
Sri Lanka 6 -1.4 3.7 5.9 5.2 6 7.5 6.3 2.2 
Pakistan 2.2 3.4 5.1 6.4 9 5.8 6.8 4.1 2.4 
Source: World Economic Outlook & World Development Report (Various Issues) 
 
 
 
Table 2. Estimated Loss To Economy from Terrorism (2005-2009) 
 
Rs billion 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 Total 
(2005-10) 
Direct Costs 67 78 83 109 114 262 712 
Indirect Costs 192 223 278 376 564 707 2,304 
Total  259 301 361 484 678 969 3,052 
In US $ bn 4.4 5.0 6.0 7.7 8.6 11.5 43.0 
Source: Finance Division, Government of Pakistan   (2009)                                                     *: July-April                                           
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Human Development Index (1980-2010) 
 
Year Pakistan South Asia World 
1980 0.311 0.315 0.455 
1990 0.359 0.387 0.526 
2000 0.440 0.440 0.57 
2005 0.460 0.481 0.598 
2008 0.484 0.504 0.619 
2010 0.490 0.516 0.624 
Source: World Bank, World Development Reports (2002, 2010)  
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Table 4. Comparative Education Statistics 
 
Country Adult Literacy Rate (%)  Expected Years of Schooling 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 
China 65.5 77.8 90.9 94.2 8.3 8.9 9.7 11.4 
India 40.8 48.2 61 68.3 6.3 7.8 8.4 10.3 
Sri Lanka 86.8 86.8 90.7 90.8 9.9 11.2 -- 12 
Bangladesh 29.2 35.3 47.5 56.5 4.4 5 7 8.1 
Nepal 20.6 33 48.6 60.3 4 7.3 9 9.6 
Pakistan 25.7 25.7 42.7 54.2 3.2 4 5.3 6.8 
 
Note: Adult Literacy Rate (both sexes) is the percentage of people 15 years and above who can read 
and write simple statements with understanding. 
 
Source: World Development Report (2002, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Growth and Income Distribution in Pakistan 
Period Growth (%) Income Distribution 
1960s 6.8 Improved 
1970s 4.8 Worsened 
1980s 6.5 Slightly Improved 
1990s 4.6 Worsened 
2000s 5.6 Worsened 
Source: Zakir and Idrees (2009) 
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 Figure 1. Economic Growth in South Asian Countries—A Comparison 
 
  
 
 
Source: World Development Report (various issues) 
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Figure 2. Investment to GDP Ratio (1960-2010) 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (various issues) 
 
Figure 3. Targeted versus Actual Economic Growth 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan (various Issues) 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
A
s %
 o
f G
D
P
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
Re
al
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
Targeted Actual
32 
 
Table 6.  Overall Infrastructure Quality 
Country Rank 
Indonesia 96 
India 89 
China 66 
Pakistan 87 
Thailand 41 
Korea 20 
Taiwan 19 
Malaysia 27 
Hong Kong 3 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report (2010) 
 
Table 7. Pakistan: State of Governance 
Indicators  World Ranking  
out of 102 Countries 
Judicial Independence  77/102 
Property Rights  71/102 
Favouritism in decisions of government 
officials  
52/102 
Irregular payments in tax collection  77/102 
Corruption  77/102 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report (2010) 
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Table 8.  Transport Infrastructure Quality (Rank out of 125 countries) 
 
 Railways Road Air 
Pakistan 51 65 76 
India 20 89 65 
Indonesia 60 94 68 
Thailand 52 35 26 
Malaysia 19 24 27 
China 27 50 80 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report (2010) 
 
 
Table 9.  Consumption Inequalities across South Asia (Gini Coefficient) 
Year Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka South Asia 
1980-84 25.9 31.4 30 32 27.6 30.84 
1985-89 28.8 31.5 - 22.2 35.8 31.46 
1990-94 28.2 31.7 - 31.2 30.1 31.27 
1995-99 33.5 37.8 36.66 32.99 34.4 36.86 
2000-04 31.7 36 47.2 30.6 33.2 35.16 
Source: Wagle (2008) 
 
 
Table 10. Property Rights, markets and Technology (out of 139 countries) 
 Property 
Rights 
Corruption Education & 
Training 
Labour 
Market 
Efficiency 
Technology 
Readiness 
Malaysia 37 44 49 35 40 
Thailand 87 71 59 24 68 
China 43 47 60 38 78 
Indonesia 74 65 66 84 91 
India 61 80 85 92 86 
Pakistan 99 108 123 131 109 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report  (2011) 
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Chapter 2 
 
Can Education Explain Changes in Earnings Inequality? 
Decomposition of Earnings Inequality in Pakistan (1993-2006) 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the evolution of earnings income distribution in Pakistan between 
1993 and 2006. In particular it identifies the contributions of changes in the structure of 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics on earnings inequality in Pakistan. In order 
to do so it employs a number of statistical and econometric inequality decomposition 
techniques. First, it analyzes the dynamics of earnings inequality by calculating, comparing 
and decomposing some General Entropy Indices and Gini coefficient of earnings inequality 
within and across provinces, and over time. This descriptive analysis is complemented with a 
regression based approach to inequality decomposition in order to identify the effect of 
changes in human capital characteristics on earnings inequality. The decomposition 
demonstrates the effect of unequal human capital characteristics of individuals on their 
earnings over time in Pakistan5. 
The main empirical findings from this study reveal that the returns to education are 
convex in Pakistan, and are higher for females as compared to males. Moreover, it has been 
shown that earnings inequality has consistently remained higher within provinces as 
compared to inequality between them. Finally, this study demonstrates that females in general 
and rural females in particular are most sensitive to policies that can affect earnings 
inequality and labour market outcomes in Pakistan. 
 
 
Keywords: Inequality, education, decomposition, counter-factual analysis 
 
                                                        
5 Acknowledgments: I’m thankful to Dr. Richard Pomfret (University of Adelaide), and Dr. Vaqar Ahmed 
(Ministry of Planning and Development, Pakistan) for their invaluable comments and suggestions. I am also 
indebted to Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) and Rabia Awan at the Federal Bureau of 
Statistics (Government of Pakistan, Islamabad) for their data support. I also thank the participants in the seminar 
series session held at the Planning Commission, Islamabad (May 2011) for their comments on the working 
paper version of this chapter. 
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1.  Introduction 
The process of economic development in a country is characterized by changes in the nature 
of its economic activities, individual economic behaviour, and its distribution of income. 
While these structural changes experienced by economies are similar in nature, the 
“combination, sequence, and the timing of (these) changes...are always unique and 
unprecedented” (Bourguignon et al, 2005: 1). The empirical results from a recent study on 
the microeconomics of income distribution for six emerging economies in Latin America and 
East Asia reveals that all the economies experienced similar socio-economic and 
demographic changes during their development process but the evolution of inequality in 
them followed very different patterns (Bourguignon et al, 2005)6. The motivation for this 
chapter comes from this finding, in order to investigate the evolution of income distribution 
of wage earners in Pakistan between 1993 and 2006—a period characterised by 
macroeconomic reforms and a decent average GDP growth rate. Specifically it addresses the 
question of how have changing human capital characteristics and the returns to them, 
contributed towards the changing dynamics of income distribution. 
Wage earners instead of the total working population have been selected in particular 
because during the period which this chapter focuses on, earnings inequality rose by 34 
percent as the proportion of wage earners increased from 40 to 62 percent and for the first 
time began to dominate the overall inequality pattern amongst the total employed population 
in Pakistan7. Moreover while in 1993, 51 percent of the Gini coefficient of earnings 
inequality could be explained by differences in the levels of education amongst wage earners, 
in 2006 it raised to almost 62 percent of the Gini coefficient. Altogether differences in 
education levels explain nearly a quarter (22 percent) of the total increase in earnings 
inequality between 1993 and 2006. In this chapter, I argue that a large portion of this 
observed change in earnings inequality can be attributed to changes in education and the 
returns to it. In this way, policies seeking to reduce the overall income inequality in Pakistan 
will have to focus more on achieving greater equality in the earnings of paid employees.  
Recent literature on income inequality has shown that three fundamental forces are 
responsible for changing income distribution dynamics: 
                                                        
6 They all experienced an increase in “the average years of schooling, the share of urban population, and the 
participation of women in the labour force...while the average household size fell” (Bourguignon et al, 2005:5). 
7  Total employed population refers to self employed and wage employed in the formal sector. Earnings 
inequality in this chapter refers to inequality amongst wage earners only. 
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i) Labour-choice effect: the effect of changes in the probabilities of participation and 
occupational choice decisions. 
ii) Price effect: the changes in the returns to population characteristics8. 
iii) Population effect: the effect of changing population characteristics (Bourguignon 
et al 2005)9. 
Keeping this in view, this chapter utilizes a regression based decomposition analysis similar 
to that used in Bourguignon et al (2005) to identify the contributions of changes in the 
structure of socio-economic and demographic characteristics on earnings inequality in 
Pakistan by simulating the effect on the distribution of earnings of the observed changes in 
structure of and returns to human capital characteristics. This allows us to investigate the 
effect of unequal human capital characteristics of individuals on their earnings over time 
across Pakistan.  
Considering the fact that 1 in 10 of the world’s out of school children is now a 
Pakistani (Pakistan Ministry of Education, 2011), an influx of young workers into the labour 
force implies a bourgeoning unskilled labour force of Pakistan. In this context, the results on 
earnings inequality from this chapter have important implications for Pakistan’s labour and 
education policies, both of which require government attention on an emergency basis. The 
chapter begins with a literature review which forms the basis for this chapter and that 
highlights why is there a need for studies that combine literatures on returns to human capital 
characteristics and income inequality in Pakistan in Section 2. It is followed by a political 
economy analysis of education in Pakistan in Section 3 to brief the reader about the 
inequalities and quality of education in Pakistan since it influences the interpretation of the 
empirical results. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology that have been utilized in this 
chapter. It elaborates the statistical and econometric techniques—inequality measures and 
Mincerian Earnings Function (MEF)—that have been utilized as the basis for the micro-
econometric decomposition exercise using counterfactuals. Section 5 presents and examines 
the empirical results obtained from the analysis of static and partial decompositions of 
earnings inequality, and the regression estimates obtained from MEFs. It discusses the 
evolution of earnings inequality, and demographic and labour force characteristics in Pakistan 
between 1993 and 2006. It also provides the most recent estimates for returns to different 
                                                        
8 Population characteristics in this chapter are considered as human capital characteristics such as education and 
experience. 
9 It measures the changes in the distribution of age, gender, ethnicity, and location. 
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education levels (by gender and region) and gender wage gap in Pakistan. Section 6 
concludes the chapter and discusses the policy implications of the results obtained in Section 
5.   
 
2. Literature Review 
Although intra-country income inequality and the human capital model have been two 
popular research fields for Pakistan, very few studies have actually examined the impact of 
changing returns to human capital characteristics on the increasing income inequality over the 
years. This section first highlights the two separate literatures on income inequality and 
returns to human capital in Pakistan, and then builds a case for a need to study how the two 
phenomena affect each other10. 
A wide range of literature has investigated the private economic returns to education 
for different countries worldwide (e.g. see Pscacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos, 2004; Li, 2003 for China; Kingdon and Unni, 2001 for India) by applying the 
human capital model developed by Becker (1964) and enhanced by Mincer (1974)11. Most 
estimates for the Mincerian Earnings Function (MEF) for Pakistan however are outdated 
(Shabbir, 1994; Ashraf and Ashraf, 1993a, 1993b; Nasir, 1998; Siddiqui and Siddiqui, 1998; 
Nasir, 1999; Nasir and Nazli, 2000). The more recent studies have complemented their 
Mincerian estimates with a gender disaggregated analysis of earnings or occupational choice 
decisions of wage earners in Pakistan (Jamal et al, 2003; Nasir, 2002; Hyder, 2007; Abass 
and Peck, 2007). Another category of studies has examined the returns to education using not 
just the standard OLS analysis, but also by applying the Heckman procedure to deal with 
sample selectivity issues (Ahmed, 2005; Hyder, 2007; Aslam, 2007; Aslam, 2009; Abass and 
Peck, 2007), 2SLS estimates as instrumental variables to deal with measurement errors and 
endogeneity (Abass and Peck 2007; Aslam 2007), and household fixed effects estimation to 
“control for unobserved family-specific heterogeneity” (Aslam 2007). Moreover, with the 
exception of Jamal et al (2003) and Khan and Toor (2003) most MEF estimates on Pakistan 
are static estimates of the rate of return to education in one particular year and hence neglect 
                                                        
10 Human capital is a multifaceted concept which comprises various types of investments in people. Although 
the choice of human capital proxy selection is a controversial topic, usually education related measures have 
been considered as closest proxies if not direct measures of human capital. This chapter refers to education & 
experience related measures when it uses the term human capital. 
11 The semi-logarithmic approach (or its modified version) is used in which the natural logarithm of monthly 
earnings is a linear function of experience, its square and completed years of schooling (or levels of schooling in 
the modified version). 
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the dynamics of increasing earnings income inequality (for example,  Hyder, 2007; Aslam, 
2007; Abbas and Peck, 2007). Several findings have consistently emerged from the above 
mentioned studies on the MEF for Pakistan. First, returns to education in Pakistan are low as 
compared to other developing countries. Second, education emerges as a productivity 
enhancing mechanism rather than a screening mechanism. Third, the returns to education 
increase with the level of education indicating a convex earnings function for Pakistan12. 
Moreover, although females have a significantly higher economic incentive to invest in 
education since they experience higher returns to education than males, the total earnings for 
males continue to be much higher than that of females suggesting the existence of possible 
gender discrimination. It should be noted here that these conclusions mainly emerge from 
studies that analyse the returns to education for workers in the non-agricultural wage 
employment since their incomes are most sensitive to changes in their educational 
qualifications (Aslam, 2007).  
With regards to research on income inequality in Pakistan, most studies have utilized 
General Entropy measures and the Gini coefficient to estimate income inequality, while 
taking the household as a unit of measurement (Ahmad and Ludlow, 1989; Jafri and Khattak, 
1995; World Bank, 2003; Anwar, 2003). Moreover, with the exception of a few studies like 
Idrees (2006) and Idress and Zakir (2009), the relatively recent studies on economic 
inequalities in Pakistan have analysed consumption expenditures instead of income as a 
measure for economic inequality (Haq, 1998; Jamal, 2003; Anwar, 2003). The overall 
conclusion from studies on the incidence of income inequality is that income inequality per 
capita household has: exhibited fluctuating trends between 1964 and 1987, gradually been 
rising since 1987, consistently remained higher in urban areas, and has been more severe than 
consumption inequalities in Pakistan (Idrees, 2006; Idress and Zakir, 2009).  
However since 1993, the employment scene has considerably changed from being 
dominated by the non wage sector towards an expansion of the wage employment sector 
making the waged work force the largest part of the total employed work force today. This 
can be attributed to the changing structure of the economy, the increasing size of the services 
sector in Pakistan, occupational move from the agriculture labour force to non-farm wage 
employment, and the increased demand for educated labour, and the rural-urban migration (in 
particular the drift of rural youth towards urban areas) which have further increased pressure 
                                                        
12 Convex returns to education means that higher levels of education have higher returns to education as 
compared to the lower levels of education.  
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on the expansion of urban social services and labour market. Hence, as earnings from 
employed individuals increasingly constitute a major part of the total household income in 
Pakistan (particularly in the urban regions), the overall pattern of household income 
inequality is increasingly being dominated by earnings income inequality amongst wage 
earners. This calls for a deeper investigation on the effects of changing socio-economic 
characteristics of Pakistani labour force on its income inequality. In order to do so this 
chapter applies the regression based inequality decomposition technique for the first time to 
Pakistani micro data to explicitly examine the highly connected phenomena of changing 
returns to human capital characteristics together with the increasing earnings inequality.  
Different methods have been developed to decompose income inequality by 
subgroups, income sources, causal factors, and by socio-demographic characteristics (see 
Pyatt 1976; Sharrocks, 1980, 1982, and 1983; Feilds, 2000, 2003; Mourduch and Sicular 
2002; Bourguignon et al 2005). In the context of Pakistan, Adams and Alderman (1992) has 
performed an inequality decomposition analysis but it is limited to a few districts in rural 
Pakistan, Nasir and Mahmood (1998) have examined the earnings inequality in Pakistan 
caused by the changes in the returns to education using the HIES data from 1993-94, while 
Idrees (2006) has decomposed earnings inequality using the General Entropy measures and 
the Gini coefficient by levels of education, region, provinces, gender and occupation. As 
demonstrated by this discussion of literature, a limited amount of economic research on 
Pakistan has investigated the changes in earnings inequality caused by microeconomic 
factors. This study attempts to fill this void by carrying out an analysis of earnings income 
inequality in Pakistan using both descriptive and regression based approaches to inequality 
decomposition and investigates the effect of the changing returns to human capital on 
earnings inequality in particular.  
 
3. The Political Economy of Education in Pakistan 
Education has remained an extremely neglected sector in Pakistan. Despite acknowledging it 
as one of the most important poverty alleviating measures, the government has not been 
successful in improving the consistently low net enrolment rates. This can be mainly 
attributed to the low level of public spending on education which has remained between 1.7 
to 2.5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the past two decades. This level of 
investment in education is much less than 4 percent of the GDP, as prescribed by UNESCO 
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for developing countries. While in 1993, 2.4 percent of the total GDP was spent on education; 
in 2006 it declined to 2.1 percent of the GDP. In the fiscal year 2009-10, only 2 percent of the 
GDP was spent on education (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2009-2010). This is quite 
contradictory to the aims of the government expressed in the current Pakistan Education 
Policy (released in September 2009), which aims at steadily increasing the education 
spending to 7 percent of the GDP13.  
The education system in Pakistan is complex and is characterized by a mixture of public and 
private schools with highly diverse standards between and within themselves. Amongst the 
public schools, there exist the ‘standard’ public schools/ collages and ‘model’ public schools/ 
colleges, the latter having more sophisticated campuses, faculty, and curriculum. There is a 
similar situation amongst the private educational institutions which have shown a mushroom 
growth. While some cater to the elite population in the urban areas, the others target the 
middle incomed class. With the limited resources directed towards education by the 
government, the private sector is playing an increasingly important role in the delivery of 
educational services in the country. The sector has expanded from about 3,300 institutions in 
1983, to about 90,000 in 2009 and now caters to around 40 per cent of total enrolment. More 
than half of urban children go attend private educational institutions and in tertiary education 
alone, private sector universities account for 25 % of total enrolment (Planning Commission, 
2011; Pakistan Ministry of Education, 2011). There also exists a separate category of schools 
called ‘madressahs’ which are actually religious institutions. Since only a few established 
‘madressahs’ in the main cities teach English and Science, they are not considered to be a 
part of the formal education system14 (Khan and Toor, 2003; Jamal et al, 2003).  
Despite the above mentioned issues and, financial and institutional constraints, the 
overall education profile in terms of education attainment levels amongst individuals has 
improved since 1993. The total literacy rate has increased from 35 percent in 1993 to 53 
percent in 2006 and is currently estimated to be about 57 percent in 2010, but remains to be 
one of the lowest in the South Asia region. This improvement may be attributed to the 
expanded role of the private sector and media, infrastructure development, expansion of the 
Information Technology (IT) and mobile technologies sector, non-governmental educational 
projects regarding educational awareness, and rural-urban migration leading to greater 
                                                        
13Higher Education budgets and facilities are an exception, since they have received immense importance under 
the Higher Education reforms, inequalities still continue to prevail. 
14 The latest education census of Pakistan has documented all the major madressahs of Pakistan. 
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exposure to non-agricultural work. It should also be noted that this seemingly overall 
improvement in the education profile has been accompanied by increasing disparities 
between enrolment levels of girls and boys, and between urban and rural areas. Differences in 
provincial budgetary allocations, ethnic factors, cultural and social norms, and the recent 
internal displacement of the people (due to the war on terror) have further aggravated the 
existing educational disparities (Sarmad et al, 1988; Khan and Toor, 2003). 
Finally, although Pakistan aims to achieve the target of 100 percent primary school 
enrolment of girls and boys by 2015 (Millennium Development Goal, MDG no.2), its net 
primary enrolment rate in 2008 stood at only 66 percent for Pakistan15. At present the 
government is spending less than 1.5 percent of its total budget on schooling. It has also been 
noted that about 30,000 school buildings are in such a dangerous condition that they threaten 
the wellbeing of children, while almost 21,000 schools currently have no building what so 
ever. Analysts predict that unlike Bangladesh and India, Pakistan will not be able to achieve 
the MDG no. 2, as almost 1 in 10 of the World’s out of school children is now a Pakistani 
(Ministry of Education-Pakistan, 2011).  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data  
This study uses micro data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey for 1992-93 
and the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Survey for 2005-06, both of which are collected 
by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) of Pakistan.  The year 2006 was chosen, since the 
2005-06 was the latest micro data set when this chapter was being written. To analyse the 
temporal changes, I decided to go backwards at least by a decade to take into account the 
macro-economic reforms that characterise the 1990s , and found the micro data from the 
HIES (1992-93) to be  a large data set with the least amount of missing observations. Other 
reasons that makes this an interesting time period for analysis include the facts that Pakistan 
saw nine Prime Ministers change between 1992 and 2006, and that this period is also 
characterized by expansion of the private sector and information communication technologies 
(ICTs). 
                                                        
15 Latest UNESCO estimates for Pakistan obtained from: 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=eng&BR_Country
=5860 
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The HIES (1992-93) data set has a sample size of 14,594 households. It is a nationally 
representative survey with a sample frame covering all urban and rural areas of the four 
provinces of Pakistan defined by the 1981 Population Census excluding the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), military restricted areas and the districts of Kohistan, 
Chitral and Malakand in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP). The population of the excluded areas 
constitutes about 4 percent of the total population. 
The PSLM survey for 2005-06 provides district level welfare indicators for a sample 
size of about 15,453 households. It is annually produced by the FBS since 2004. It is the only 
socio-economic micro data that is representative at the provincial and at the district level. 
Moreover, the sample size of the district level data is also substantially larger than the 
provincial level data contained in micro data surveys such as Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES) of Pakistan and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of Pakistan. This 
enables researchers to draw socioeconomic information which is representative at lower 
administrative levels as well. The data is statistically comparable with the Pakistan Census 
Data (1998). It provides data on districts in all four provinces of Pakistan namely; Punjab, 
Sindh, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP), and Balochistan. The federally administered tribal areas 
(FATA region) along the Afghan border in the North West and Azad Kashmir are not 
included in the data. The PSLM is divided into two parts. The first part contains data on 
socio-economic characteristics such as education, health, population welfare, immunization, 
pre/post natal care, family planning, water supply, and sanitation, and the second part 
contains household income and expenditure data. Finally, this study has also utilized macro 
data provided in the Economic Survey of Pakistan and the Labour Force Survey of Pakistan 
for various years between 1990 and 2009.  
The analysis carried out in this chapter is confined to wage workers between the age 
of 15 and 65 with a positive income. For each year the earnings data was collected for the 
‘past one month’ from all those in the sample who could report it on a monthly basis. With 
this a sample of 9,070 employed waged workers between the ages of 15 and 65, has been 
analysed for the year 1992-93, and a sample of 14,463 employed waged workers between the 
ages of 15 and 65 has been analysed for the year 2005-06. All earnings data from 2006 was 
deflated with the Pakistani consumer price index (CPI) of 1993. Further details on variable 
specification along with their descriptive statistics have been provided in Table 2.  
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4.2 Methodology 
This chapter first analyzes the dynamics of earnings inequality between 1993 and 2006 by 
calculating, comparing, and decomposing some General Entropy Indices and the Gini 
coefficient of earnings inequality. The analysis is further disaggregated by population groups: 
region (urban and rural), gender, and levels of education to quantify how individual 
characteristics have affected inequality. However, such scalar indices limit the decomposition 
results to pure descriptive results because of their lack of control for endogeneity since there 
can be the case that the ‘variables used to explain existing inequality may themselves be 
partly determined by income patterns’ (Mourduch and Sicular, 2002: 94 )16.  
As a remedy, the descriptive analysis has been complemented with the regression 
based approach to inequality decomposition. A labour market model is estimated at two 
points in time (1993 and 2006) using the Mincerian Earnings Function (MEF). The MEF is 
first estimated using years of education as a continuous variable. However, since the return to 
education is not the same for each successive year of education, I have incorporated splines 
of education in the MEF to examine the additional earnings associated with each successive 
level of education. The estimations utilize the Standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
procedure. Moreover in order to take into account the role of gender differences among 
returns to individual characteristics and gender discrimination in the labour market, this 
chapter also investigates earnings inequalities due to gender differences by employing the 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition techniques. Finally, an empirical 
framework similar to that proposed in Bourguignon et al (2005) has been utilized to identify 
the contributions of changes in the structure of earnings and socio-demographic 
characteristics in Pakistan by simulating the effect on the distribution of earnings from the 
observed changes in: returns to education and the demographic structure.   
4.2.1 Inequality measures 
Inequality decomposition techniques can be broadly categorized into macro and micro 
economic approaches. The microeconomic techniques identify the contribution of changes in 
the characteristics of the groups under study (males and females, regions, levels of education, 
                                                        
16 For a further analysis of income inequality decomposition literature see Bourguignon et al (2005) and 
Heshmati (2004). 
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location etc) to the changes in inequality. A scalar measure is employed and decomposed 
into17:  
1) change in inequality due to changes in the relative mean income of various groups 
under study 
2) change in inequality due to changes in their shares in the total population 
3) change in inequality due to changes within those groups 
This study uses Gini coefficient, Pyatt’s decomposition of Gini coeffcient (1976), and the 
General Entropy measures to calculate the extent of earnings income inequality ‘between’ 
and ‘within’ the groups under study.  
The Gini coefficient is the most popular version of measuring inequality and ranges from 0 
(perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). It is derived from the Lorenz curve which sorts the 
population under study from the poorest to richest and displays the cumulative proportion of 
the population on the horizontal axis and the cumulative proportion of income on the vertical 
axis. Formally, assume ݔ௜ to be a point on the X-axis, and ݕ௜ to be a point on the Y-axis. 
Then: 
ܩ݅݊݅ = 1 −  ∑ (ݔ௜ −  ݔ௜ିଵ)( ݕ௜ +  ݕ௜ିଵ)ே௜ୀଵ                                                                              (1) 
 
On the other hand, General Entropy Measures (GE) are inequality indices that differ in their 
sensitivity (based upon a weight α) to income differences in different parts of the income 
distribution (Sharrocks, 1980). Formally the value of a GE measure is: 
 
ܩܧ( ߙ) =  ଵ
ఈ(ఈିଵ) ቂଵே  ∑ ቂ௬೔௬ത ቃఈ −  1ே௜ୀଵ ቃ                                                                                      (2) 
 
where ݕത is the mean income. The values of the GE measures range between zero and infinity, 
with zero implying an equal distribution while higher values indicate inequality. The 
parameter α, represents the weight given to distances between different income levels at 
different parts of the income distribution. The more positive α is, the more sensitive GE(α) is 
to income differences at the top of the distribution; the more negative α is, the more sensitive 
it is to differences at the bottom of the distribution. GE(0) is the mean logarithmic deviation, 
GE(1) is the Theil index, and GE(2) is half the square of the coefficient of variation. 
Therefore while the Theil index is more sensitive than Mean Logarithm Deviation to income 
                                                        
17 See Sharrocks (1980) for desirable properties of an inequality measure. 
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differences at the top of the distribution, the Gini coefficient is most sensitive to income 
differences at the mode of the distribution. 
 
4.2.2 Decomposing earnings inequality by gender 
Studies on gender discrimination in Pakistan’s labour market confirm that men continue to 
earn higher wages even in cases where men and women have similar individual 
characteristics (Siddique et al 2006; Nasir and Nazli, 2000; Sabir and Aftab, 2007).  
For estimating the extent of gender pay gap during the time under study, the Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition technique is employed18. Consider the following 
example as a simple illustration of how Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition operates. Assume that 
wages only depend upon years of education (Ed) and the years of experience (Exp) of a 
worker, and that the relationship between these characteristics is linear. The male (m) and 
female (f) wage equations would then be: 
 
௠ܹ =  ߙ௠ + ߚ௠ܧ݀௠ + ߛ௠ܧݔ݌௠                                                                                          (3) 
௙ܹ =  ߙ௙ + ߚ௙ܧ ௙݀ + ߛ௙ܧݔ݌௙                                                                          (4) 
 
where ߚ and ߛ are the amount by which an extra year of education and experience will raise 
male and female wages. The estimated regression uses the mean of the sample means. Hence 
if W, Ed and Exp are sample averages, the above equations exactly hold. The gap in average 
wage can then be written as: 
௠ܹ − ௙ܹ =  ߙ௠ +  ߚ௠ܧ݀௠ +  ߛ௠ ܧݔ݌௠ −  (ߙ௙ +  ߚ௙ܧ ௙݀ +  ߛ௙ܧݔ݌௙)                                (5) 
 
If we add and subtract ߚ௠ܧ݀௙ +  ߛ௠ ܧݔ݌௙, we obtain:  
 
௠ܹ − ௙ܹ =  ߚ௠  ൫ ܧ݀௠ −  ܧ ௙݀  ൯ + ߛ௠  ൫ ܧݔ݌௠ −  ܧݔ݌௙ ൯ + ൫ߙ௠ − ߙ௙൯ +  ܧ ௙݀  ൫ ߚ௠ − ߚ௙  ) + ܧݔ݌௙  ൫ ߛ௠ −  ߛ௙  ൯                                                                                                       (6) 
                                                        
18 I have also utilized the dummy variable approach by performing a regression analysis using the MEF in which 
gender is incorporated as a dummy variable to capture the effect of discrimination. 
Previously Oaxaca-Blinder approach has only been utilized by Siddique and Siddique (1998) and Ashraf and 
Ashraf (1993), the results both have become out dated by now. Recent studies which have carried out a gender 
disaggregated analysis of income inequality have employed the dummy variable approach via the Mincerian 
Earning Function (e.g. Nasir and Nazli 2000; Aslam 2007) or the quantile regression approach (Sabir and Zehra 
2007). 
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The total wage gap between men and women consists of an explained and an unexplained 
part. The first three terms in the equation represent the part of the wage gap that occurs due to 
differences in the ‘average’ characteristics between men and women. It is referred to as the 
‘explained’ wage gap. It implies that if men and women have the same mean characteristics, 
these three terms would be zero. The last two terms represent the ‘discriminatory’ part of the 
wage gap which is referred to as the ‘unexplained’ wage gap or ‘discrimination’. If the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are the same for men and women, the gap occurs 
entirely due to differences in characteristics and there would be no discrimination. Since they 
are rarely the same, this part explains the differences due to unobserved variables that may 
influence labour productivity and how these differences are remunerated during the wage 
determination process in the labour market. 
 
4.2.3 Mincerian earnings function 
The rates of return to education in Pakistan have been estimated using a modified Mincer’s 
wage equation also known as the ‘human capital model’. Consider the earnings equation 
specified below: 
 ln ௜ܻ =  ߙ + ߚଵ ܧݔ݌݁ݎ ௜ + ߚଶ(ܧݔ݌݁ݎ ௜)ଶ + ߚଷܻݎݏ݁݀ ௜ + ߚସ( ܻݎݏ݁݀ ௜)ଶ +  ߚହܯ݈ܽ݁ ௜ + ߚ଺ ܷݎܾܽ݊ ௜ + ߚ଻ ܲݑ݆݊ܽ  ܾ௜ + ߚ଼ ܵ݅݊݀ℎ ௜ +  ߚଽ ܭ  ܲ௜ +  ߚଵ଴ ܯܽ݊ݑ  ݂௜ + ߚଵଵܵ݁ݎݒ ௜ + ݑ௜                                                                                                                                                              (7) 
                               
where ln Y is the natural logarithm of monthly earnings of an individual. It is regressed on 
the individual’s total years of work experience, the square of experience (to capture non 
linearity), total years of schooling, and the square of schooling (to capture non linearity). 
Moreover, ߚହ to ߚଵଵ are the estimated coefficients of discrete dummy variables: Urban, 
indicating whether the individual belongs to an urban area; Male, indicating whether the 
individual is male (to capture the gender effect); Punjab, Sindh and KP, indicating whether 
the individual belongs to any one of these provinces (to capture the provincial/spatial 
effect19); and Manuf and Serv, indicating whether the individual belongs to the 
manufacturing or services industries (to capture the industry effect20). The residual term 
                                                        
19 Balochistan was used as the reference category. 
20 Agriculture was used as the reference category. 
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captures any other determinants of earnings such as unobserved ability of individuals. The 
definitions of the variables used in the earnings equation are elaborated in Table (1) along 
with their means and standard deviations in Table (2). 
Since it would be misleading to assume that the rate of return to all education levels is 
uniform, a modified MEF is used to include different educational splines. The overall 
structure of the education system in Pakistan consists of primary, secondary (middle), lower 
secondary (matric), upper secondary (intermediate), bachelors (BA/BSc), and post graduation 
(MA/MSc or above) education levels. The primary education consists of five years of 
schooling; middle requires three more years up to grade 8; after completing two more years 
after middle, students obtain the Secondary School Certificate (Matriculation /Matric); 
another two years of non technical formal education i.e. until grade 12 makes students 
eligible for the Higher Secondary School Certificate (Intermediate). Further two years of 
education can make students obtain a Bachelor’s degree (BA) or an Honours degree (BSc) 
after four years of education. This can be followed by a Master’s program after which most 
students have completed sixteen years of education. This can be followed by an M. Phil 
which requires further two years of study or a doctorate degree requiring three years of study 
after a Master’s degree. This information is incorporated into the MEF using the following 
specification: ln ௜ܻ =   ߙ + ߚଵ ܧݔ݌݁ݎ௜ + ߚଶ(ܧݔ݌݁ݎ௜)ଶ + ߚଷܲݎ݅݉௜ + ߚସܯ݈݅݀݀݁௜ +  ߚହܯܽݐݎ݅ܿ௜ + ߚ଺ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ௜ +  ߚ଻ܤܣ ௜ + ߚ଼ܲ݋ݏݐ݃ݎܽ݀ ௜ +  ߚଽܯ݈ܽ݁ ௜ + ߚଵ଴ ܷݎܾܽ݊ ௜ + ߚଵଵ ܲݑ݆ܾ݊ܽ ௜ + ߚଵଶ ܵ݅݊݀ℎ ௜ + ߚଵଷ ܹܰܨ  ܲ௜ + ߚଵସ ܯܽ݊ݑ݂ ௜ + ߚଵହܵ݁ݎݒ ௜ + ݑ ௜                                            (8)                                              
 
Again the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of monthly earnings. ߚଷ to ߚ଼ are the 
estimated coefficients from primary to post graduate levels of education. 
The estimated coefficients are utilized to calculate the private rate of return to each level of 
education. The rate of return to the ݆௧௛ level of education ( ݎ௝) is estimated by subtracting the 
coefficient of a previous year of education from a successive year of education and dividing it 
by the number of years of schooling it takes to complete the ݆௧௛ level of education (ݎ௝ =
൫ߚ௝ −  ߚ௝ିଵ൯/ ௝݊21.   
 
                                                        
21 Note that the coefficients have to be first adjusted by ( ݁௖௢௘௙௙௜௖௜௘௡௧ −  1) .This is because the “value of the 
coefficient of a dummy variable in the semilogarithmic regression equation is not a good estimate of the effect 
of that variable on the variable being explained for large values of the coefficient” (Siphambe, 2000: 292). 
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4.2.4 Econometric issues 
Sample selectivity bias  
Since this study only focuses on waged workers (between the age of 15- 65), its estimates of 
returns to education for wage workers are on a potentially non random sample from the 
population and hence possibly biased (lnY is only observed for wage workers). As a remedy 
Heckman’s two-step procedure for sample selectivity correction can be utilized (Heckman 
1979)22. However, while estimating earnings equations using this procedure, I was unable to 
find good instruments23. It has also been noted that the “assumptions required to validate 
OLS estimation of standard wage equations are not more demanding than those required to 
validate the results of the selection bias procedure” (Bourguignon et al, 2005:96) . This is 
because the Heckman procedure makes strong assumptions about the orthogonality between 
the error terms of the MEF and the wage participation model. Therefore following Ferreira 
and Paes de Barros (2005), I have also chosen not to present the selection-bias corrected 
results, and assume that errors are independently distributed. Even without the application of 
this procedure, it will be demonstrated (see Section 5.3) that the earnings estimates from this 
study are in line with the results from other recent studies on Pakistani labour market 
including those that have tried to use the selection-bias correction procedure (e.g Aslam, 
2007; 2008).   
Finally, omitted variable bias issues are also endemic to applied econometric analysis. 
As previously mentioned data constraints made the extraction of appropriate instruments 
difficult and I have not utilized any instrumental variables. 
4.3  Micro-econometric decomposition of earnings inequality via Bourguignon et al (2005) 
This part of the methodology–based on the work of Legovini et al in Bourguignon et al 
(2005)—may be seen as an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology which decomposes 
the effects of discrimination among two different groups of people into: differences in means 
caused by differences in the characteristics of the individuals in the two groups (the 
population effect), and differences in the remuneration of these groups (price effect). 
                                                        
22 This involves finding the probability that an individual chooses wage work via a probit regression equation. A 
selection variable lambda (the Inverse Mills Ratio) is obtained from the probit equation and is included in the 
regressors of the main earnings equation. The new equation then provides results for the wage workers only and 
its estimates are free of selection bias. 
23 Micro data on developing countries often lacks the required information to find appropriate instruments 
(Jamal et al, 2003) 
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However, now the decomposition is made on the full distribution rather than on means and 
for every individual in the sample. It allows us to measure the relative importance of the 
different sources (such as changing demographics, changes in the returns to human capital 
characteristics) on the change in income distribution of earners across Pakistan. 
As the first step, a standard labour market model is estimated for individual earners in 
1993 and 2006. The model includes earnings functions for men and women in wage 
employment located in urban and rural locations in the four provinces of Pakistan. The 
simulation is performed by re-estimating the vector of incomes, changing one microeconomic 
factor at a time. For example the following vector of earnings is estimated for 1993: 
ݕଽଷෞ =  ܽଽଷෞ + ܾଽଷ෢ܺଽଷ                                           (9) 
In order to determine the effect of the changes in the price of X on the distribution of y, the 
estimated parameter for 1993 is replaced with that for 2006 to obtain a new vector of y: 
ݕଽଷ
௕బల෢ =  ܽଽଷෞ +  ܾ଴଺෢  ܺଽଷ                                  (10) 
 
The difference between vectors (9) and (10) describes the changes in income which can be 
attributed to changes in b across the entire distribution. This is carried out for each parameter 
and explanatory variable in the earnings equations for both 1993 and 2006. This way it is 
possible to obtain a detailed description of the effect of each of the microeconomic 
determinants on the distribution of individual incomes (Legovini et al, 2005).  
Conventional measures of income inequality have also been estimated for each 
simulated vector of income to obtain estimates of the proportional contribution of each factor. 
The Gini coefficient, log mean deviation (ܧ଴), and Theil Index (ܧଵ) have been used to 
summarize our results. Since these measures give different weights to different parts of the 
income distribution, the differences in their results highlights the part of the distribution that 
is responsible for the change. 
4.4 Empirical specification of the labour-market model utilized in counterfactual based    
decomposition analysis 
4.4.1 Earnings equation 
For this part a much simpler specification of the earnings function has been utilized in order 
to make the ‘simulation stage of the decomposition feasible’ (see Bourguignon et al 
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2005:95). Earnings are a function of skills (proxied by education and experience), and are 
controlled for regional variation.  The earnings equation has been separately estimated for 7 
labour categories on the basis of gender, urban or rural location, and four provincial 
dummies.  
As a first step the following OLS equation is estimated:  
log (y) =ߙ + ܧ݀ݑߚଵ + ܧ݀ݑଶߚଶ +  ܧݔ݌ߚଷ + ܧݔ݌ଶߚସ + ܴߜ +  ߝ                                         (11) 
where:  y is the real individual monthly earning;  Edu is the years of schooling24; Exp is the 
years of work experience, and R consists of four regional dummies for Punjab, Khyber 
Pakhtoonkhwa (KP), Sindh and Balochistan.  
Next to investigate what determines differences across distributions; counterfactual 
distributions have to be simulated.  The counterfactual is obtained by simulating the fact that 
what would happen to the earnings of each individual in the sample if the returns to each 
observed characteristic had been those which were observed at time t-1 rather than the actual 
returns observed at time t (and vice versa).  
Therefore following the methodology of Legovini et al (2005), to simulate changes in 
years of education and experience, the observations have to be clustered according to gender 
and location. Then the distribution of these factors (mean and standard deviation) in each 
cluster is estimated, and finally the distribution of the 1993 cluster is replicated into the 
corresponding cluster in 2006 and vice versa. 
Hence for each x in cluster c, the following transformation is applied: 
 
ݔ௖ଽଷ
ௗ௜௦௧଴଺ = ( ݔ௖ଽଷ - ߤ௖ଽଷ) ఙ೎బలఙ೎వయ +  ߤ௖଴଺                                                            (12) 
where the μs and the ߪs are the means and the standard deviations in each cluster25. 
Finally to treat the residual, the distribution of residuals from one year is imported to 
another year through the rank-preserving transformation procedure. If we assume that the 
residuals are normally distributed with a zero mean, then this transformation is equivalent to 
                                                        
24 The rate of return across education levels is assumed to be constant for decompositions. 
25 “To simulate regional distribution, the weights from the household surveys are used and the observations of 
one survey are reweighed for example 1993 with the weighs of 2006. This technique ensures that the resulting 
regional distribution of the population across all regions matches the observed one in 2006 and vice versa” 
(Legovini et al, 2005: 285). 
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“multiplying the residual observed at time t by the ratio of standard deviations observed at 
time t’ and t” (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993; Bourguignon et al, 2005:35).  
Having set up the basic foundation of this technique, it is now possible to carry out 
decomposition exercise. Assume D (y) to be a measure of income distribution, where y is 
earnings. Let ߚ consist of estimated parameters in the earnings equation; let X contain the 
explanatory variables of education, experience, and regional location, and let ߝ be the error 
terms in the earnings equations. With this D (y) can be expressed as D (ߚ,ܺ, ߝ). The 
following decomposition exercise allows us to estimate the effects in the joint distribution of 
income by changing one or more elements contained in D (.).The price effect has been 
estimated by modifying ߚ௧  (estimated returns to education, experience, and location in the 
earnings equations). The population effect is estimated by modifying the structure of ܺ௧ (e.g. 
the distribution of the years of schooling and experience). The effect of unobservable factors 
is estimated by simulating the distribution of residuals, as described in the previous 
paragraph. 
Let y be income and in the initial time period (1993) and ݕ′ be income in the final 
time period (2006).  To explain the changes in income distribution between the initial year 
and the final year we use the following specification: 
∆ܦ = ܦ (ݕ ′) −ܦ (ݕ) =  ܦ (ߚ′,ܺ′, ߝ′) −  ܦ ( ߚ,ܺ, ߝ)                       (13) 
This change in distribution of income can be decomposed into three effects. The effect of 
changing prices, changing unobservable factors (after changing prices), and finally changing 
the Xs (after having changed prices and unobservable factors).  
 
5.  Results 
5.1 Changing demographics and labour force characteristics  
This section provides a description of the changes in the socio-demographic structure of 
Pakistan between 1993 and 2006 (see Table 3)26. In 1993 the total population was estimated 
to be at 120.84 million, with 82.77 million persons living in rural areas and 38.07 million 
living in urban areas. The total labour force stood at a 33.80 million persons and the labour 
                                                        
26 The information provided here is obtained from the Economic Survey of Pakistan (1992-1993, 2005-06 and 
2006-07) and the Labour Force Survey of Pakistan (1990-91 and 2005-06).  
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force participation rate was 27.97 percent (see Figure 1). By 2006, the total population was 
estimated to be 151.55 million, out of which 55.05 million persons constituted its labour 
force. About 18.9 percent of this labour force consisted of females. Although their 
participation rate has increased immensely as compared to 1993 but as compared to the South 
Asian region, it has continued to remain low. For example, in 2006, the female participation 
rate stood at 12.6 percent in Balochistan, 13 percent in KP, and 9.1 percent in Sindh. It is 
believed that female participation is usually under reported due to cultural factors, under 
reporting in non wage sectors, and unavailability of suitable jobs especially in rural areas 
(Labour Force Survey, 1991)27.  
As for the Pakistani labour force, the proportion of currently active population (as 
measured by the Crude Activity Rate) has tremendously increased28. Out of this the fraction 
of young people in the labour force (15-35 age group) has increased by 21 percent as family 
size increased by 6 percent during this period. The higher participation of younger age groups 
into the labour force generates a proportional increase in wage employment as they are less 
likely to opt for self employment. Hence, wage work replaced self employment as the 
preferred employment category between 1993 and 2006 as the proportion of paid employees 
has risen by 13 percent and their real wages grew by 19 percent. The skill premium has 
increased by 13 percent for average skilled workers (measured by those having completed 10 
years of schooling). 
Another major feature that has characterises structural changes in Pakistan is how the 
education structure of the employed population has changed as the total proportion of 
population having passed grade 10 (known as the matriculate level in Pakistan) increased 
from 9 percent in 1993 to 22 percent in 2006. Moreover, the total proportion of persons 
having passed secondary education increased by 57 percent, while those with an education 
level below primary have reduced by 5 percent between 1993 and 2006. Education attainment 
increased for males in rural and urban areas as the percentage of males having completed 
primary education grew by 25 percent, secondary education grew by 96 percent and basic 
                                                        
27  An increasing amount of women are entering the non agricultural labour force in Pakistan. However, since 
most of them (in rural areas and towns) own or run micro enterprises, they do not enter the formal economy. 
There are very few estimates of the informal economy in Pakistan. According to a recent study, about 30 percent 
of the GDP remained unmeasured as a percentage of the total GDP (Arby, Malki and Hanif, 2010).The 
existence of a large informal sector can bias the results based on data on the formal economy. However this 
issues is remains out of this chapter’s scope. 
28 The Labour Force Survey of Pakistan defines the ‘crude activity rate’ as the currently active population 
expressed as a percentage of the total population in Pakistan. 
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tertiary education (Matric and above) grew by 171 percent in urban areas. In rural areas the 
percentage of males having completed primary increased by 32 percent, secondary education 
increased by 101 percent, and those with education levels of Matric and above rose by 244 
percent. Although female enrolment rates have considerably improved, their education 
attainment at all levels dropped as compared to 1993 (See Figure 2 and Table 6). 
 
5.2 Earnings inequality in Pakistan  
Earnings inequality increased by 34 percent between 1993 and 200629. This paper has 
decomposed earnings inequality into the following subgroups: location (urban/rural), gender 
(males/females), level of education (primary, middle, matric, inter, bachelors, post-
graduation), to observe how it has changed ‘between’ and ‘within’ them. Although the 
discussion of results below only highlights inequality as measured by the changes in Gini 
coefficient, Table 4 reports the results using the Theil index, mean log deviation, and the 
modified coefficient of variation as well30. 
 
i. Earnings inequality by location (urban/rural):  In 1993, earnings inequality ‘within’ 
rural and urban areas accounted for 50 percent of the total inequality; while the 
earnings inequality ‘between’ urban and rural locations was about 25 percent of the 
total inequality. By 2006, ‘within’ location inequality accounted for 48 percent and 
the between location inequality was 28 percent of the total inequality. Inter-temporal 
changes in the Gini coefficient show that between the 13 years under consideration, 
within location earnings inequality increased by 28 percent; while earnings inequality 
between rural and urban locations increased by 48 percent. 
 
ii. Earnings inequality by gender: In 1993, within group earnings inequality amongst 
males and amongst females accounted for 87 percent of total earnings inequality; 
while only 4 percent of earnings inequality was attributed to earnings inequality 
between males and females. In 2006, within earnings inequality amongst males and 
females reduced to about 73 percent of the total inequality, while earnings inequality 
between males and females as a proportion of the total inequality increased to 16 
percent. Hence, between 1993 and 2006, earnings inequality within males and females 
                                                        
29 As measured by percentage change in the Gini coefficient 
30 I  used Pyatt’s (1976) methodology to decompose the Gini coefficient. 
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increased by 10 percent, while earnings inequality between males and females 
increased even more.  
 
iii. Earnings inequality by the level of education: In 1993 earnings inequality ‘within’ 
each of the 7 education levels, accounted for 17 percent of total earnings inequality, 
while earnings inequality ‘between’ different education levels constituted 51 percent 
of the total earnings inequality. In 2006, ‘within’ education levels earnings inequality 
reduced to 12 percent of the total Gini coeffcient, while earnings inequality between 
various education levels increased to 61 percent of the total Gini coefficient. 
Altogether between 1993 and 2006, earnings inequality within educational levels 
decreased by 10 percent, while earnings inequality amongst individuals with different 
education levels increased by 57 percent. 
The dynamics of earnings inequality between 1993 and 2006 demonstrate that within 
group inequalities continue to constitute a greater part of the total earnings inequality over the 
years. Within group inequality is even more than between group inequality when measured 
by General entropy measures since they are sensitive to different levels of the earnings 
income distribution. This is in accordance with international evidence on income inequality 
which suggests that in most developing countries within group earnings inequality usually 
constitute about 75 percent of total income inequality (World Bank Handbook on Inequality, 
2005). Moreover, although within group inequality has increased (at a decreasing rate) for 
location and gender subgroups, it has decreased for inequality within different levels of 
education. Finally, earnings inequality between groups has continued to rise at an increasing 
rate suggesting widening disparities between them.   
5.3 OLS Results 
5.3.1 The MEF estimates for Pakistan  
The estimated results of equations 7 and 8 have been reported in Table 7 for waged workers 
between 15 to 65 years of age. The coefficients are highly significant and bear signs in 
accordance with the human capital model for both 1993 and 2006.  The overall estimated 
results also indicate a good fit of the model. Between 1993 and 2006, the marginal returns to 
an additional year of schooling increased by 38 percent. The positive and significant 
coefficient of ‘male’ in both the years demonstrates how males continue to earn more than 
females over time. With respect to location, earnings continued to remain significantly higher 
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in urban areas than rural areas as the coefficient to ‘urban’ increased by 24 percent between 
1993 and 2006. These results are similar to the findings of Jamal et al (2003) and Nasir and 
Nazli (2000). 
 
5.3.2 MEF estimates by province  
Since significant inter provincial differences are observed in the returns to individual 
characteristics (equations 7 and 8), four separate regression equations have been estimated for 
each of the four provinces of Pakistan to examine the spatial effect in differences to returns 
over time (See Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 8, 9, 10, 11 for details) . 
It is observed that between 1993 and 2006, the maximum change in the returns to an 
education level was associated with the lower secondary level ‘middle’ in  Punjab, Sindh, and 
Balochistan, as returns to middle increased from 2 to 6 percent. However, in KP, the returns 
to primary changed the most, as they rose from 2 percent in 1993 to 7 percent in 2006. The 
returns to post graduation were highest in Balochistan in 1993 (22 percent) and in 2006 (73 
percent). This finding is in accordance with the findings of Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 
(2002) which suggests that low levels of development (as present in Balochistan) are 
associated with higher returns to education. In Balochistan high levels to post graduation 
levels may be due to a greater demand for skilled labour because of increasing development 
activities or due to the fact that the supply of skilled labour is still low as compared to other 
provinces. 
 
5.3.3 MEF estimates by level of education  
Between 1993 and 2006—except for primary—the returns to all the rest of education levels 
rose substantially. In 1993, the private returns to education were 3, 2, 5, 7, 9, 14, and 21 
percent for primary, middle, matric, inter, bachelors, and post graduation respectively. 
However in 2006, the private returns to education were 2, 3, 6, 9, 14, 20, and 26 percent for 
primary, middle, matric, inter, bachelors, and post graduation respectively. Hence tertiary 
education has been most profitable over the years as the increase in returns were the largest 
for the three highest education levels. Rates of return to primary and middle education levels 
have been low probably because the earnings differential between workers who have 
completed primary and middle, and workers with no education has been small. This suggests 
that the monetary incentives of having primary or lower secondary education are very low. 
Workers with these educational levels have increasingly been pushed into very low paying 
jobs or into the activities in the informal sector and have to now compete with illiterate 
56 
 
working population. This phenomenon has been noted as a dominant feature of developing 
countries experiencing an influx of workers in their labour markets (Siphambe, 2000).  
 
5.3.4 MEF estimates by gender  
In 1993, the private returns to education for male waged workers were 2, 2, 5, 7, 10, and 15 
percent for primary, middle, matric, inter, bachelors, and post graduation respectively. By 
2006, the returns were estimated to be 2, 2, 3, 5, 8, 12, and 17 percent for primary, middle, 
matric, inter, bachelors, and post graduation respectively. Therefore, males primarily 
experienced a rise in the returns to higher secondary, bachelors, and post graduation 
education levels. Similarly in 1993, the private rate of return to education levels for females 
was estimated to be 9, 3, 12, 17, 15, and 28 percent for primary, middle, matric, inter, 
bachelors, and post graduation respectively. By 2006, they were 5, 5, 19, 20, 33 and 51 
percent for primary, middle, matric, inter, bachelors, and post graduation respectively. As 
evident in both the years, the highest returns were associated with post graduation education 
level (i.e. having completed masters or above) for both the genders. However, the coefficients 
at all education levels were significantly higher for females than for males. 
While the returns to experience for males, decreased by 4 percent; they increased by 
17 percent for females between 1993 and 2006. As expected, males and females in urban 
areas earned higher than their counter parts in rural areas. This disparity rose by 48 percent 
for men, and 79 percent for women, between 1993 and 2006. The returns to ‘urban’ region 
alone remained higher for men than for women. It should be noted that despite the higher 
returns to education for females, men continue to earn more in both rural and urban areas. 
Wage working females are predominantly associated with the services sector, and in 
particular with low paying jobs in social and community service areas. In 1993, 62 percent of 
wage working females belonged to the services industry as compared to 54 percent females in 
2006. While these jobs provide flexibility in timings and require limited travelling, they are 
also associated with low wages and short term contracts. Higher female participation in these 
jobs may in part be due their own job preference but the discrimination in the labour market 
could also be playing a role in forcing females to opt for them as demonstrated by Aslam 
(2008) and Riboud et al (2006).  
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5.3.5 Gender wage gap  
The results from Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition carried out for male and female wage 
differentials are reported in Tables (5.1) and (5.2). The estimates from the MEF (which 
utilized the dummy variable approach to estimating wage differentials) suggest that females 
(and within females, urban females) have higher returns to an additional year of schooling 
than males. Provincial dummies in 1993 and 2006 suggest that urban females in Balochistan 
experience maximum gains from an additional year of schooling. 
In 1993, the net gender wage difference (between the OLS estimates of logarithm of wages) 
was 0.399. Out of 0.399, only 0.0027 was ‘explained’ by better male characteristics (when 
standardized by male means), while 0.396 of the gap remained ‘unexplained’. This means 
that 99 percent of the gender wage was unexplained in 1993 indicating a large role of gender 
discrimination in wages. In 2006, the gender wage difference increased to 1.167, out of which 
0. 278 was ‘explained’ and 1.069 was ‘unexplained’. Hence by 2006, 64 percent of the wage 
difference was unexplained. These results indicate that the ‘unexplained’ component of 
gender wage difference has declined by 35 percent between 1993 and 2006. While gender 
wage discrimination has declined, it still constitutes a large part of the gender was difference. 
However, in order to be more confident about our results we have to consider the number of 
days worked by both males and females in the two years. Since our data suggests that only 
2620 females as compared to 19009 males worked for more than 300 days in 1993 and only 
1668 females as compared to 14441 males  worked for more than 300 days in 2006, the large 
discrimination may be a result of factors that have influenced low female participation in the 
labour force.  
 
5.4 Characterization of changes in earnings inequality and decomposition results 
As the first step of the simulation exercise, a simple Mincerian function (equation 11) has 
been re-estimated again, but this time only for four categories: urban males, urban females, 
rural males, and rural females in order to capture gender and regional effects. Detailed results 
have been presented in Table 5. As discussed in Section 5.3.3, the returns to education 
function have become more convex during 1993 and 2006 implying that marginal returns to 
education are lowest for individuals with lower educational qualifications. The wage gap 
related to skills (measured by the returns to various years of education) has widened (see 
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Tables 4 and 5) as the returns to low and medium levels of education declined, while returns 
to higher education levels increased for both urban and rural males and females31. 
This widening wage gap in returns to various education levels can be attributed to 
different demand and supply factors. As the supply of primary qualified wage earners has 
increased over the year, the wage rewards to primary education have fallen. On the demand 
side, it is conjectured that skill biased technological change could be a major reason behind 
greater variance in wages (Bound and Jhonson, 1992; Juhn et al, 1993; Autor et al, 1999; 
Fräßdorf et al, 2008; Colclough et al, 2009). This refers to a shift in production technology 
that increases the relative productivity and hence the demand of skilled labourers as 
compared to the unskilled32. This factor bias has put “technological change at the 
centerstage of the income distribution debate” (Violante, 2008)33. Traditionally technical 
change is considered to be factor neutral, but at least in its adoption phase many developed 
and developing countries have experienced increased returns to skills after trade liberalization 
(Harrison, 1997; Beyer et al, 1999; Robertson, 2000 Berman et al, 1998; 2003). Studies on 
the impact of trade liberalization in Pakistan have also found evidence of shifts in demand 
towards skills (Berman and Machin, 2000; Sabir, 2004).  
Changes in the structure of returns to education coupled with improvement in the 
distribution of overall education can generate large increases in income inequality. A 
comparison of education attainment across our sample, suggests that percentage of workers 
with secondary education or above was much larger in 2006 than in 1993. This was 
accompanied by much larger marginal rates of return to education at higher levels of 
education as compared to lower levels in 2006 than in 1993. Therefore convexification of 
returns to education in Pakistan has also been unequalizing over time. Altogether changes in 
returns to various educational levels account for almost a 23 percent increase in earnings 
income inequality between 1993 and 2006. This has led to an increasing number of workers 
with low education levels at the bottom of the income distribution. Bourguignon et al (2005) 
explains that poorer workers experience greater constraints to achieving higher levels of 
                                                        
31 Only in 1993, the coefficient for returns to education for rural females was not statistically significant from zero. However 
estimates for each level of education for rural females in 1993 show that only the coefficient for primary education was 
statistically different from zero. 
32 In-flowing capital embodies in-flowing technology, which is assumed to be skill-biased because the new technology is 
mainly designed in the industrialized world, which is skill intensive, and because there is evidence that new technology is 
skill-biased within the industrialized world (Berman et al, 1998). 
33 “A large number of economic models in the literature provides a foundation for Skill Biased Technological Change (for 
surveys, see Acemoglu, 2002; Aghion, 2002; Hornstein et al., 2005). The central tenet of all these theories is technology-
skill complementarity” (Violente, 2008).  
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education due to demand side factors (such as inability to afford schooling) and supply side 
factors (such as unavailability of schools and educational infrastructure). With rapidly 
changing labour market situations, such groups suffer the most as they are unable to catch up 
with the changing demand situation in the labour market. 
An important implication of our findings for Pakistan is that over the years, the 
positive yet reduced returns to primary education have reduced the poverty reducing element 
of attaining primary education since the wage increment associated with it is much lower than 
before. An important policy concern here is to think about whether individuals who have only 
attained primary education (because it was free) or who can only afford to obtain primary 
education have any incentive at all to acquire education. However it still remains important to 
take into account the non-monetary benefits of acquiring basic education (increased 
awareness, reduced crime, improved civic sense, lower fertility rates etc) and its positive 
socio-economic externalities. This implication also puts pressure to expand the education 
system at the secondary level and above in order to increase the average duration of 
schooling34. 
 Furthermore, experience was more valued in 2006 than in 1993 perhaps as a result of 
a shift in the demand for goods and services requiring more experience due to the skill biased 
technological growth. The effect of experience on earnings remained positive and concave. 
The returns to experience have risen over the 13 years, but not as much as for males (urban 
and rural) as they have for females (rural and urban).  While males experienced a 1 percent 
increase in earnings for an additional year of work, females experienced a 4 percent increase. 
The returns to experience increased by 8 percent for urban males, 55 percent for urban 
females, 19 percent for rural males, and 43 percent for rural females between 1993 and 2006.  
Therefore although ‘experience’ as a characteristic has also had an unequalizing effect on 
earnings income distribution (as the Gini coefficient for years of experience increased from 
0.34 to 0.35), but this has not been as large as the effect of returns to education.  
The regional effect (rural/urban and the effect of belonging to the provinces) has also 
been unequalizing. The returns to provinces show that in 1993, regional effects (measured by 
the effect of belonging to one of the four provinces of Pakistan, with Balochistan as the 
                                                        
34 This chapter does not discuss the effect of schooling quality on the demand for schooling. Colclough (2009) 
argues that if the returns to primary education are declining (partly) due to declining schooling quality, then the 
demand for primary education “as a terminal stage” will be reduced. 
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reference category) were negative and highly significant. In 2006 however, although regional 
effects still remained negative but some of them became statistically insignificant. This 
change confirms uneven growth across the provinces (and urban & rural regions) and that 
their conditions have extensively diverged from each other. It can also been taken as an 
evidence of the fact that the influence of regional differences on wage determination have 
reduced over time across Pakistan. 
Finally to analyse the possible effects of unobservable factors, we observe that the 
variance of the residuals of the earnings function for males and females (both in rural and 
urban areas) increased during 1993-2006. An intuitive explanation for this is that the 
unobservable talents (cognitive skills and non cognitive factors) of males and females such as 
innate ability increased due to the expansion of media, information technology sector, 
contributing to a raise in the general awareness levels.  
5.5 Decomposing changes in earnings inequality 
Four counterfactuals have been simulated for four population sub groups: urban males, urban 
females, rural males, and rural females. Since decompositions are path dependent, this study 
considers both 1993 and 2006 alternatively as base years. While Table 2 reports the simulated 
change in earnings inequality by simulating the 2006 model on the 1993 distribution of 
earnings, Table 3 reports the results from the simulation of the 1993 model on the distribution 
of earnings in 2006. 
The first simulated change demonstrates what individual earnings would have been in 
1993 (or 2006) if the returns to each of the observed individual characteristics had been those 
observed in year 2006 (or 1993). However, the returns to unobserved factors and the 
distribution of the individual characteristics were kept unchanged. This counterfactual shows 
the change in the earnings distribution due to the ‘price effect’. The second simulated change 
incorporates the effect of changing unobservable factors (after having changed prices) by 
performing a counterfactual on the distribution of the random term. It imports the distribution 
of the residuals from 2006 (or 1993) to 1993 (or 2006) through the rank preservation process. 
The third simulated change highlights the effect of changing the distribution of education and 
experience (after having changed prices and residuals) on the distribution of earnings. It 
simulates the distribution of individual endowments of education and experience in 2006 
(1993) on the distribution of earnings in 1993 (2006). Finally, the fourth simulated change 
61 
 
shows the effect of changing the returns to education only (keeping all the other elements of 
the equation the same) on earnings inequality. 
To understand the ex-ante changes in the distribution and returns to individual 
characteristics, 1993 is kept as the base year and 2006 coefficients are replicated into the 
1993 distribution35. After performing simulation 1, urban females experience the least 
increase in their mean wages (15 percent), but the largest increase in their wage inequality 
(73 percent). Simulation 2 and simulation 3 affects rural males the most as their wage 
inequality increases by 103 percent and 65 percent respectively (see Table 15 and Figure 4). 
To examine the effect of only modifying education related parameters, simulation 4 shows 
that except for rural females, it has a highly unequalizing impact for urban males, urban 
females, and rural males whose wage inequality increases by 23 percent, 63 percent, and 53 
percent respectively. Rural females however experience a slight reduction of 0.8 percent 
under this simulation. 
To observe ex-post changes, we replicate 1993 coefficients and distribution into that 
of 2006. By simply importing the 2006 returns to individual characteristics into 1993 
(simulation 1), urban women experience the maximum reduction in their wage inequality (23 
percent), while the Gini coefficient for rural males increases the most (46 percent). After 
combining simulation 1 with a rank preservation process (simulation 2) rural males 
experience the maximum increase in their wage inequality (19 percent). Under this 
simulation, rural females experience the maximum increase their mean incomes (94 percent) 
which is accompanied by a 19 percent reduction in their wage inequality. After combining 
the two previous simulations with a procedure of replicating the distribution of education and 
experience (the Xs) of 2006 into 1993, we perform simulation 3 which turns out to be the 
most equalizing for all four population groups under consideration. It results in reducing 
wage inequality by 3 percent for urban males, 44 percent for urban females, 19 percent for 
rural males, and 40 percent for rural females. Finally, only replicating the returns to education 
of 2006 into the distribution of 1993 (simulation 4), proves to be equalizing only for urban 
females and rural females, whose wage inequality reduces by 23 percent and 16 percent 
                                                        
35 Here the results have been discussed in terms of changes in the Gini coefficient here. Tables 18 and 17 (in the 
appendix) report the changes in earnings distribution through Gini coefficient, Theil Index, and log mean 
deviation. 
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respectively. On the other hand it proves to be unequalizing for males as it increases wage 
inequality for urban males by 40 percent and for rural males by 45 percent. 
The impact of the simulations on changes in mean real monthly earnings has also 
been examined. Table 14 reports the changes in mean monthly wages because of the price 
effect after having replaced the vector coefficients of 1993 by the vector of coefficients of 
2006 while keeping the residual constant in part(a) and the vice versa in part(b). It shows the 
evolution of monthly wages of urban males and females, and rural males and females, while 
keeping their individual characteristics constant. In part (a) it is observed that when 1993 is 
the base year, rural males and females benefit the most by having the 2006 returns to 
individual characteristics.  Part (b) however, demonstrates that rural females and urban 
females would have experienced a substantial increase of 746 percent and 892 percent in their 
monthly wages if the returns to their characteristics were the same as that in 1993. This is 
explained by the improvement in the distribution of their characteristics. For example by 
2006, female educational enrolment has increased intensively (100% increase or more) at all 
education levels (Figure 2).  Moreover, rural females benefit from the maximum increase in 
their mean earnings under all four simulations when 2006 is considered as the base year. 
However, when 1993 is considered as the base year, the simulation measuring the price effect 
increases the mean earnings the most only. Under the other three conditions (simulations 2, 3, 
and 4), urban women experience the maximum increase in their mean earnings (See Table 
15). 
Results from the decomposition exercise demonstrate that the rise in earnings 
inequality of individuals in Pakistan between 1993 and 2006 is a consequence of strongly 
unequalizing effects of education and regions, and weakly unequalizing effects of experience 
and unobservable factors. First, as shown by the price effect (simulation 1), changes in the 
returns to education have particularly affected earnings inequality for urban females and rural 
males the most over time (Table 14). Two other factors that have contributed towards 
increased overall earnings inequality include: the rise in the variance of unobserved 
individual characteristics, and changes in the structure of schooling and experience (socio-
demographic changes depicted in simulation 3). The empirical results also demonstrate that 
females in general and rural females in particular are most susceptible to changes in policies 
that can affect earnings inequality (See Table16). Finally, as shown by simulation 4, changes 
in education related parameters can highly affect wage inequality for all four segments of the 
population, but affect rural females the most.  
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 It should be noted here that this analysis remains preliminary in three ways. First, it 
has only analysed the distribution of earnings income. Second, it has not taken into account 
the effect of changing labour force participation decisions over the years on income 
inequality. Third, this analysis has decomposed changes in earnings inequality at an 
individual level only. In most developing countries, income is a household concern and hence 
it is equally important to analyse the effect of structural changes in an economy on household 
poverty and inequality. These caveats are being addressed in a working paper version of this 
chapter.  
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Between 1993 and 2006 earnings inequality in Pakistan rose by approximately 34 percent as 
the proportion of wage earners in its working population increased from 40 to 62 percent36. 
This steady rise in earnings income inequality now dominates the overall inequality pattern 
amongst its total employed population. Since nearly a quarter (22 percent) of the total 
increase in earnings inequality between 1993 and 2006 is due to differences in education 
levels, this chapter investigated the extent to which can this observed change in earnings 
inequality be attributed to changes in returns to human capital across Pakistan between 1993 
and 2006? In this way it makes a timely contribution towards the literature on earnings 
inequality in Pakistan and has presented the latest estimates for returns to education across 
Pakistan, taking into account gender and spatial differences. 
The Pakistani labour force increased by over 60 percent between 1993 and 2006 
during which the proportion of wage earners increased by 13 percent. The chapter first 
examined how the dynamics of their earnings inequality over the past decade by location, 
gender and education levels. Between 1993 and 2006, earnings inequality within rural and 
urban regions has increased more than between rural and urban regions. Similarly it remained 
higher amongst women as compared to men in both the years under study. However earnings 
inequality between different levels of education has increased much more than within 
different education levels reflecting the inequality generating effect of education levels. 
These findings of greater within group inequalities are typical of emerging market economies 
                                                        
36 When this chapter was written, the latest available household data set (PSLM) was used to carry out the 
analysis for the fiscal year 2005-06. The next PSLM survey was carried out in 2007-08 but was not made 
available officially until late 2009. 
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during their development phase and are similar to the results from previous studies (see WB, 
2005, for global inequalities; Idrees, 2006, for the case of Pakistan). 
Next the chapter investigated how have the returns to human capital changed over the 
period under investigation with the aim of updating existing evidence on returns to skills and 
gender discrimination in the Pakistani labour market. The following main results emerge 
from this empirical analysis:  
1) The marginal returns to an additional year of schooling increased by 38 percent, and 
remained significantly higher in urban areas, and in manufacturing and services 
sectors between 1993 and 2006. Moreover except for primary education, the returns to 
each successive level of education have substantially increased between 1993 and 
2006 with female returns being higher as compared to males throughout.  
2) To examine the spatial differences in the returns to education over time, four separate 
Mincerian earnings functions (MEFs) were estimated for each of the provinces. 
Balochistan has had the highest returns to all education levels in 1993 and in 2006. 
This could be explained by the overall enrolment rates in Balochistan which have 
always remained the lowest in Pakistan. 
3) When MEF estimates were obtained for each of the seven educational levels in 
Pakistan, it has been observed that the returns to all education levels rose substantially 
between 1993 and 2006. While the returns to primary education have not substantially 
risen for Punjab and Sindh (the two provinces with the largest amount of primary 
graduates), tertiary education become even more profitable in 2006 as compared to 
1993 in all four provinces. The falling marginal returns to primary education are a 
dominant feature of emerging market economies that are experiencing an influx of 
workers. With an increasing proportion of population between the ages 15 and 65 (i.e. 
working population) and due to skill biased technology change, this chapter 
demonstrated that Pakistan too is now experiencing this phenomenon. However 
despite increased convexity of returns to skills, the returns to primary are still higher 
in Pakistan as compared to other developing countries (Aslam, 2009). This perhaps 
relates to a possible un-met demand for low-skilled labour in some industries. Low 
schooling quality is another reason which may explain falling returns to primary 
education in Pakistan.  It has been observed that having completed primary educated 
for many individuals may not guarantee the acquisition of basic literacy and numeracy 
skills (Colclough et al, 2009).  
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4) The findings from this chapter clearly demonstrate that the returns to skills of females 
are much higher than the returns to skills for men in the Pakistani labour market 
(Section 5.3.4).  However the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results demonstrate a 
large element of gender discrimination (Section 5.4). These results are consistent with 
the findings of other similar studies on Pakistan (Jamal et al, 3003, Abbas, 2004; 
Aslam, 2007; 2008; 2009). Although higher returns to skill for females should imply 
that parents would favour education amongst girls as compared to boys, it is not so in 
reality. Various cultural factors in Pakistan (such as parents living with sons when 
old) have contributed towards a gender bias against female education. Moreover in a 
male dominated society, females find it particularly hard to enter the labour market 
after having suffered from under investment in their education. 
5) Unequal returns to various levels of education have not only contributed towards 
increasing earnings inequality between provinces but also earnings inequality within 
them. The uneven spread of gains associated with increased distribution of education 
can also threaten social solidarity, as ethnicity may be perceived as a determinant of 
wage earnings. Clearly this calls for a detailed spatial analysis of educational and 
income inequalities (see Chapter 3 for details). 
All of the above results are validated by the evidence from recent studies on Pakistan such as 
Jamal et al (2003) and Aslam (2007; 2008; 2009), and studies on emerging market economies 
similar to Pakistan (in terms of earnings inequality patterns in the past 2 decades) such as 
Kingdon et al (2008), Vasudeva-Datta (2004) for India, Li (2003) for the case China, and 
Bouillon et al (1999; 2005) for Mexico. Moreover, micro-econometric decomposition 
technique has been utilized to separate the effects of changing labour market and human 
capital characteristics on the evolution of earnings income distribution over the past decade. 
Micro-simulations were carried out for the following four counter factual questions 
respectively, for urban males, urban females, rural males, and rural females in Pakistan: 
1) How would have individual earnings changed in 1993 (or 2006) if the returns to each 
of the individual characteristics had been those observed in the year 2006 (or 1993)? 
This was carried out to extract the price effect. 
2) After having changed the returns, what would have happened to individual earnings in 
1993 (or 2006) if the distribution of the unobservable factors had been those in the 
year 2006 (or 1993)? This was carried out to examine the role of unobservable 
individual characteristics. 
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3) How would the earnings income distribution have changed if the distribution of 
individual characteristics (education and earnings) in 1993 (or 2006) were replaced by 
the distribution of individual characteristics in 2006 (or 1993)? This was carried out to 
analyse the effect of individual endowments on earnings. 
4) How would have the distribution of earnings be changed if only the returns to 
education in 1993 (or 2006) were exchanged with the returns to education in 2006 (or 
1993)? This was carried out to separate the effect of education from all other factors 
on earnings income. 
 
The following results emerged from the ex-ante exercise i.e. results for 1993 using 2006 
coefficients and distribution: 
1) From the first simulation, urban females would have been affected the most. They 
would have experienced the maximum increase in their earnings inequality while their 
mean wages would experience the least amount of rise as compared to urban males, 
rural males, and rural females. 
2) Simulations 2 and 3, resulted in increasing the wage inequality for rural men by the 
largest amount. 
3) Finally replacing the returns to education for 1993 with those in 2006 proved to be 
highly unequalizing for rural males, urban males, and urban females. 
 
The following results emerged from the ex-post exercise i.e. results for 2006 using 1993 
coefficients and distribution: 
1) Simulation 1 attributed the maximum benefits to urban females in terms of reducing 
their wage inequality but also resulted in the largest increase in the wage inequality 
amongst rural males. 
2) Simulation 2 resulted in reducing wage inequality for both urban females and rural 
females, but again resulted in generating higher wage inequality for rural males. 
3) Simulation 3 appeared to have the most equalizing effect for all population groups 
under study, as it reduced wage inequality for all of them. 
4) Simulation 4 resulted in reducing wage inequalities for rural and urban females, while 
increasing wage inequality for rural and urban males. 
 
The counterfactual analysis has highlighted the importance of education, in influencing the 
labour market returns and the distribution of earnings income in Pakistan. Most importantly, 
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the micro simulations have demonstrated how females in general and rural females in 
particular (due to the high returns to their skills) are most sensitive to changes in policies that 
can affect labour market outcomes. This inequality reducing role of education supports the 
case for enhanced public investments in female education in Pakistan (Kingdon and 
Soderbom, 2008).  
At the same time the unequalizing effects of returns to education also demonstrate 
that educational progress does not necessarily imply an improvement in the distribution of 
earnings income. Although this analysis has just been carried for the distribution of earnings 
income, several studies have observed similar results for the distribution of total income (see 
Bourguignon et al, 2005 for examples on Indonesia and Mexico). Hence if earnings-
education profile continues to disadvantage workers with lower levels of education (convex), 
increased distribution of basic education might not even contribute much towards poverty 
reduction as presumed by the Millennium Development Goals. The policy implication for 
this finding lies in targeted government interventions that can facilitate in distributing the 
gains of education across different groups in the Pakistani labour market (see Chapter 5 for 
details on policy prescriptions). However no matter what the consequences of education are 
for income distribution, it generates various other positive externalities such as crime 
reduction and intergenerational benefits (O’ Donoghue, 1999). Moreover, since it has been 
noted that returns to lower education levels are still high in Pakistan as compared to other 
similar emerging market economies, educating the children from households belonging to the 
lower ends of the income distribution, may outweigh the convexification of returns to 
education (Legovini et al, 2005). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Population and Labour Force in Pakistan, 1993-2006 (% change) 
 
  Source: Author’s Calculations, Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005-06 and 2006-07 
 
Figure 2: Change in Female Enrolment in Educational Institutions, 1993-2006 (%) 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations, Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005-06 and 2006-07 
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Figure 3: Change in the Distribution of Employed Persons by Industry, 1993-2006 (%) 
 
 
 Source: Author’s Calculations, Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005-06 and 2006-07 
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  Table 1.  Definition of variables used in Mincerian Earnings Function 
 
 
Variable 
 
Definition 
Lwage  Log of real monthly wage 
Exper Total years of labour market experience (Age-yrsed-5), 5 years was 
replaced by the age of starting school if provided in the data. 
Exper2 Square of years of  labour market experience 
Yrsed Number of completed years of education 
Yrsed2 Square of completed years of education 
No_ed Equals 1 if an individual has had no schooling or completed less than 5 years 
of  it, 0 otherwise 
Primary Equals 1 if an individual has completed 5 years of schooling , 0 otherwise 
Middle Equals 1 if an individual has completed 6,7 or 8 years of education, 0 
otherwise 
Matric Equals 1 if an individual has completed 9 or 10 years of education, 0 
otherwise 
Inter Equals 1 if an individual has completed 11 or 12 years of education, 0 
otherwise 
Bachelors Equals 1 if an individual has completed 13 or 14 years of education, 0 
otherwise 
Pgrad Equals 1 if an individual has completed 16 years of education or more 
(Masters and above), 0 otherwise 
Urban Equals 1 if an individual lives in an urban location, 0 otherwise 
Male Equals 1 if an individual is a male, 0 otherwise 
Punjab Equals 1 if an individual is located in Punjab, 0 otherwise 
Sindh Equals 1 if an individual is located in Sindh, 0 otherwise 
KP Equals 1 if an individual is located in KP, 0 otherwise 
Manuf Equals 1 if an individual is employed in the Manufacturing sector, 0 otherwise 
Serv Equals 1 if an individual is employed in the Tertiary/Services sector, 0 
otherwise 
 
Note: 1) Descriptive statistics are computed for wage workers between 15-65 years of age. 
          2) ‘No_ed’ is the reference category for educational splines, ‘Balochistan ‘for province, 
               and ‘Agriculture’ for industry of occupation. 
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 Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in Earnings Equations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  1993 2006 
    
  Mean SD Mean SD 
          
Lwage 7.373 0.656 7.107 0.915 
Exper 12.677 16.652 15.005 18.604 
Exper2 438.005 869.290 571.256 1071.258 
Yrsed 1.928 3.758 3.728 4.633 
Yrsed2 32.876 38.032 35.361 62.195 
No_ed* 0.760 0.427 0.533 0.499 
Primary* 0.100 0.300 0.214 0.410 
Middle* 0.102 0.439 0.089 0.285 
Matric* 0.050 0.218 0.085 0.279 
Inter* 0.020 0.138 0.037 0.188 
Bachelors* 0.013 0.115 0.025 0.155 
Pgrad* 0.006 0.078 0.018 0.132 
Urban* 0.393 0.488 0.393 0.488 
Male* 0.517 0.500 0.503 0.500 
Punjab* 0.444 0.497 0.390 0.488 
Sindh* 0.249 0.432 0.248 0.432 
KP* 0.192 0.394 0.215 0.411 
Manuf* 0.010 0.097 0.056 0.230 
Serv* 0.620 1.214 0.117 0.322 
  N =  9,070 N =  14,463 
N= Total number of employed waged workers (males and females) 
The variables with superscript (*) are binary 0/1 variables and their means represent the 
proportions of ones in the sample 
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Table 3. Characteristics of the Labour Force in Pakistan, 1993 and 2006 
Characteristic 1993 2006 % Change 
 Pakistan Urban Rural Pakistan Urban Rural  
Average no. of persons per household (%) 6.40 6.66 6.30 6.83 6.65 6.93 6.72 
Average no. of earners per household (%) 1.70 1.64 1.72 2.07 1.91 2.16 21.76 
Average monthly income per household  
(Rs 1993) 
3590 4976 3070 3643 4249 3321 1.47 
Earners by employment status (%)        
            Employer 1.67 3.09 1.16 1.06 1.78 0.72 -36.53 
            Self-employed 31.67 21.64 35.26 27.39 21.87 29.97 -13.51 
            Paid employee 40.07 62.15 32.17 45.43 62.22 37.58 13.38 
            Unpaid family helper 23.80 9.96 28.74 23.74 10.28 29.58 -1.39 
            Economically inactive 2.75 3.10 2.62 2.65 3.85 2.09 -3.64 
Distribution of monthly household Income by source (%)        
           Wages & salaries 33.28 46.34 25.33 35.33 48.81 25.57 6.16 
            Self  employment 41.41 29.47 48.68 39.71 23.42 51.53 -4.11 
Age structure (%)        
           15-35 age-group 28.92 32.87 27.33 35.03 37.68 33.29 21.13 
           35-55 age group 16.37 16.35 16.38 15.66 16.91 14.84 -4.34 
           55-65 age-group 4.56 4.34 4.64 4.45 4.47 4.44 -2.41 
Education structure (%)        
          Primary & below 20.18 24.09 18.60 19.05 18.92 19.11 -5.60 
          Middle 6.08 9.91 4.52 9.59 12.65 8.18 57.73 
          Matric & above 8.91 19.83 4.44 22.20 39.50 14.26 149.20 
Earnings of wage employees ( Rs 1993)        
          Average monthly real earnings 3385   4045   19.50 
Earnings premium ( ratio)        
         Average-to-low skilled earnings 1.27   1.44   13.39 
         High-to-low skilled earnings 3.36   2.98   -11.31 
Source: Author’s calculations based on  HIES 1992-93 and HIES 2005-06 
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Table 4. Earnings Inequality in Pakistan 1993-2006 
 1993 2006 Percentage Change 
Indicator Gini GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) 
             
Earnings Inequality 0.35 0.22 0.25 0.52 0.46 0.41 0.46 1.21 34.29 86.36 84 132.69 
Static Decomposition of Between and Within-group Inequality in Earnings 
By Location (Urban/Rural)             
Within group 0.176 0.201 0.235 0.501 0.225 0.375 0.422 1.181 27.841 86.567 79.574 135.73 
Between group 0.09 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.133 0.036 0.035 0.035 47.777 111.77 105.88 118.75 
             
By Gender (Male/Female)             
Within group 0.304 0.217 0.250 0.516 0.335 0.383 0.433 1.20 10.197 76.497 73.7 132.55 
Between group 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.074 0.029 0.024 0.02 428.57 1350 1100 900 
             
By Education (levels)             
Within group 0.066 0.157 0.176 0.416 0.059 0.277 0.292 0.99 -10.61 76.433 65.909 137.98 
Between group 0.18 0.062 0.076 0.101 0.282 0.135 0.164 0.226 56.66 117.74 115.79 123.76 
Source: Author’s Calculations.  
Note: GE(0)  is the mean log deviation, GE(1) is the Theil Index, GE(2) is the modified coefficient of variation 
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Table  5.1 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (1993)                Number of obs   =       9070 
                                                   Model           =     linear 
Group 1: males                                     N of obs 1      =       8477 
Group 2: females                                   N of obs 2      =        593 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lwage |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
overall      | 
     group_1 |   7.398877   .0068436  1081.14   0.000     7.385463     7.41229 
     group_2 |   6.999727    .035879   195.09   0.000     6.929405    7.070048 
  difference |   .3991498   .0365259    10.93   0.000     .3275605    .4707392 
  endowments |   .0027897   .0281785     0.10   0.921    -.0524392    .0580185 
coefficients |    .396779   .0301393    13.16   0.000     .3377071    .4558509 
 interaction |  -.0004188   .0189378    -0.02   0.982    -.0375362    .0366986 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Author’s estimates from HIES 1992-93  
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Table 5.2 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (2006)               Number of obs   =      14463 
                                                  Model           =     linear 
Group 1: males                                    N of obs 1      =      12170 
Group 2: females                                  N of obs 2      =       2293 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lwage |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
overall      | 
     group_1 |    7.29192   .0066346  1099.07   0.000     7.278916    7.304924 
     group_2 |   6.124576   .0237419   257.96   0.000     6.078043    6.171109 
  difference |   1.167344   .0246515    47.35   0.000     1.119028     1.21566 
  endowments |   .2789452   .0249169    11.20   0.000     .2301091    .3277814 
coefficients |   1.069887   .0206987    51.69   0.000     1.029319    1.110456 
 interaction |  -.1814884   .0204632    -8.87   0.000    -.2215954   -.1413813 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Author’s estimates from  HIES 2005-06 
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Table 6.1 Marginal returns to educational levels in Pakistan (%) 
Level 1993 2006 
Primary  2.63 1.61 
Middle 1.77 2.45 
Matric 5.20 4.89 
Inter 6.86 7.85 
Graduation 9.38 10.41 
Post-graduation 13.64 17.69 
Source: Author’s estimates from HIES 1992-93 and HIES 2005-06 
Table 6.2 Marginal returns to educational levels for males in Pakistan (%) 
Level 1993 2006 
Primary  2.63 3.62 
Middle 1.77 4.21 
Matric 5.20 6.06 
Inter 6.86 9.48 
Graduation 9.38 12.98 
Post-graduation 13.64 20.45 
Source: Author’s estimates from HIES 1992-93 and HIES 2005-06 
Table 6.3 Marginal returns to educational levels for females in Pakistan  (%) 
Level 1993 2006 
Primary  7.02 10.13 
Middle 2.86 10.70 
Matric 8.04 26.37 
Inter 11.88 29.27 
Graduation 13.49 44.96 
Post-graduation 21.60 73.35 
Source: Author’s estimates from HIES 1992-93 and HIES 2005-06 
Table 6.4 Marginal returns to educational levels in Punjab (%) 
Level 1993 2006 
Primary  3.22 5.83 
Middle 2.04 5.90 
Matric 11.34 8.78 
Inter 8.56 14.35 
Graduation 12.17 21.30 
Post-graduation 19.10 34.95 
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Table 6.5 Marginal returns to educational levels in Sindh (%) 
Level 1993 2006 
Primary  3.51 3.56 
Middle 2.04 13.75 
Matric 5.62 6.52 
Inter 6.70 8.18 
Graduation 9.09 13.56 
Post-graduation 11.41 24.04 
Source: Author’s estimates from HIES 1992-93 and HIES 2005-06 
Table 6.6 Marginal returns to educational levels in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa –KP (%) 
Level 1993 2006 
Primary  0.84 6.65 
Middle 1.02 5.07 
Matric 5.40 9.10 
Inter 6.52 13.98 
Graduation 8.15 17.24 
Post-graduation 12.86 24.73 
Source: Author’s estimates from HIES 1992-93 and HIES 2005-06 
Table 6.7 Marginal returns to educational levels in Balochistan (%) 
Level 1993 2006 
Primary  7.02 10.13 
Middle 2.86 10.70 
Matric 8.04 26.37 
Inter 11.88 29.26 
Graduation 11.56 44.96 
Post-graduation 21.60 73.36 
Source: Author’s estimates from HIES 1992-93 and HIES 2005-06 
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Table 7. Earnings functions for wage earners in Pakistan  
 1993 2006 
Variable Coeff  (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| Coeff  (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) P>|Z| 
   
Exper 0.057 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.055 0.000 
 0.002   0.002   0.001   0.002   
Exper2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Yrsed 0.019 0.000 --   0.026 0.000 --   
 0.002       0.003       
Yrsed2 0.003 0.000 --   0.004 0.000 --   
 0.000       0.000       
Primary --   0.122 0.000 --   0.104 0.000 
     0.016       0.017   
Middle --   0.137 0.000 --   0.221 0.000 
     0.010       0.020   
Matric --   0.429 0.000 --   0.453 0.000 
     0.017       0.018   
Inter --   0.616 0.000 --   0.742 0.000 
     0.025       0.024   
Bachelor --   0.855 0.000 --   1.063 0.000 
     0.025       0.025   
Pgrad --   1.180 0.000 --   1.438 0.000 
     0.029       0.029   
Male 0.446 0.000 0.444 0.000 1.030 0.000 1.088 0.000 
 0.022   0.022   0.015   0.016   
Urban 0.187 0.000 0.188 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.232 0.000 
 0.011   0.011   0.011   0.012   
Manuf -0.111 0.000 -0.110 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.155 0.000 
 0.020   0.020   0.018   0.019   
Serv -0.048 0.000 -0.048 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.226 0.000 
 0.004   0.004   0.018   0.019   
Punjab -0.213 0.000 -0.214 0.000 -0.131 0.000 -0.115 0.000 
 0.018   0.018   0.016   0.017   
Sindh -0.133 0.000 -0.135 0.000 -0.083 0.000 -0.081 0.000 
 0.019   0.019          0.017   0.018   
KP -0.250 0.000 -0.251 0.000 -0.160 0.000 -0.139 0.000 
 0.020   0.020   0.019   0.020   
                 
Constant 6.124   6.213   4.837   4.996   
R square 0.418   0.417   0.533   0.475   
N 9070  9070  14463  14463  
Note: Standard errors are in the second rows, Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table 8.  Earnings functions for wage earners in Punjab 
PUNJAB 
 1993 2006 
Variable Coeff  (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| Coeff  (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| 
         
Exper 0.060 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.065 0.000 
 0.003   0.003   0.003   -0.003   
Exper2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Yrsed 0.018 0.000 -- -- 0.017 0.000 -- -- 
 0.004      -0.005     -- 
Yrsed2 0.004 0.000 -- -- 0.005 0.000 --   
 0.000      0.000       
Primary -- -- 0.147 0.000 -- -- 0.270 0.000 
     0.027       -0.028   
Middle -- -- 0.155 0.000 -- -- 0.405 0.000 
     0.015       -0.032   
Matric -- -- 0.457 0.000 -- -- 0.656 0.000 
     0.028       -0.030   
Inter -- -- 0.717 0.000 -- -- 1.036 0.000 
     0.042       -0.044   
Bachelor -- -- 1.005 0.000 -- -- 1.418 0.000 
     0.048       -0.046   
Pgrad -- -- 1.415 0.000 -- -- 1.930 0.000 
     0.055       -0.046   
Male 0.516 0.000 0.508 0.000 1.175 0.000 1.186 0.000 
 0.033   0.033   0.022   -0.022   
Urban 0.187 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.146 0.000 
 0.018   0.018   0.020   0.020   
Manuf -0.086 0.013 -0.076 0.032 0.184 0.000 0.192 0.000 
 0.035   0.035   0.031   -0.031   
Serv -0.034 0.000 -0.035 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.227 0.000 
 0.007   0.007   0.032   0.032   
                 
Constant 5.742   5.856   4.530   4.536   
R square 0.404   0.405   0.588   0.594   
N 3812  3812  5426  5426  
Note: Standard errors are in the second rows, Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table 9.  Earnings functions for wage earners in Sindh  
SINDH 
 1993 2006 
Variable Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| 
         
Exper 0.055 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.056 0.000 
 0.003   0.003   0.002   0.002   
Exper2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Yrsed 0.029 0.000 -- -- 0.006 0.192 -- -- 
 0.004   ( )   -0.005   ( )   
Yrsed2 0.002 0.000 -- -- 0.005 0.000 -- -- 
 0.000   ( )   0.000   ( )   
Primary -- -- 0.166 0.000 -- -- 0.191 0.000 
     0.027       0.025   
Middle -- -- 0.158 0.000 -- -- 0.389 0.000 
     0.017       0.034   
Matric -- -- 0.462 0.000 -- -- 0.553 0.000 
     0.030       0.029   
Inter -- -- 0.609 0.000 -- -- 0.757 0.000 
     0.040       0.035   
Bachelor -- -- 0.842 0.000 -- -- 1.140 0.000 
     0.038       0.037   
Pgrad -- -- 1.076 0.000 -- -- 1.664 0.000 
     0.044       0.040   
Male 0.459 0.000 0.456 0.000 0.992 0.000 0.991 0.000 
 -0.038   0.038   -0.019   0.024   
Urban 0.267 0.000 0.268 0.000 0.265 0.000 0.266 0.000 
 0.020   0.020   -0.019   0.019   
Manuf -0.134 0.000 -0.140 0.000 0.014 0.582 0.022 0.393 
 0.035   0.035   -0.026   0.026   
Serv -0.047 0.000 -0.047 0.000 0.075 0.004 0.071 0.000 
 0.007   0.008   0.026   0.026   
Constant         
R square         
N 2630  2630  4679  4679  
Note: Standard errors are in the second rows, Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
Table 10. Earnings functions for wage earners in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP) 
KHYBER PAKHTOONKHWA 
 1993 2006 
Variable Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| 
         
Exper 0.053 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.077 0.000 
 0.004   0.004   0.004   0.004   
Exper2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Yrsed 0.013 0.016 -- -- 0.052 0.000 -- -- 
 0.005   ( )   0.007   ( )   
Yrsed2 0.004 0.000 -- -- 0.002 0.000 -- -- 
 0.000   ( )   0.000   ( )   
Primary -- -- 0.035 0.363 -- -- 0.311 0.000 
     0.038       0.046   
Middle -- -- 0.081 0.000 -- -- 0.372 0.000 
     0.023       0.048   
Matric -- -- 0.431 0.000 -- -- 0.692 0.000 
     0.039       0.043   
Inter -- -- 0.583 0.000 -- -- 1.053 0.000 
     0.058       0.059   
Bachelor -- -- 0.767 0.000 -- -- 1.295 0.000 
     0.059       0.058   
Pgrad -- -- 1.123 0.000 -- -- 1.677 0.000 
     0.073       0.054   
Male 0.380 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.493 0.000 0.551 0.000 
 0.049   0.051   0.049   0.048   
Urban 0.157 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.088 0.001 
 0.025   0.025   0.028   0.027   
Manuf -0.073 0.109 -0.068 0.132 0.300 0.000 0.326 0.000 
 0.046   0.045   0.079   0.077   
Serv -0.054 0.000 -0.044 0.000 0.241 0.002 0.246 0.001 
 0.010   0.010   0.078   0.076   
Constant 6.025   6.114   4.852   4.848   
R square 0.380   0.380   0.420   0.450   
N 1599  1599  2246  2246  
Note: Standard errors are in the second rows, Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table 11. Earnings functions for wage earners in Balochistan  
BALOCHISTAN 
 1993 2006 
Variable Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| 
         
Exper 0.052 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.055 0.000 
 0.004   0.004   0.004   0.003   
Exper2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Yrsed 0.004 0.510 -- -- 0.043 0.000 -- -- 
 0.006      0.007      
Yrsed2 0.003 0.000 -- -- 0.002 0.000 -- -- 
 0.000      0.000      
Primary -- -- 0.070 0.110 -- -- 0.222 0.000 
     0.044       0.040   
Middle -- -- 0.101 0.001 -- -- 0.339 0.000 
     0.027       0.045   
Matric -- -- 0.275 0.000 -- -- 0.563 0.000 
     0.043       0.039   
Inter -- -- 0.360 0.000 -- -- 0.875 0.000 
     0.065       0.053   
Bachelor -- -- 0.590 0.000 -- -- 1.052 0.000 
     0.065       0.055   
Pgrad -- -- 1.051 0.000 -- -- 1.264 0.000 
     0.073       0.057   
Male 0.040 0.598 0.034 0.661 0.596 0.000 0.638 0.000 
 0.077   0.077   0.067   0.067   
Urban 0.056 0.037 0.052 0.052 0.104 0.000 0.109 0.000 
 0.027   0.027   0.025   0.025   
Manuf -0.181 0.000 -0.158 0.001 0.030 0.487 0.042 0.316 
 0.045   0.046   0.043   0.042   
Serv -0.090 0.000 -0.092 0.000 0.101 0.015 0.102 0.012 
 0.010   0.010   0.041   0.041   
Constant 6.744   6.851   5.447   5.447   
R square 0.390   0.390   0.350   0.370   
N 1029  1029  2112  2112  
Note: Standard errors are in the second rows, Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
Table 12. Earnings functions for male waged workers  
MALES 
 1993 2006 
Variable Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| 
         
Exper 0.060 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.057 0.000 
 0.002   -0.002   -0.001   0.002   
Exper2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Yrsed 0.016 0.000 --   0.021 0.000     
      0.002      -0.003      
Yrsed2 0.004 0.000 --   0.004 0.000     
 0.000      0.000      
Primary --   0.109 0.000 --   0.081 0.000 
    0.016      0.016   
Middle --   0.136 0.000 --   0.207 0.000 
    0.010      0.019   
Matric --   0.428 0.000 --   0.402 0.000 
    0.017      0.017   
Inter --   0.622 0.000 --   0.694 0.000 
    0.024      0.023   
Bachelor --   0.893 0.000 --   0.977 0.000 
    0.025      0.024   
Pgrad --   1.235 0.000 --   1.328 0.000 
    0.028      0.028   
Urban 0.176 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.250 0.000 
 0.011   0.011   0.010   0.011   
Punjab -0.207 0.000 -0.208 0.000 -0.081 0.000 -0.068 0.000 
 0.018   0.018   0.015   0.016   
Sindh -0.127 0.000 -0.130 0.000 -0.090 0.000 -0.093 0.000 
 0.018   0.018   0.015   0.016   
KP -0.253 0.000 -0.254 0.000 -0.171 0.000 -0.148 0.000 
    0.020   0.020   0.017   0.019   
Constant 6.423   6.520   6.010   6.233   
R square 0.404   0.403   0.426   0.341   
N 8477  8477  12170  12170  
Note: Standard errors are in 2nd rows, Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table 13. Earnings functions for female waged workers  
FEMALES 
 1993 2006 
Variable Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff (b) p>|Z| Coeff (a) p>|Z| Coeff 
(b) 
p>|Z| 
         
Exper 0.055 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.063 0.000 
 -0.007   0.007   0.005   0.005   
Exper2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Yrsed 0.065 0.000     0.069 0.000     
 0.013      0.011      
Yrsed2 0.002 0.037     0.005 0.000     
 0.001      0.001      
Primary --   0.365 0.000 --   0.237 0.000 
    0.135      0.070   
Middle --   0.243 0.000 --   0.340 0.001 
    0.068      0.100   
Matric --   0.822 0.000 --   1.094 0.001 
          0.071   
Inter --       --   1.251 0.000 
          0.086   
Bachelor --       --   1.734 0.000 
          0.085   
Pgrad --   1.708 0.000 --   2.206 0.000 
     0.128      0.099   
Urban 0.193 0.000 0.199 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.310 0.000 
 0.063   0.063   0.038   0.040   
Punjab -0.630 0.000 -0.647 0.000 -0.423 0.000 -0.454 0.000 
 0.126   0.127   0.103   0.110   
Sindh -0.538 0.000 -0.544 0.000 -0.177 0.095 -0.221 0.050 
 0.131   0.131   0.106   0.113   
KP -0.565 0.000 -0.576 0.000 -0.122 0.294 -0.129 0.297 
 0.136   0.136   0.116   0.124   
Constant 6.361   6.433   4.644   5.051   
R square 0.444   0.449   0.441   0.372   
N 593  593  2293  2293  
Note: Standard errors in the 2nd rows, Source: Author’s estimates from HIES 1992-93 & HIES 2005-
06 
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Table 14.  Mincerian Estimates for Pakistan (wage workers between 15-65 years) 
 Urban Males Urban Females Rural Males Rural Females 
Variable 1993 2006 1993 2006 1993 2006 1993 2006 
Exper 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.052*** 0.079*** 0.053*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.083*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.015 0.008 
Exper2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Yrsed 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.052*** 0.082*** 0.021*** 0.040*** 0.064* 0.048** 
 0.003 0.004 0.015 0.016 0.004 0.004 0.034 0.019 
Yrsed2 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.005 0.007*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 
Punjab -0.119*** -0.034 -0.581*** -0.296** -0.308*** -0.130*** -0.790*** -0.657*** 
 0.023 0.024 0.142 0.130 0.027 0.019 0.254 0.174 
Sindh -0.024 0.005 -0.492*** -0.132 -0.265*** -0.184*** -0.702** -0.335*** 
 0.024 0.024 0.144 0.133 0.029 0.019 0.288 0.177 
KP -0.209*** -0.185*** -0.514*** -0.061 -0.309*** -0.170*** -0.730** -0.322*** 
 0.027 0.028 0.153 0.149 0.029 0.022 0.280 0.191 
Constant 6.441 6.108 6.538 4.707 6.645 6.080 6.409 4.913 
         
R squared 0.45 0.456 0.41 0.464 0.237 0.332 0.423 0.297 
N 4731 6195 413 1100 3746 6184 180 1193 
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Table 15. Simulated change in typical mean earnings: Price Effect 
a) Percentage increase in mean income from 1993 to 2006 because of price effect 
Urban males 41 
Urban females 15 
Rural males 48 
Rural females 58 
b) Percentage increase in mean income from 2006 to 1993 because of price effect 
Urban males 53 
Urban females 746 
Rural males 83 
Rural females 892 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 16. Changes in earnings inequality 
Base Year = 1993 
 Urban Males Urban Females Rural Males Rural Females 
Simulation 1  *   
Simulation 2   *          
Simulation 3   *          
Simulation 4  *   
Base Year = 2006 
Simulation 1  **          *  
Simulation 2  ** *  
Simulation 3  **   
Simulation 4  ** *  
Note: * stands for largest increase in earnings inequality after performing a simulation,   ** stands for largest 
decrease in earnings inequality after performing a simulation. 
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Figure 4: Simulated Earnings Inequality in 1993, using 2006 Coefficients 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using HIES 1992-93 and HIES 2005-06. This table reports GINI coefficient 
results. 
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Urban Males -17 25 62 37 23
Urban Females -45 73 96 44 64
Rural Males -24 59 103 65 53
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Figure 5: Simulated Earnings Inequality for 2006, using 1993 Coefficients 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using HIES 1992-93 and HIES 2005-06. This table reports GINI coefficient 
results.  
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Urban Males 21 32 9 -30 32
Urban Females 83 -23 -35 -44 -23
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Table 17. Distribution of Earnings Income, Substituting 1993 Values into 2006 
Distribution 
Indicator Inequality Measure 
 Gini E(0) E(1) 
Actual value 2006    
  Urban Males 0.352 0.203 0.229 
  Urban Females 0.527 0.478 0.626 
  Rural Males 0.315 0.160 0.171 
  Rural Females 0.559 0.544 0.817 
       
Actual value 1993       
  Urban Males 0.292 0.136 0.143 
  Urban Females 0.288 0.134 0.150 
  Rural Males 0.239 0.091 0.096 
  Rural Females 0.380 0.245 0.297 
 
Actual change ( as a % of total change )       
  Urban Males 20.821 49.339 60.129 
  Urban Females 82.931 255.199 317.322 
  Rural Males 32.154 76.007 79.253 
  Rural Females 46.860 121.848 175.295 
 
Simulated change 1 (absolute value)       
  Urban Males 0.465 0.416 0.474 
  Urban Females 0.404 0.327 0.401 
  Rural Males 0.459 0.402 0.462 
  Rural Females 0.483 0.455 0.666 
 
Simulated change 1 (as a % of total change)       
  Urban Males 31.835 104.520 107.487 
  Urban Females -23.280 -31.598 -35.979 
  Rural Males 45.603 151.761 169.591 
  Rural Females -13.553 -16.414 -18.534 
 
Simulated change 2 (absolute value)       
  Urban Males 0.383 0.263 0.285 
  Urban Females 0.341 0.216 0.235 
  Rural Males 0.374 0.251 0.272 
  Rural Females 0.453 0.385 0.498 
 
Simulated change 2 (as a % of total change)       
  Urban Males 8.737 29.399 24.624 
  Urban Females -35.303 -54.778 -62.452 
  Rural Males 18.699 56.947 58.507 
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  Rural Females -18.860 -29.184 -39.047 
 
Simulated change 3 (absolute value)       
  Urban Males 0.247 0.122 0.112 
  Urban Females 0.293 0.157 0.149 
  Rural Males 0.256 0.130 0.121 
  Rural Females 0.336 0.212 0.201 
 
Simulated change 3 (as a % of total change)       
  Urban Males -29.959 -39.982 -50.840 
  Urban Females -44.338 -67.155 -76.204 
  Rural Males -18.753 -18.968 -29.429 
  Rural Females -39.772 -61.075 -75.424 
 
Simulated change 4 (absolute value)       
  Urban Males 0.465 0.416 0.473 
  Urban Females 0.405 0.326 0.397 
  Rural Males 0.458 0.399 0.459 
  Rural Females 0.467 0.422 0.624 
 
Simulated change 4 (as a % of total change)       
  Urban Males 31.977 104.461 106.927 
  Urban Females -23.100 -31.803 -36.595 
  Rural Males 45.428 149.703 167.974 
  Rural Females -16.488 -22.384 -23.681 
Note: E(0) is log mean deviation, E(1) is Theil Index. Source: Author’s calculations based on 
HIES 1993 and 2006. 
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Table 18. Distribution of Earnings Income, Substituting 2006 Values into 1993 
Distribution 
Indicator Inequality Measure 
 Gini E(0) E(1) 
Actual value 1993    
  Urban Males 0.292 0.136 0.143 
  Urban Females 0.288 0.134 0.150 
  Rural Males 0.239 0.091 0.096 
  Rural Females 0.380 0.245 0.297 
 
Actual value 2006    
  Urban Males 0.352 0.203 0.229 
  Urban Females 0.527 0.478 0.626 
  Rural Males 0.315 0.160 0.171 
  Rural Females 0.559 0.544 0.817 
 
Actual change ( as a % of total change )    
  Urban Males -17.233 -33.038 -37.550 
  Urban Females -45.334 -71.847 -76.038 
  Rural Males -24.331 -43.184 -44.213 
  Rural Females -31.908 -54.924 -63.675 
 
Simulated change 1 (absolute value)    
  Urban Males 0.365 0.239 0.278 
  Urban Females 0.495 0.434 0.519 
  Rural Males 0.378 0.255 0.291 
  Rural Females 0.429 0.326 0.375 
 
Simulated change 1 (as a % of total change)    
  Urban Males 25.336 75.837 95.004 
  Urban Females 72.544 222.847 246.141 
  Rural Males 58.654 180.841 204.195 
  Rural Females 12.829 33.139 26.386 
 
Simulated change 2 (absolute value)    
  Urban Males 0.471 0.418 0.591 
  Urban Females 0.563 0.589 0.787 
  Rural Males 0.483 0.436 0.598 
  Rural Females 0.465 0.392 0.475 
 
Simulated change 2 (as a % of total change)    
  Urban Males 61.540 206.683 314.351 
  Urban Females 96.056 338.249 424.540 
  Rural Males 102.667 380.324 525.748 
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  Rural Females 22.301 59.706 60.026 
 
Simulated change 3 (absolute value)    
  Urban Males 0.398 0.308 0.463 
  Urban Females 0.414 0.321 0.481 
  Rural Males 0.394 0.299 0.446 
  Rural Females 0.423 0.322 0.401 
 
Simulated change 3 (as a % of total change)    
  Urban Males 36.533 126.520 224.189 
  Urban Females 44.080 138.420 220.581 
  Rural Males 65.099 229.333 367.033 
  Rural Females 11.194 31.413 35.095 
 
 
Simulated change 4 (absolute value)    
  Urban Males 0.35801 0.23131 0.26991 
  Urban Females 0.47168 0.38821 0.4734 
  Rural Males 0.36594 0.24043 0.27515 
  Rural Females 0.37709 0.25449 0.30558 
 
Simulated change 4 (as a % of total change)    
  Urban Males 22.74067 69.88102 89.13181 
  Urban Females 63.77778 188.7178 215.5159 
  Rural Males 53.42753 164.7324 187.874 
  Rural Females -0.86753 3.809912 2.909679 
Note: E(0) is log mean deviation, E(1) is Theil Index. Source: Author’s calculations based on 
HIES 1993 and 2006. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Does Economic Geography Matter for Pakistan? A Spatial 
Exploratory Analysis  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Generally, econometric studies of income inequality consider regions as independent entities, 
ignoring the likely possibility of spatial interaction between them. This interaction may cause 
spatial dependency or clustering, which is referred to as spatial autocorrelation. This chapter 
analyzes the spatial clustering of income, income inequality, education, and growth by 
employing spatial exploratory data analysis (ESDA) techniques for the first time to data on 
Pakistani districts. By detecting outliers and clusters, ESDA allows policy makers to focus on 
the geography of socio-economic regional characteristics. Global and local measures of 
spatial autocorrelation were computed using the Moran’s I and the Geary’s C index to obtain 
estimates of the spatial autocorrelation of spatial disparities across 98 districts. The overall 
finding is that the distribution of district wise income inequality, income, education 
attainment, growth, and development levels, exhibit a significant tendency for inequality and 
similar levels of education to cluster in Pakistan (i.e. the presence of spatial autocorrelation is 
confirmed)37. 
 
Key words: Pakistan, spatial effects, spatial exploratory analysis, spatial disparities 
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1.  Introduction 
From the industrial revolution to the emergence of the so-called knowledge economy, history 
has shown that economic development has taken place unevenly across regions. A region’s 
economy is a complex mix of varying types of geographical locations comprising different 
kinds of economic structures, infrastructure, and human capital. In this context recent 
literature in regional sciences has highlighted how crucial it is to analyse socio-economic 
phenomena in the light of spatial concepts such as geography, neighbourhood, density, and 
distance (Krugman, 1991; Krugman and Venebles, 1995; Quah, 1996; Baldwin et al, 2003; 
van Oort, 2004; Kanbur and Venebles, 2005; World Development Report, 2009). Keeping 
these recent developments in view, this chapter identifies, measures, and models the temporal 
relationship between space, economic inequalities and growth for the case of Pakistan38. 
Specifically, by using data at district level from 1998 to 2007, it utilizes spatial exploratory 
techniques to determine the effect of distance and contiguity among 98 of Pakistan’s 
administrative districts on their human capital characteristics and inequalities39. This way it 
provides some of the first spatially explicit results for clustering of socio-economic 
characteristics across Pakistani districts40.  
Most of the existing research on Pakistan’s economy is based on a provincial level, 
and it neglects the role of social interactions within the provinces41. This chapter in particular 
investigates whether spatial clustering of income and average education levels can explain 
their distribution across Pakistani districts. District level research has become even more 
important as Pakistan has taken a major step towards fiscal decentralization with the enaction 
of the 18th Constitutional Amendment42. Moreover the 7th National Finance Commission 
Award has allowed the transfer of more funds from the federation to the provinces which will 
                                                        
38 Economic inequalities refer to education, earnings, and income inequalities in particular. 
39 Examples of studies similar to this chapter include: Rey and Montouri (1999) on convergence across USA, 
Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) for income inequality in Philipines, Dall’erba (2004) analyses productivity 
convergence across Spanish regions over time, Dominicis, Arbia and de Groot (2005) analyses spatial 
distribution of economic activities in Italy, Pose and Tselios (2007) investigates education and income 
inequalities in the European Union, and Celebioglu and Dall’erba (2009) analyses spatial disparities in growth 
and development in Turkey. 
40 The only other exception includes Burki et al (2010) that has explicitly considered spatial dependencies in its 
analysis. However it only studies 56 districts.  
41 Exceptions include Jamal and Khan (2003a, 2003b), Jamal and Khan (2008a, 2008b), Naqvi (2007),Arif et al 
(2010), Siddique (2008) and a few others. Except for Jamal and Khan (2003a, 2003b), Jamal and Khan (2007a, 
2007b), most of them only study selected districts/villages from the same province e.g. Naqvi (2007) only 
analyses the districts/villages of Punjab. 
42 The 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan (8th April 2010) has removed the power of the President 
of Pakistan to unilaterally dissolve the Parliament, removed the limit on a Prime Minister serving more than two 
terms, and has increased provincial autonomy to a very large extent. 
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now have more authority over the provision of health, educational and physical infrastructure 
facilities. This fundamental shift towards the division of power between the centre and the 
provinces bears significant implications for the country’s long term policy planning, 
management and implementation. As education and other public and social services become 
the sole domain of the provinces, there is a need for increased research on how will the 
provinces build their capacities and generate resources for efficient public service delivery in 
social sectors across their districts. 
Furthermore, economic inequalities in particular are being considered in this chapter 
because like most emerging market economies today, Pakistan is also characterised with 
increasing inequalities in the spatial distribution of its key socio-economic characteristics 
such as education, health, physical infrastructure, etc (Burki et al, 2010). While some districts 
have the state of the art physical and human capital infrastructure, others have made little or 
no progress at all. This phenomenon is in line with the findings of the World Bank’s World 
Development Report (2009) that has demonstrated how and why the clustering or 
concentration of people and production usually takes place in certain favourable areas 
(coasts, cities, etc) during the growth process in any country. For the case of Pakistan, the 
most developed districts are located in Northern and Central Punjab. Moreover it has been 
noted that districts with population density of more than 600 persons per square km are 
characterized by industrial clusters, superior education and health infrastructure and better 
sanitation facilities that serve as attractive pull factors, e.g., Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, 
Charsadda, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Mardan, Islamabad, Multan, Swabi, Gujrat and 
Rawalpindi (Khan, 2003). On the other hand, districts with lower population density (or 
below 30 persons per square km) are characterized by prevalence of various push factors such 
as: absence of job opportunities due to lower education and health facilities, poor agricultural 
endowments, barren or mountainous topography, and limited presence of industrial units 
(Khan, 2003). Moreover, since a region’s (a town, city or country) prosperity and 
development is ultimately also shared by its neighbours, recent evidence has also 
demonstrated that neighbourhoods do matter in Pakistan. For example, the highly (and 
medium) concentrated districts (except for Swat and Muzzaffargarh) are mostly clustered 
around metropolitan cities of Karachi and Lahore (Burki et al, 2010).  
In the light of the above mentioned issues, this study investigates the spatial clustering 
of economic inequalities, growth and development across Pakistani districts by utilizing 
ESDA techniques.  The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data; Section 
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3 gives an overview of the methodology; Section 3 explains the global and the local spatial 
autocorrelation detection techniques; Section 4 provides an analysis of the results after having 
applied the ESDA techniques on district income and education data; finally Section 5 
summarizes and evaluates. 
 
 
2. Data 
This study uses micro data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement 
survey (PSLM) which is annually produced by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) of 
Pakistan since 2004. It is the only socio-economic micro data that is representative at the 
provincial and at the district level. Moreover, the sample size of the district level data is also 
substantially larger than the provincial level data contained in micro data surveys such as 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of Pakistan and the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) of Pakistan. This has enabled researchers to draw socioeconomic information which is 
representative at lower administrative levels as well.  
The survey for 2004-05 provides district level welfare indicators for a sample size of 
about 76,500 households. It provides data on districts in all four provinces of Pakistan 
namely; Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP), and Balochistan. The federally 
administered tribal areas (FATA region) along the Afghan border in the north-west and Azad 
Kashmir are not included in the data.  The PSLM is divided into two parts. The first part 
contains data on socio-economic characteristics such as education, health, population welfare, 
immunization, pre/post natal care, family planning, water supply, and sanitation while the 
second part contains household income and expenditure data.  
To analyse the spatial differences in growth rates and development levels over time, 
this chapter has also utilized the district level data from the 1998 Population Census of 
Pakistan. This is the latest available census and provides detailed macro-data on all the 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of Pakistani districts. Since the data from 
PSLM (2004-05) is statistically comparable with the Pakistan Census Data (1998), with some 
margin of sampling error, the two data sets together provide a decent gap of 7 years to 
analyse the temporal changes in income and development characteristics across Pakistan.  
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3. Methodology 
Due to the abundance in data collected at a provincial or a rural/urban disaggregation, most 
socio-economic studies on Pakistan, are a province based analysis. Pakistani provinces 
however have extreme ‘within’ diversity in terms of their economic structures, development 
levels, cultures, language, natural resources and geography. Hence regional policy making 
requires analyzing socio–economic issues at an even smaller geographical disaggregation. 
For this reason, the spatial unit of analysis in this study will be the ‘districts’ of Pakistan. In 
terms of geographical disaggregation Pakistan (excluding the Federally Administered Tribal 
Area (FATA) region and Azad Kashmir) has 4 levels consisting of 4 provinces (Punjab, 
Sindh, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP), and Balochistan), 107 districts, 377 sub-districts, and 
45653 villages (see Figure 1 and 2).  A lower level unit of analysis is not being used because 
data on regional scales below the district level in Pakistan suffers from reliability issues. 
Finally, due to data constraints, this chapter analyzes 98 out of 107 districts in Pakistan. 
3.1 Spatial economic analysis 
A fundamental concept in geography is that proximate locations often share more similarities 
than locations far apart. This idea is commonly referred to as the ‘Tobler’s first law of 
geography’ (Tobler, 1970). Classical statistical inference such as conventional regressions are 
inadequate for an in-depth spatial analysis since they fail to take into account spatial effects 
and problems of spatial data analysis such as spatial autocorrelation, identification of spatial 
clusters and outliers, edge effects, modifiable areal unit problem, and lack of spatial 
independence (Arbia, Benedetti, and Espa, 1996; Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley, 2006; 
Franzese and Hays, 2007)43. Moreover, as an uneven distribution of socio-economic 
economic characteristics is shaping the economic geography of most countries, spatial 
analysis also has increasing policy relevance (World Development Report—WDR, 2009). 
These reasons together necessitate the use of spatial exploratory and explanatory methods 
that can explicitly take spatial effects into account.  
 
 
                                                        
43 Modifiable Areal Unit Problem: When attributes of a spatially homogenous phenomenon (e.g people) are 
aggregated into districts, the resulting values (e.g totals, rates and ratios) are influenced by the choice of the 
district boundaries just as much as by the underlying spatial patterns of the phenomenon. 
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3.2 Spatial effects 
Spatial effects can be divided into two main kinds: spatial dependence and spatial 
heterogeneity. Spatial heterogeneity refers to the display of instability in the behaviour of the 
relationships under study. This implies that parameters and functional relationships vary 
across space and are not homogenous throughout data sets. Spatial dependence on the other 
hand, refers to the lack of independence between observations often present in cross sectional 
data sets. It can be considered as a functional relationship between what happens at one point 
in space and what happens in another. If the Euclidean sense of space is extended to include 
general space (consisting of policy space, inter-personal distance, social networks etc) it 
shows how spatial dependence is a phenomenon with a wide range of application in social 
sciences. Two factors can lead to it. First, measurement errors may exist for observations in 
contiguous spatial units. The second reason can be the use of inappropriate functional 
frameworks in the presence of different spatial processes (such as diffusion, exchange and 
transfer, interaction and dispersal) as a result of which what happens at one location is partly 
determined by what happens elsewhere in the system under analysis.  
Assuming non-stationarity or structural stability over space is a highly unrealistic 
assumption when the variable under study belongs to different locations across space. Along 
the lines of temporal autocorrelation often found in time series data, spatial autocorrelation 
also violates the standard assumption of independence among observations. Hence standard 
regression analysis that does not compensate for spatial dependency can yield possibly biased 
estimators and unreliable significance tests. As a remedy spatial autocorrelation statistics 
have been devised in order to detect, measure, and analyze the degree of dependency among 
observations. 
3.3 Quantifying spatial effects  
Spatial dependence puts forward the need to determine which spatial units in a system are 
related, how spatial dependence occurs between them, and what kind of influence do they 
exercise on each other. Formally these questions are answered by using the concepts of 
neighbourhood expressed in terms of distance or contiguity. 
Boundaries of spatial units can be used to determine contiguity or adjacency which 
can be of several orders (e.g. first order contiguity or more). Contiguity can be defined as 
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linear contiguity (i.e. when counties which share a border with the county of interest are 
immediately on its left or right), rook contiguity (i.e. counties that share a common side with 
the county of interest), bishop contiguity (i.e. counties share a vertex with the county of 
interest), double rook contiguity (i.e. two counties to the north, south, east, west of the county 
of interest), and queen contiguity (i.e. when counties share a common side or a vertex with 
the county of interest) (LeSage, 1999). Other common conceptualizations of spatial 
relationships include inverse distance, travel time, fixed distance bands, and k-nearest 
neighbours. 
The most popular way of representing a type of contiguity or adjacency is the use of 
the binary contiguity (Cliff and Ord, 1973; 1981) expressed in a spatial weight matrix (W). In 
spatial econometrics W provides the composition of the spatial relationships among different 
points in space. The spatial weight matrix enables us to relate a variable at one point in space 
to the observations for that variable in other spatial units of the system. It is used as a variable 
while modelling spatial effects contained in the data. Generally it is based on using either 
distance or contiguity between spatial units. Consider below a spatial weight matrix for three 
units: 
 
where w ij may be the inverse distance between two units i and j or it may be 0 and 1 if they 
share a border or a vertex. The W matrix displays the properties of a spatial system and can 
be used to gauge the prominence of a spatial unit within the system. The usual expectation is 
that values at adjacent locations will be similar. 
3.4 The spatial weight matrix for Pakistan 
The choice of the W matrix representation and its conceptualization has to be carefully based 
on theoretical reasoning and the historical factors underlying the concept or phenomenon 
under study. For example for cluster detection and influence analysis inverse distance is the 
most appropriate measure due to the distance decay effect, but when we are assessing the 
geographic distribution of a region’s commuters, travel time or cost would be a better choice. 
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This paper has employed two W matrices for Pakistan44. It is the first time a W matrix 
has been utilized for a spatial analysis of Pakistan. The first matrix is a simple binary 
contiguity W matrix (referred to as BC matrix from now onwards) based on the concept of 
Queen Contiguity i.e. if a district i shares a border or a vertex with another district j, they are 
considered as neighbours, and ݓ௜,௝  takes the value 1 and 0 otherwise. This matrix is also zero 
along its diagonal implying that a district cannot be a neighbour to itself. Hence it is a 
symmetric binary matrix with a dimension of 98x98 (98 being the total number of the 
districts being analyzed). This matrix precisely tells us the influence of geographically 
adjacent neighbours on each other. A simple binary contiguity matrix is a standard starting 
point and its influence is often compared with other types of W matrices. 
The second W matrix developed for Pakistan is one based on inverse average road 
distance from district i to the closest district j which has a ‘large city’ in it (referred to as ID 
matrix from now onwards). Out of the 98 districts being studied there are only 14 that come 
under the category of a district with a ‘large size’ city as per the classification of the coding 
scheme for the PSLM survey. These include Islamabad as the federal capital city; Lahore, 
Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, Gujranwala, Sargodha, Sialkot, and Bahawalpur as districts 
with a ‘large size’ city in Punjab; Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur in Sindh; Peshawar in the 
North West Frontier Province and Quetta in Balochistan. This matrix is a symmetric non-
binary matrix, again with a dimension of 98x98. 
The reason for selecting road distance instead of train distance as is normally done in 
most studies on urban area analysis is that in Pakistan, the road network is much better 
developed than the railway network . As a result, Pakistan’s transport system is primarily 
dependent on road transport which makes up 90 percent of national passenger traffic and 96 
percent of freight movement every year (The Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2007-08). 
Inverse distance matrices have more explanatory power as partitions of geographic 
space especially when the phenomenon under study involves the exchange or transfer of 
information and knowledge (in our case income and education). It establishes a decay 
function that weighs the effect of events in geographically proximate units more heavily than 
those in geographically distant units.  Since a country is not a plain piece of land, Euclidean 
distance calculations or distance as ‘the crow flies’ make little economic sense when we are 
                                                        
44  Usually two or more weights matrices are utilized in spatial exploratory and econometric studies as a 
robustness measure. It is way of demonstrating whether the strength of spatial effects is robust to changing 
definitions of neighbourhood. 
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trying to investigate the effect of distance from districts with a large city on regional wages. 
The effect of the density of country’s infrastructure network is an important influence. For 
this reason this chapter has utilized the Google Maps service of distance calculation. It not 
only provides the Euclidean or the straight line distance between districts using their 
longitude and latitude information but also the maximum and minimum road distance to 
reach from one district to another carefully taking into consideration the existing road 
network of Pakistan. The distance used in this paper is the inverse of the average of the 
maximum and the minimum road distance between a district and its closest large city district. 
Finally both the matrices are row-standardized i.e. each weight is divided by its row 
sum. Row standardization is recommended whenever the distribution of the variables under 
consideration is potentially biased due to errors in sampling design or due to an imposed 
aggregation scheme. 
 
4. Exploratory spatial data analysis 
Spatial effects are incorporated in spatial modelling which typically aims to look for 
“associations instead of trying to develop explanations” (Haining 2003: 358). This chapter 
applies exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) techniques to district wise data on income, 
education, growth and development levels in order to detect the presence of spatial 
dependence. ESDA describes and visualizes spatial distributions, “identifies spatial outliers, 
detects agglomerations and local spatial autocorrelations, and highlights the types of spatial 
heterogeneities” (Oort 2004, 107; Haining 1990; Bailey and Gatrell 1995; Anselin 1988; Le 
Gallo and Ertur 2003).The particular techniques employed in this study include the 
calculation of Moran’s I statistic and Geary’s C statsitic. The global Moran’s I demonstrates 
the spatial association of data collected from points in space and measures similarities and 
dissimilarities in observations across space in the whole system (Anselin, 1995). However in 
the presence of uneven spatial clustering, the Local Indicators of Spatial Association have 
been utilized. They measure the contribution of individual spatial units to the global Moran’s 
I statistic (Anselin, 1995). The study will also generate Moran scatter plots to demonstrate the 
spatial distribution of district wage and education levels across Pakistan. 
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4.1 Measures of spatial autocorrelation: 
i) Global spatial autocorrelation 
Spatial autocorrelation occurs when the spatial distribution of the variable of interest exhibits 
a systematic pattern (Cliff and Ord, 1981). Positive (negative) spatial autocorrelation occurs 
when a geographical area tends to be surrounded by neighbours with similar (dissimilar) 
values of the variable of interest. As previously mentioned, this paper utilizes two measures 
Moran’s I and Geary’s C statistics to detect the global spatial autocorrelation present in the 
data45.  The Moran’s I is the most widely used measure for detecting and explaining spatial 
clustering not only because of its interpretative simplicity but also because it can be 
decomposed into a local statistic along with providing graphical evidence of the presence of 
absence of spatial clustering.   
It is defined as: 
 
I = ௡
ௌబ
  ∙ ∑ ∑ ௪೔,ೕ ೙ೕ೙೔ (௬೔ି௬ത)൫௬ೕି௬ത൯
∑ (௬೔ି௬ത )మ೙೔                                                                                                     (1) 
 
where ݕ௜ is the observation of variable in location i , ݕത is the mean of the observations across 
all locations, n  is the total number of geographical units or locations, ݓ௜,௝  is one of the 
elements of the weights matrix and it indicates the spatial relationship between location i and 
location j. 
 ܵ଴ is a scaling factor which is equal to the sum of all the elements of the W matrix :  
ܵ଴ = ∑ ∑ ݓ௜,௝௡௝௡௜                                                                                                                         (2) 
ܵ଴ is equal to n for row standardized weights matrices (which is the preferred way to 
implement the Moran’s I statistic), since each row then adds up to 1. The first term in 
equation (1) then becomes equal to 1 and the Moran’s I simplifies to a ratio of spatial cross 
products to variance.  
                                                        
45 Another well known measure of spatial autocorrelation is Getis and Ord’s G statistic, see Anselin (1995a, 
p.22-23).  
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Under the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation, the theoretical mean of Moran’s I is 
given by  
E (I) = -1/ (n-1)               (3) 
The expected value is thus negative and will tend to zero as the sample size increases as it is 
only a function of n (the sample size). Moran’s I ranges from -1 (perfect spatial dispersion) to 
+1 (perfect spatial correlation) while a 0 value indicates a random spatial pattern.  If the 
Moran’s I is larger than its expected value, then the distribution of y will display positive 
spatial autocorrelation i.e. the value of y at each location i tends to be similar to values of y at 
spatially contiguous locations. However, if I is smaller than its expected value, then the 
distribution of y will be characterized by negative spatial autocorrelation, implying that the 
value of y at each location i tends to be different from the value of y at spatially contiguous 
locations. Inference is based on z-values computed as 
ݖூ = ூିா(ூ)௦ௗ(ூ)                                                                                                            (4)                                    
i.e. the expected value of I is subtracted from I and divided by its standard deviation. The 
theoretical variance of Moran’s I depends on the assumptions made about the data and the 
nature of spatial autocorrelation. This paper will present the results under the randomization 
assumption i.e. each value observed could have equally occurred at all locations46. Under this 
assumption ݖூ asymptotically follows a normal distribution, so that its significance can be 
evaluated using a standard normal table (Anselin 1992a). A positive (negative) and 
significant z- value for Moran’s I accompanied by a low (high) p-value indicates positive 
(negative) spatial autocorrelation47.  
The second measure of spatial autocorrelation that has been utilized is the Geary’s C which is 
defined as: 
ܥ = (ேିଵ)∑ ∑ ௪೔,ೕೕ೔ (௑೔ି௑ೕ)మ
ଶௐ ∑ (௑೔ି௑ത)మ೔                                                                                                          (5) 
                                                        
46 The other two assumptions include the assumption of normal distribution of the variables in question 
(normality assumption) or a randomization approach using a reference distribution for I that is generated 
empirically (permutation assumption). For details and formulas of the randomization assumption, see Sokal et 
al. 1998).  
47 Negative spatial autocorrelation reflects lack of clustering, more than even the case of a random pattern. The 
checkerboard pattern is an example of perfect negative spatial autocorrelation.  
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where N is the number of spatial units (districts in our case); X is the variable of interest; ݓ௜,௝  
represents the spatial weights matrix, where W is the sum of all ݓ௜,௝. The value of Geary’s C 
lies between 0 and 2. Under the null hypothesis of no global spatial autocorrelation, the 
expected value of C is equal to 1. If C is larger (smaller) than 1, it indicates positive 
(negative) spatial autocorrelation. Geary’s C is more sensitive to local spatial autocorrelation 
than Moran’s I. Inference is based on z-values, computed by subtracting 1 from C and 
dividing the result by the standard deviation of C: 
ݖ௖ = ௖ିଵ௦ௗ(௖)                                                                                                                                 (6) 
The standard deviation of C is computed under the assumption of total randomness, implying 
that ݖ௖ is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate (Anselin, 1992a; Pissati, 
2001). 
Finally, the results of the Moran’s I and Geary’s C are dependent on the specification 
of the weights matrix. Although interpretations change depending on whether the matrix was 
based on the use of physical distance or economic distance, a “pattern of decreasing spatial 
autocorrelation with increasing orders of contiguity (distance decay) is commonly witnessed 
in most spatial autoregressive processes regardless of the matrix specification” (van Oort, 
2004: 109).  
ii) Local spatial autocorrelation 
Since the Moran’s I and Geary’s C are  global statistics based on simultaneous measurements 
from many locations, they only provide broad spatial association measurements, ignore the 
location specific details, and cannot identify which local spatial clusters (or hot spots) 
contribute the most to the global statistic. As a remedy, local statistics commonly referred to 
as ‘Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA)’are used along with graphic visualization 
techniques of the spatial clustering such as a Moran’s Scatterplot (Fotheringham et al, 2000; 
Haining, 2003).  
The Moran scatterplot is derived from the global Moran I statistic. Recall that the 
Moran’s I formula when we use a row standardized matrix can be written as 
 
I=
∑ (௬೔ି௬ത)೙೔  (∑ ௪೔,ೕ೙೔  (௬ೕି௬)തതത)
∑ (௬೔ି௬ത)మ೙೔                                                                                                            (7) 
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This is similar to the formula for a coefficient of the linear regression b, with the exception of (∑ ݓ௜,௝௡௜  (ݕ௝ − ݕ)തതത), which is the so-called spatial lag of the location i.  
Therefore I is formally equivalent to the regression coefficient in a regression of a location’s 
spatial lag (Wz) on the location itself. This interpretation is used by the Moran’s scatterplot, 
enabling us to visualize the Moran’s I in a scatterplot of Wz versus z, where ݖ = ݕ௜ −
ݕത)/(ݕ௜).Moran’s I is then the slope of the regression line contained in the scatterplot. A lack 
of fit in this scatterplot indicates local spatial associations (local pockets/non-stationarity). 
This scatterplot is centered on 0 and is divided in four quadrants that represent different types 
of spatial associations.  
However since graphical evidence alone does not give the significance levels of the spatial 
clustering for which we resort to complementing the Moran scatterplot with a local statistic. 
Local statistics or indicators can reveal the locations that display significant deviation from 
spatial randomness in the presence of global spatial autocorrelation (hot spots) and the 
significant outliers in a diagnostic analysis for local stability. Anselin (1995b) defines a LISA 
as a statistic that satisfies the following two requirements: 
1) The LISA for each observation gives an indication of the spatial clustering of similar 
values around that observation; 
2) The sum of all LISA’s for all observations is proportional to a global indicator of 
spatial association  
We use the local Moran’s I statistic which satisfies the above requirements for our analysis. 
Each local Moran I for a particular location indicates the extent of spatial clustering around it 
and the sum of all local Moran’s I’s is equal to the global Moran’s I. The Local Moran’s I can 
be defined as:   
ܫ௜ = (ݕ௜ − ݕത)∑ ݓ௜,௝௡௜ (ݕ௝ − ݕത)                                                                                                 (8) 
The null hypothesis tested in this case is that there is no association between the value 
observed at a location i and values observed in its neighbours i.e. values of  ܫ௜’s are zero. 
Positive (negative) local spatial autocorrelation exists when we obtain positive (negative) 
values for ܫ௜ and z-scores which indicate the clustering of similar (dissimilar) values of y 
around location i. 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Spatial autocorrelation of income inequality 
Our first empirical estimation involves calculating measures of spatial dependence for the 
Gini coefficient of district per capita income in the year 2005. Table 1 shows the results of 
Moran’s test and Geary’s C statistic for district income inequality levels using the two 
weights matrices. In both of the cases, the null hypothesis of no spatial dependence of income 
inequality between districts is rejected at the significance level of 1% as the measures 
demonstrate a weakly positive spatial autocorrelation amongst district inequality levels (0.21 
under BC matrix specification and 0.25 under ID matrix specification). The results for 
Geary’s C statistic have been reported in Table 2 in Appendix. 
Table 1: Global autocorrelation results for income inequality—Moran’s I (2005) 
           Weight Matrix 
 
 
                        
                       I 
 
             II 
i ≠ ࢐ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૙ ࢕࢘ ૚ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૚ࢊ࢏,࢐ 
࢏ = ࢐ ࢝ ࢏,࢏ = ૙ 
Moran’s I 0.211 0.257 
E(I) -0.010 -0.010 
Sd(I) 0.074 0.103 
Z 2.985 2.601 
p-value 0.003 0.009 
 
5.2 Local spatial autocorrelation of income inequality 
The Moran scatterplot (in Figures 1 and 2) provides a more disaggregated view of the nature 
of the global autocorrelation. It not only provides us information on the presence of clusters 
in the data but also the outliers contained in it. This scatterplot is divided into four quadrants, 
each of which represents a different type of spatial association: 
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 The upper right quadrant represents spatial clustering of a district with a high income 
level around neighbours that also have high incomes. This quadrant is also called the 
High-High zone (HH) since Z-score and Wz (the spatial lag) both have high values. In 
general these are locations that have a positive value for the local Moran’s I. 
 The upper left quadrant represents spatial clustering of a district with a low income 
level (or any other economic variable under study) which is neighbours to districts 
with high income levels. This quadrant is also called the Low-High zone (LH) since 
Z-score is low while Wz has high values indicating a low outlier among neighbours 
with high values. In general these are locations that have a negative value for the local 
Moran’s I. 
 The lower left quadrant represents spatial clustering of a district with a low income 
level around neighbours that also have low incomes. This quadrant is also called the 
Low-Low zone (LL) since Z-score and Wz both have low values. In general these are 
locations that have a negative value for the local Moran’s I. 
 The lower right quadrant represents spatial clustering of a high income district with 
neighbours that have low income levels. This quadrant is also called the High-Low 
zone (HL) since the Z-score is high while Wz has low values indicating a high outlier 
among neighbours with high values. In general these are locations that have a 
negative value for the local Moran’s I. 
Figure 1 illustrates the Moran scatterplot for Gini coefficient of district per capita incomes 
using the binary contiguity weights matrix. It shows a positive global Moran’s I (z-score = 
2.98), which is represented by the slope of the black line. Due to the weakly positive spatial 
autocorrelation, we are unable to detect any substantial clusters of high (or low) inequality 
districts in particular for the year 2005.  
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Figure 1. Spatial autocorrelation of district income inequality using the BC matrix 
 
Similarly, Figure 2 (see below) also shows a Moran scatterplot for Gini coefficient of district 
per capita incomes, however it has utilized an inverse distance weights matrix instead (also 
see Table 2). It has a slightly higher value for the higher value for the global Moran’s I (z-
score = 2.65) since the clusters here are not based on geographic contiguity but on geographic 
proximity to the provincial capital. The overall spatial autocorrelation is although statistically 
significant, it still remains weak. Significant LISA statistics for district income inequality 
have been reported in Tables 2a and 2b in the Appendix. 
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Figure 2. Spatial autocorrelation of district incomes using the inverse distance matrix 
 
5.3 Spatial autocorrelation of district education levels 
The role of human capital in generating growth is important since the distribution of income 
is mainly driven by the distribution of human capital within a country (Golmm and 
Ravikuman, 1992; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997).  Hence the 
operation of human capital externalities and knowledge spillovers plays an important role in 
generating regional dependencies and disparities. It has been demonstrated that regions 
located in an economic periphery experience lower returns to skill attainment and hence have 
reduced incentives for human capital investments and agglomerations. However spatial 
externalities do not spread without limits (Darlauf and Quah, 1999) as a result of which 
closely related economies or regions tend to have similar kinds of human capital externalities 
and technology levels as compared to the more distant ones (see Quah, 1996; Mion, 2004). 
This section investigates the spatial dimensions of education in Pakistan, the extent to which 
neighbouring districts share similar levels of education, and examines whether human capital, 
income and development level inequalities are spatially associated. 
In order to do so, this chapter uses the average district wise education attainment level 
(which is measured as the average number of schooling years completed in a district) as a 
proxy for human capital. It is expected that neighbours of districts with high education 
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attainment should also have high educational awareness and hence similar if not equal 
attainment levels. Again the chapter utilizes the Moran’s I global and local indices along with 
a Moran scatterplot using the two weights matrices.  
 Results show that there exists a greater possibility of knowledge spillovers between 
districts that share a border, as compared to when they do not (see Table 2 and Tables 4a and 
4b in Appendix). The global Moran’s I for average district education level (measured as the 
average education attainment of a district’s citizens) is positive and statistically significant 
when neighbourhood is defined in terms of contiguity, however it is negative and statistically 
insignificant when neighbourhood is defined in terms of proximity. These results imply that 
for a Pakistani district, sharing a border with a district whose individuals have a high (low) 
education level, ‘may’ result in increasing (decreasing) its own education levels. 
 
Table 2: Global autocorrelation results for education attainment—Moran’s I (2005) 
                   Weight Matrix 
 
 
                        
                       I 
 
             II 
i ≠ ࢐ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૙ ࢕࢘ ૚ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૚ࢊ࢏,࢐ 
࢏ = ࢐ ࢝ ࢏,࢏ = ૙ 
Moran’s I 0.395 -0.003 
E(I) -0.010 -0.01 
Sd(I) 0.075 0.103 
Z 5.440 0.072 
p-value 0.000 0.943 
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Figure 3. Spatial autocorrelation of district education levels using the BC matrix 
 
 The positive pattern for spatial autocorrelation for average district education levels 
demonstrated by the BC matrix shows more clusters with low education levels (in the case of 
Balochistan) and high education levels (in the case of Punjab) as compared to outliers. 
Districts in northern Punjab emerge in the High-High quadrant and confirm our assumption 
about high human capital districts being close to each other. These results have also been put 
forward in a recent study on agglomeration patterns of industries across Pakistani districts in 
a study by Burki and Khan (2010) and have been illustrated using a cluster map in Figure 9 in 
the Appendix. 
     The neighbouring districts of Karachi and Thatta emerge as the most significant outliers 
when we analyze the local Moran’s I values using the BC and the ID matrices. While Karachi 
falls into the High-Low zone, Thatta falls in the Low-High zone. However, the fact that being 
a neighbour with Karachi (a district with one of the highest average education levels in 
Pakistan) does not translate in Thatta having improved human capital characteristics is not 
very surprising. Regional science and regional economics literature has demonstrated that the 
economic influence and knowledge spillover effects of coastal cities (such as Karachi) are 
quite different from the pattern of spillovers generated by landlocked regions (Glaeser et al, 
1992; Henderson, 2003). The overall spatial pattern of autocorrelation is quite diffused when 
Moran scatterplot (Moran's I = 0.395)
avg district education level
W
z
z
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Jhal M
Nasira
KohistAwaran
Jaffar
Kharan
Qilla 
Batagr
Upper Bunir
Jaccob
Thatta
Gwadar
Kalat
Musa K
Bolan
Shangl
Tharpa
Tank
Muzaff
Badin
Lodhra
LarkanR Y Kh
Mirpur
Hangu
Dadu
Khuzda
R janp
S nghaNawab 
SibiCharsa
Ve ri
Okara
Bahawa
Pishin
Jh ng
Mastun
Ziarat
Turbat
D G Kh
Nowshe
Bahawa
Ghotki
Khair 
S ikar
D I Kh
Pakpat
Lower 
Bhakka
Lakki 
Chagai
Khanew
BannuBarkha
Swat
Pangju
M nseh
Sawabi
Khusha
Hafiza
Malaka
Kasur
Mard n
HyderaMultan
KarkKohat
Layyah
Lasbel
Nowshe
Sahiwa
Chitra
Sheiku
Mianwa
Lahore
Sargod
TT Sin
Narowa
Mandi 
Peshaw
Sukkur
Faisal
Attock
Lorala
Quetta
Killa 
Gujrat
Haripu
Zhob
Jhelum
Gujran
Abbott
Chakwa
Sialko
Rawalp
Karach
112 
 
we use the ID matrix for analysis. However under both the neighbourhood structures 
Rawalpindi, Abbottabad, Chakwal and Jhelum emerge as a statistically significant cluster of 
districts with high average education attainment levels. The global spatial autocorrelation 
while using the ID matrix is negative but close to 0 and statistically insignificant (see Table 
4b in Appendix). Again these findings indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of no 
spatial association, or that a random pattern exists between districts for average education 
rates48.  
5.4 The dynamics of spatial autocorrelation of district inequality and education levels 
The availability of district wise macro-data for the year 1998, allowed me to measure spatial 
association between district wise primary, secondary, and bachelors education levels for 
1998. It has also been utilized in order to analyse the temporal change in the spatial 
distribution of district wise real per capita GDP growth rate, district wise per capita incomes, 
and district human development levels between 1998 and 2005.  
     Figures 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b in the Appendix each demonstrates a Moran scatterplot which 
provides a disaggregated picture of the nature of spatial autocorrelation for district per capita 
income in 1998 and 2005, using the BC and ID matrix respectively. The spatial lag (Wz) in 
this situation is a weighted average of the incomes of a district’s neighbouring districts. The 
scatterplots in both the years using both the matrices demonstrate that the overall pattern of 
spatial dependence between districts has remained positive and statistically significant. 
However, the overall value of the global Moran’s I statistic has reduced from being 0.81 to 
0.38 between 1998 and 2005 when the results are reported using the BC matrix. Similarly, the 
value of global Moran’s I statistic has reduced from being 0.91 to 0.51 between 1998 and 
2005 under the results produced using the ID matrix (see Figures 4a and 4b in the Appendix). 
The LISA cluster maps further enhance our understanding of the temporal change in spatial 
association between district incomes (Figure 5 in Appendix). The clusters of High-High 
income levels have considerably reduced between 1998 and 2005 (as shown by dark grey 
regions), and the cluster of High-High income regions in 2005 shows how most of the 
districts of Punjab have the highest income levels in Pakistan. 
 
 
                                                        
48 The Moran’s scatterplot using the ID matrix for average district education attainment level is provided in 
Figure 6 in the Appendix. 
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Table 3. Spatial Autocorrelation of per capita GDP growth rate between 1998—2005 
GDP Growth Rate (1998-2005) 
 
 BC matrix ID matrix 
Moran's I 0.430 0.140 
E(I) -0.010 -0.010 
Sd(I) 0.071 0.099 
Z 6.204 1.524 
P-value 0.000 0.128 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Furthermore a spatial analysis of the growth rate between 1998 and 2005, also 
indicates a positive and a statistically significant spatial autocorrelation pattern when 
neighbourhood is defined in terms of contiguity but a statistically insignificant pattern when 
neighbourhood is defined in terms of proximity as measured by the ID matrix (see Table 5). 
This implies that districts with a high (low) real GDP growth rate have been spatially 
associated with other districts which also have high (low) real GDP growth rates. This result 
motivates the spatial econometric analysis of beta-convergence across Pakistani districts by 
explicitly incorporating these spatial effects, in Chapter 4.  
          Moreover, since our macro-data set from 1998 provides district wise statistics on 
individual education attainment levels (measured as the percentage of individuals having 
completed an education level), it has allowed us to analyse how the distance from large 
neighbouring cities (or provincial capitals) affects the incentives to obtain education in a 
district. Table 4 demonstrates that whether neighbourhood is measured in terms of 
geographic proximity (using ID matrix) or in terms of  geographic contiguity (using BC 
matrix), there exists a positive and highly significant spatial autocorrelation for levels of 
education below high-school (i.e primary, matric i.e. grade 10, and inter i.e. grade 12). 
However, for higher levels (Bachelors and above), geographic contiguity to a district with a 
high percentage of graduates, is more influential than the distance from the provincial capital 
or the nearest large city. 
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Table 4. Spatial autocorrelation for education levels, 1998 
Primary Education  Matric   Higher Education—Bachelors 
   
 BC 
Matrix 
ID 
Matrix 
 BC 
Matrix 
ID 
Matrix 
 BC 
Matrix 
ID 
Matrix 
Moran'
s I 
0.494 0.559 
Moran's I 0.391 0.247 Moran's I 0.327 -0.014 
E(I) -0.010 -0.010 E(I) -0.010 -0.010 E(I) -0.010 -0.010 
Sd(I) 0.075 0.103 Sd(I) 0.074 0.102 Sd(I) 0.074 0.102 
Z  6.745 5.501 Z  5.443 2.523 Z  4.582 -0.038 
P-value 0.000 0.000 P-value 0.000 0.012 P-value 0.000 0.969 
   
Geary's C 0.497 0.983 Geary's C 0.610 0.703 Geary's C 0.610 1.643 
E(c) 1.000 1.000 E(c) 1.000 1.000 E(c) 1.000 1.000 
Sd(c) 0.079 0.244 Sd(c) 0.085 0.379 Sd(c) 0.086 0.392 
Z -
6.401 
-0.069 
Z -4.573 -0.783 Z -4.538 4.193 
P-value 0.000 0.945 P-value 0.000 0.434 P-value 0.000 0.000 
Note: BC stands for Binary Continuity, ID for Inverse Distance. Author's own calculations. 
 
Finally, spatial association between district development levels (as measured by the Human 
Development Index (HDI) calculated by the UNDP in NHDR, 2003) has reduced between 
1998 and 2005 from 0.40 to 0.311, but is still positive and significant (see Table 5). These 
results again confirm the findings of the new economic geography literature that a region’s 
development levels, depend on the development levels prevailing in its neighbouring regions. 
Table 5.  HDI Spatial Autocorrelation using the Binary Contiguity Matrix 
District Human Development Index (HDI) 
 1998 2005 
Moran's I 0.405 0.311 
Standard deviation (I) 0.075 0.074 
Z-value  5.573 4.341 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from NHDR (2003).  
Finally, it should be noted that the opposite results obtained after using two different 
weight matrices poses a dilemma towards deriving policy implications from our empirical 
results. After having analyzed the matrices and results in detail, it seems that the logic upon 
which the inverse distance matrix is based on in this chapter could be making this matrix 
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measure connectedness instead of proximity between districts. Future research work will 
focus on investigating this issue along with the formulation of weight matrices based on other 
definitions of proximity using the GIS software. 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter has performed an exploratory analysis of socio-economic disparities across 
Pakistan for the first time and has provided useful insights for the conduct of economic 
regional policy in Pakistan. It has investigated the spatial distribution of income inequality, 
income, education, growth and development levels for 98 districts between 1998 and 2005. 
The overall finding that emerges from this chapter is that the distribution of district wise 
income inequality, income, education attainment, growth, and development levels, exhibits a 
significant tendency to cluster in space (i.e. the presence of spatial autocorrelation is 
confirmed), and hence economic geography does matter for Pakistan.  
Specifically the following main findings emerge using the contiguity matrix from this 
chapter: 
1) The province of Punjab contains the largest cluster of high incomes districts in both 
1998 and 2005.  
2) Districts with a high (low) real GDP growth rate have been spatially associated with 
neighbouring districts (with which they share a border) which also have high (low) 
real GDP growth rates between 1998 and 2005. 
3) District education levels reveal high spatial association. 
4) Except for Lahore, none of the other 3 provincial capitals of Pakistan (Karachi, 
Peshawar, Quetta) have high knowledge spillovers. While this finding is not 
surprising for Karachi, since coastal cities have different spillover mechanisms as 
compared to landlocked cities, it indicates that infrastructure and cluster development 
can facilitate increased knowledge spillovers at least from the centers of economic 
activity in Pakistan if not from all large city districts. 
5) There exists positive spatial autocorrelation dependence for education levels below 
bachelors (i.e. primary, matric i.e. grade 10, and inter i.e. grade 12).  
6) Finally, an analysis of spatial association of district wise Human Development 
Indicators confirms that a district’s development levels are weakly associated with the 
development levels prevailing in its neighbouring districts. 
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The methodological implication of the above mentioned results is that studies which 
utilize Ordinary Least Squares to investigate intra- Pakistan socio-economic issues could 
possibly be producing inaccurate statistical inferences. By assuming spatial-independence, 
they may produce estimates that are biased and over estimated, since our results show that 
observations for socio-economic district characteristics do tend to cluster in Pakistan. The 
main policy implication that emerges from our results is that growth and development 
policies need to focus on infrastructure and cluster development that can cater to large 
segments of the population. This is because the spatial pattern of income inequality, district 
incomes, education levels, and development levels shows how development in Pakistan is 
concentrated in Punjab (in particular Northern Punjab especially in terms of human 
development indicators).  
Increasing public unrest in Balochistan due to insufficient public sector development 
activities in it has demonstrated that development in Punjab has taken place at the expense of 
other provinces especially Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa. Since geography of 
development matters, it is crucial to reduce these spatial inequalities via expansion of 
infrastructure and creation of ‘spatially blind’ institutions i.e. institutions that do not 
discriminate between regions when policies are implemented (World Bank—World 
Development Report, 2009; Celebioglu and Dall’erba, 2010). The presence of possible 
spatial spillovers also implies that cluster development can play an extremely important role 
in generating knowledge externalities, domestic commerce, and employment creation by 
bringing work and knowledge to people instead of them travelling to it. Pakistan already has 
many pseudo-clusters that have developed over time. Examples include the IT cluster 
‘Karachi’, textile and leather cluster ‘Faisalabad’, automotive manufacturing cluster ‘Port 
Qasim’, furniture cluster ‘Gujranwala’, light engineering cluster ‘Gujrat’, sports and surgical 
cluster ‘Sialkot’, heavy industries cluster ‘Wah’ and even light weapons manufacturing 
cluster ‘Landikotal’.  An emphasis on regional and industrial regeneration policies can play a 
crucial role in enhancing the regional advantages of these districts. Pakistan can learn from 
available models such as “National Advantage Model (capitalising on natural strengths of the 
country for instance cheap labour, youth bulge, natural resources, location), Networking 
Model (banking on and monetising the country’s huge network of SMEs both documented 
and un- documented), Regional cluster development model (clusters as described above) and 
Research-Industry relationship model (making of clusters in or around academic 
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institutions)” for the development of new clusters based a region’s comparative advantage 
(Planning Commission, 2011).   
Finally, this chapter has highlighted the importance of additional research on Pakistan 
that takes into account spatial effects. Since this chapter has only considered spatial changes 
in socio-economic phenomena in 8 years between 1998 and 2005, as a next step I first plan to 
extend the data set to observe whether there exists a spatio-temporal pattern in the way 
inequality in income, education and development levels has spread across Pakistani districts. 
Moreover, an analysis of how growth and inequality have evolved over time and across space 
would also enrich this analysis. In particular, I plan to carry out a spatial econometric analysis 
of the effect of a district’s inequality on its growth. While the presence of spatial clustering of 
income inequality in Pakistan could support the use of a spatial lag model to capture the 
spillover of inequality between districts, missing data on district incomes or omitted variables 
could also necessitate the use of a spatial error model (which reflects spatial autocorrelation 
in measurement errors) in analyzing the effect of inequality on district income levels.  
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APPENDIX  
Figure 1. District Administrative Map of Pakistan49 
 
 
 
                                                        
49 Punjab has a population density of 358.5. persons/square kilometer, Sindh of 216 persons/ sq, Khyber 
Pakhtoonkhwa of 238.1 persons/sq, while Balochistan has a population density of 4.9 persons/ sq. The more 
densely populated is a region, the more is the spatial interaction in it and hence a greater probability of regional 
spillovers. 
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Table 1. List of Districts  
 PUNJAB  SINDH 67 Chitral 
    68 Malakand Agency 
1 Rawalpindi 35 Hyderabad 69 Shangla 
2 Jhelum 36 Dadu 70 Bannu 
3 Chakwal 37 Badin 71 Lakki Marwat 
4 Attock 38 Thatta 72 D I Khan 
5 Gujranwala 39 Mirpur Khas 73 Tank 
6 Mandi Bahauddin 40 Sanghar 74 Bunir 
7 Hafizabad 41 Tharparkar   
8 Gujrat 42 Sukkur  BALOCHISTAN 
9 Sialkot 43 Ghotki 75 Quetta 
10 Narowal 44 Khair pur 76 Sibi 
11 Lahore 45 Nawab shah 77 Nasirabad 
12 Kasur 46 Larkana 78 Kalat 
13 SheikuhuPura 47 Jaccobabad 79 Pishin 
14 Okara 48 Shikarpur 80 Qilla Abd 
15 Faisalabad 49 Nowshero Feroz 81 Bolan 
16 Jhang 50 Karachi  82 Pangjur 
17 TT Singh   83 Barkhan 
18 Sargodha  KP 84 Chagai 
19 Khushab 51 Peshawar 85 Jaffarabad 
20 Mianwali 52 Charsadda 86 Jhal Magsi 
21 Bhakkar 53 Nowshera 87 Mastung 
22 Multan 54 Kohat 88 Awaran 
23 Khanewal 55 Kark 89 Gwadar 
24 Lodhran 56 Hangu 90 Turbat 
25 Vehari 57 Mardan 91 Kharan 
26 Sahiwal 58 Sawabi 92 Ziarat 
27 Pakpattan 59 Abbottabad 93 Khuzdar 
28 Bahawalpur 60 Haripur 94 Killa Saif 
29 Bahawalnagar 61 Mansehara 95 Lasbella 
30 R Y Khan 62 Batagram 96 Loralai 
31 D G Khan 63 Kohistan 97 Musa Khel 
32 Muzaffar grah 64 Swat 98 Zhob 
33 Layyah 65 Lower Dir   
34 Rajanpur 66 Upper Dir   
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Figure 1a. Provincial Administrative Map of Pakistan 
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Figure 2. Administrative Set Up Of Pakistan 
25875 villages 5871 villages 6554 villages 7337 villages 
118 towns 90 towns 54 towns 35 towns 
34 districts 21 districts 26 districts 24 districts 
8 divisions 5 divisions 6 divisions 7 divisions 
Balochistan KP Sindh Punjab 
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Table 1a. Sample Binary Contiguity Weight Matrix* 
 Rawalpindi Jhelum Chakwal  Attock Gujranwal Mandi Bah Hafizabad Gujrat Sialkot 
Rawalpindi 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Jhelum 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Chakwal 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Attock 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gujranwal 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Mandi Bah 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Hafizabad 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Gujrat 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Sialkot 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 
 
Table 1b. Sample Inverse Distance Weight Matrix* 
 Rawalpindi Jhelum Chakwal  Attock Gujranwal Mandi Bah Hafizabad Gujrat Sialkot 
Rawalpindi 0 0.003663 0.007813 0.011601 0 0 0 0 0 
Jhelum 0.003663 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chakwal 0.007813 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Attock 0.011601 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gujranwal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.020121 0 0 
Mandi Bah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hafizabad 0 0 0 0 0.020121 0 0 0 0 
Gujrat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.016313 
Sialkot 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.016313 0 
*Full matrix is available in Stata format from the author upon request.
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Table 2: Global autocorrelation results for income inequality—Geary’s C (2005) 
            Weight Matrix       
 
 
                        
                       I 
 
             II 
i ≠ ࢐ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૙ ࢕࢘ ૚ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૚ࢊ࢏,࢐ 
࢏ = ࢐ ࢝ ࢏,࢏ = ૙ 
Geary’s C 0.824 1.458 
E(C) 1.000 1.000 
Sd(C) 0.082 0.324 
Z -2.138 1.413 
p-value 0.033 0.158 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Table 2b. Global autocorrelation results for district per capita income— BC Matrix 
                   Weight Matrix 
 
 
                        
                       1998 
 
             2005 
i ≠ ࢐ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૙ ࢕࢘ ૚ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૙ ࢕࢘ ૚ 
࢏ = ࢐ ࢝ ࢏,࢏ = ૙ 
Moran’s I 0.818 0.380 
E(I) -0.010 -0.010 
Sd(I) 0.103 0.101 
Z 8.048 3.856 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Table 3a. Local spatial autocorrelation for income inequality in 2005 (BC matrix)50 
 
Moran's Ii (Gini Coeff for monthly in 2004-05) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
               dist |    Ii    E(Ii)  sd(Ii)     z    p-value* 
--------------------+----------------------------------------- 
            Barkhan | -1.393  -0.010   0.692  -1.997   0.046 
            Lodhran | -0.974  -0.010   0.485  -1.990   0.047 
        Mirpur Khas | -0.967  -0.010   0.562  -1.701   0.089 
           Kohistan | -0.832  -0.010   0.485  -1.696   0.090 
            Pangjur |  0.930  -0.010   0.562   1.672   0.095 
            Khuzdar |  0.736  -0.010   0.431   1.731   0.084 
           Batagram |  0.967  -0.010   0.562   1.738   0.082 
             Gwadar |  1.172  -0.010   0.562   2.101   0.036 
           Peshawar |  1.460  -0.010   0.692   2.124   0.034 
         Bahawalpur |  0.864  -0.010   0.391   2.234   0.025 
           Lasbella |  1.298  -0.010   0.562   2.327   0.020 
             Turbat |  1.732  -0.010   0.562   3.097   0.002 
             Awaran |  1.349  -0.010   0.391   3.471   0.001 
            Chitral |  2.701  -0.010   0.692   3.916   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
*2-tail test 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
50 Only the statistically significant LISA statistics have been reported here. 
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Table 3b. Local spatial autocorrelation for income inequality in 2005 (ID matrix) 
 
Moran's Ii (Gini Coeff for mthy in 04-05) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
               dist |    Ii    E(Ii)  sd(Ii)     z    p-value* 
--------------------+----------------------------------------- 
           Batagram | -5.147  -0.010   0.984  -5.220   0.000 
           Kohistan | -4.373  -0.010   0.984  -4.433   0.000 
             Multan | -1.081  -0.010   0.430  -2.491   0.013 
            Lodhran | -2.249  -0.010   0.984  -2.275   0.023 
           D G Khan | -2.216  -0.010   0.984  -2.242   0.025 
           Khanewal | -1.822  -0.010   0.984  -1.841   0.066 
               Kark | -1.631  -0.010   0.984  -1.646   0.100 
         Faisalabad |  0.720  -0.010   0.448   1.628   0.104 
           Sargodha |  0.844  -0.010   0.519   1.646   0.100 
             Vehari |  1.647  -0.010   0.984   1.684   0.092 
              Bannu |  1.845  -0.010   0.984   1.885   0.059 
          Charsadda |  2.020  -0.010   0.984   2.063   0.039 
           R Y Khan |  2.059  -0.010   0.984   2.103   0.035 
             Sawabi |  2.280  -0.010   0.984   2.327   0.020 
       Lakki Marwat |  2.510  -0.010   0.984   2.561   0.010 
            Haripur |  2.971  -0.010   0.984   3.030   0.002 
            Chitral |  4.195  -0.010   0.984   4.274   0.000 
           Peshawar |  1.192  -0.010   0.240   5.005   0.000 
               Swat |  9.763  -0.010   0.984   9.932   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
*2-tail test 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 3a. Moran Scatterplot district real per capita income, 1998 (BC matrix) 
 
Figure 3b. Moran scatterplot district real per capita income, 2005 (BC matrix) 
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Figure 4a. Moran scatterplot district real per capita income, 2005 (ID matrix) 
 
Figure 4b. Moran scatterplot district real per capita income, 1993 (ID matrix) 
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Moran scatterplot (Moran's I = 0.911)
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Figure 5. Local Moran statistics for per capita income 
1998 
 
 
2005 
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Figure 6.  Moran scatterplot for average level of district education using the ID matrix 
 
 
Table 4. Global autocorrelation results for education attainment—Geary’s C (2005) 
                   Weight Matrix 
 
 
                        
                       I 
 
             II 
i ≠ ࢐ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૙ ࢕࢘ ૚ ࢝࢏,࢐ = ૚ࢊ࢏,࢐ 
࢏ = ࢐ ࢝ ࢏,࢏ = ૙ 
Moran’s I 0.584 1.092 
E(I) 1.000 1.000 
Sd(I) 0.080 0.275 
Z -5.230 0.336 
p-value 0.000 0.737 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 7. Moran’s scatterplot for primary education  
 
i) Binary Contiguity Weights Matrix 
 
 
 
 
ii) Inverse Distance Weights Matrix 
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Figure 8. Moran’s scatterplot for higher education (Bachelors) in 1998 
 
i) Binary contiguity weights matrix 
 
 
 
ii) Inverse distance weights matrix 
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Figure 9. Education Based District Ranking in Pakistan51 
                    Source: Burki and Khan (2010) 
 
 
                                                        
51 A cluster map of education based district ranking. The darkest polygons are the districts with the highest 
rankings. Except for Karachi, only districts in Punjab have high education rankings.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Are Districts across Pakistan catching up? A Spatial Econometric 
Analysis of Regional Convergence 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
This study investigates for the first time convergence across 98 Pakistani districts between 
1998 and 2005 using spatial and non-spatial econometric techniques. While standard 
econometric techniques utilized in this chapter demonstrate a lack of convergence, the 
inclusion of spatial effects leads to an evidence for possible convergence as highlighted by 
the results of the spatial error model. The results from this chapter show how ignoring spatial 
dependence in data may lead to model misspecification and eventually inaccurate inferences 
for the case of Pakistani districts. Several robustness checks have also been carried out to 
confirm our findings52.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Pakistan, spatial econometric analysis, growth, convergence 
 
 
                                                        
52Acknowledgements: I am indebted to Dr. Alejandro Canadas (Mount St Mary’s University, Washington DC) 
for guiding me in the initial stages on how to compile and analyze spatial data. I’m also thankful to Dr. Harry 
Kelejian (University of Maryland), Dr. Giuseppe Arbia (University G. D’Annunzio of Chieti, Spatial 
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1. Introduction 
Do initially poorer economies grow faster in terms of per capita income and catch up to those 
that were initially richer? Economic theory refers to this issue as regional ‘convergence’, and 
it has consistently remained an attractive field of research for economists (Solow, 1956; 
Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995 for a review). Although Pakistan has been a part of the sample 
in studies on convergence across countries, a limited amount of research has been carried out 
on the convergence process across regions within the country. Moreover, like most 
developing countries today, Pakistan faces the daunting challenge of overcoming its unequal 
regional growth. While the growth hubs of the country continue to be situated in Karachi, 
some urban centres of Punjab and a few other districts along the river Indus, very few lesser 
developed districts have been successful in making a shift from periphery to core regions of 
the country. It has also been noted that economic geography matters for Pakistan as economic 
inequalities and development tend to cluster across Pakistan (see empirical findings in 
Chapter 3; Khan, 2003; Burki et al, 2010).  In this context, analysing convergence and 
regional disparities in income distribution across Pakistan is a valuable exercise from a policy 
making perspective.  
 Despite an increasing agreement on the fact that a region’s geographical location 
influences its growth performance via spatial interactions caused by technological spill-overs 
and factor mobility between regions (Vaya et al, 1998; Moretti, 2004; Rosenthal and Strange, 
2005; Fingleton and Lopez-Bazo, 2006), empirical evidence on the spatial effects influencing 
convergence remains limited (Annekatrin, 2001). Most standard econometric studies neglect 
spatial effects across borders and assume that all the regions under study belong to the same 
growth cluster. Such studies overlook the fact that most of the spatial correlation is based in 
country specific effects (in cross-country analysis) or region specific effects (intra-country 
analysis). They either nationally weight their data or include a country dummy into the main 
regression specification to deal with spatial effects. In this way they manage to completely 
ignore the possible spatial correlation from the disturbance term, while failing to shed light 
on the process of convergence itself. 
 In the light of the above mentioned issues, this chapter aims to address the 
weaknesses of studies on inter/intra regional convergence that neglect spatial effects and 
contribute towards the literature on the spatial analysis of regional convergence by exploring 
the process of convergence across 98 Pakistani districts between 1998 and 2005 using spatial 
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and non spatial econometric techniques53. Its main goal is to examine absolute and 
conditional convergence of real per capita income in Pakistan based on a district level 
aggregation. The advantage of working at a district level is that it allows for better 
exploitation of the geographical characteristics of socio-economic data and a deeper analysis 
of the spatial effects (regional spill-overs and spatial regimes) as compared to analysis carried 
out on a provincial level in Pakistan. It is the first study of its kind carried which analyses 
Pakistani districts and that too from a spatial econometric perspective. 
 The layout of the paper is the following: In Section 2, a review of convergence and 
growth concepts along with a description of the standard econometric techniques that have 
been used to study them is presented. Section 3 analyses convergence models from a spatial 
perspective and sheds light on the spatial econometric techniques that have been utilized in 
this chapter. Section 4 discusses the empirical results for convergence obtained from spatial 
and non-spatial techniques. Section 5, provides an alternative statistical methodology based 
on non-parametric analysis techniques to analyze convergence. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Convergence and Growth concepts 
Two forms of convergence hypothesis have been analyzed over the years in the growth 
literature (Sala-i-Martin, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). The first form is known as 
Sigma (ߪ) convergence which demonstrates the evolution of the dispersion of real per capita 
incomes across a group of regions or countries over time. A reduction in the dispersion of 
regional per capita incomes indicates ߪ-convergence between the regions. Measures such as 
standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and the log of per capita income have been 
utilized in literature to examine this form of convergence (Carlino and Mills, 1996a; Bernard 
and Jones, 1996a; Kuznets, 1955; Easterlin, 1960a, 1960b; Amos, 1988, 1989; Fan and 
Casetti, 1994). However, Rey and Montoury (1988) argues that ߪ-convergence analysis may 
“mask non-trivial geographical patterns that may also fluctuate over time” (Arbia, 2005:7-8). 
Therefore it is equally important to analyse the “geographical dimensions of income 
                                                        
53 The analysis is carried out for the time period between 1998 and 2005. It should be noted here that the choice 
of the years for this chapter is data driven. District level analysis on Pakistan so far is rare since district level 
data is not annually produced. 
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distribution in addition to the dynamic behaviour of income dispersion” (Arbia, Basile and 
Salavtore, 2003:5). 
The second form of convergence studied mainly by macroeconomists is referred to as 
the ‘Absolute Beta (ߚ)-convergence’, which tests whether poorer regions grow faster than 
richer regions, and occurs when the former catch up to the per capita income levels of the 
latter. This is a neoclassical approach to ߚ-convergence based on the Solow-Swan growth 
model which predicts that states (or regions within a country) would have similar levels of 
real per capita income in the long run under provided that they all share similar preferences 
and technology, and technological barriers that can prevent the flow of labour and capital do 
not exist.  It is based on the assumption of decreasing marginal productivity of capital, 
implying that due to their high endowment of capital, richer regions would grow at a slower 
rate than poorer regions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1997, 2003). This chapter utilizes the 
following cross-sectional econometric specification to test absolute ߚ-convergence:   
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,்ି௧ =  ߙ +  ߚ logݕ௜,௧ + ݑ௜,௧                                                                                      (1)    
where ݕ௜,௧  denotes the initial per capita income or GDP in region/country i at the beginning 
i.e. time t ; T denotes the last time period under study or t+x years; ߙ is the intercept term and 
ߚ the parameters that are estimated (where ߚ < 0 ); and ݑ௜,௧ is the stochastic error term 
distributed iid (0,ߪଶ). The dependent variable is measured as: 
 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜ = log(ீ஽௉ଶ଴଴ହீ஽௉ଵଽଽ଼)                                                                                                  (2) 
This standard model in the growth/convergence literature rests on a highly restrictive 
assumption that all the regions under study have the same steady-state income path which is a 
function of the initial conditions (Darlauf and Quah, 1999; Magrini, 2004). A negative value 
of ߚ suggests beta convergence (Sala-i-Martin, 1996) implying that per capita income growth 
rates over the time period under study were negatively correlated with the initial income 
levels. The rate of convergence is calculated using the following formula: 
 
ܥ =  −[ln(1 − ߚܲ)]/ܲ                                                                                                            (3) 
where P is the number of years (time period) being considered. 
The absolute or the unconditional convergence hypothesis is confirmed usually only 
when applied to relatively similar economic units such as the provinces of the same country 
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or countries belonging to the same region or political arrangement e.g. the EU (Arbia, 2005). 
For other cases, the absolute convergence model has been modified by relaxing the 
assumption of similar steady states for the regions under study. This is done by incorporating 
additional explanatory variables on the right hand side of equation (1), and the modified 
specification is referred to as the conditional convergence or an extended growth model 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Mankiw et al, 1992): 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,்ି௧ =  ߙ +  ߚ logݕ௜,௧ +  ߛܺ௜,௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧                                                                        (4) 
where ܺ௜,௧  is a vector of explanatory variables at the beginning of the time period t. The 
conditional ߚ-convergence, analyses the income per capita of regions (or countries) with 
similar socioeconomic and political characteristics which converge to their own steady state 
income levels in the long run (Arbia, 2005)54.Most studies first estimate ߪ–convergence and 
then ߚ-convergence because while ߚ-convergence is a necessary condition, it is not a 
sufficient condition for ߪ-convergence to take place (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Sala-i-
Martin, 1996; Young, Higgins and Levy, 2008).   
However Quah (1993) argues that these traditional cross-sectional specifications do 
not reveal the actual growth dynamics because these models may suffer from the 
heterogeneity bias induced by the restrictive assumptions on which they have been based. As 
a remedy to the heterogeneity bias, studies on convergence began to adopt a time series 
analysis to investigate common trends of convergence between regions over time. In such 
models convergence would occur if the long run forecasts of the differences in the per capita 
income levels would go to zero (Rey and Montouri 1999; Carlino and Mills, 1996a, 1996b, 
and Bernard and Durlauf, 1995). This is often not possible because of shocks to individual 
regional economies. As noted by Bernard and Darlauf (1996), with the occurrence of a shock, 
the “time series would contain unit roots”, and the due to the stationarity requirement, such a 
form of convergence has been labelled ‘stochastic convergence’ (Rey and Montouri, 1999 
p.145). However, this approach is dependent on the availability of long series of data over 
time at a national and provincial level, often which either does not exist, is difficult to obtain, 
or has been collected at irregular intervals over the years (Yildirim et al, 2009).  
Most of the above mentioned approaches consider the regions which they study as 
isolated entities ignoring any role of spatial interaction. Exceptions include studies such as 
                                                        
54 “Two things are analysed from this analysis, namely the speed of convergence and the so called half life. The 
speed of convergence refers to the speed at which the economy is converging towards the steady state, while 
half life is the time necessary for half of the initial gap in per capita output to be eliminated “(Arbia 2005:5) 
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Quah (1996b), Fingleton (1999) and Rey (1999) which combine Markov chain approach (to 
study the entire income distribution) with spatial methods. Their findings show that spatial 
effects are more influential than national factors for explaining regional convergence across 
Europe (Quah, 1996b). Rey (1999) has also demonstrated similar results for US states. 
Studies that neglect the spatial features of their data, fail to take into account the fact that 
spatial data represents the aggregation of individuals in arbitrary geographical borders which 
portray different political and historical meanings. The level of spatial aggregation is hence 
crucial because different levels (countries, provinces, districts, states, towns, municipalities, 
villages etc) can lead to different estimates of a certain phenomenon (Arbia, 1988). 
  Therefore another branch of research emerged to explicitly take into account spatial 
association amongst observations and modelled it to examine regional convergence. Such 
analysis is based on the idea that inter-regional interactions induce dependence between 
regions. For this reason regional data cannot be considered as independently generated since 
their exist similarities amongst neighbouring regions (Anselin 1988; Anselin and Bera, 1988). 
While technological and knowledge spillovers have been identified as important instruments 
that may contribute towards convergence (Krugman, 1987; Jones, 1997), regional 
specialization in various economic sectors could even lead to divergence instead of 
convergence at the aggregate level (Bernard and Jones, 1996b).  Such arguments demand an 
explicit incorporation of spatial dependence between the regions under consideration in the 
model, so that the spatial pattern (if any) of economic growth can be identified and quantified 
(Anselin and Rey, 1991, Rey and Montouri, 1999).  Spatial dependence may also arise due to 
the “...mismatch between boundaries of the market process...and the administrative 
boundaries used to organize the data.” (Rey and Montouri, 1999:145). Such spatial 
dependence has been referred to as ‘nuisance dependence’ because it is reflected by the 
spatially autocorrelated error term (Anselin and Rey, 1991). 
Another type of spatial effect relevant to studying convergence is the presence of spatial 
heterogeneity i.e. the “...instability of a behavioural relationship across the observational units 
(Rey and Montouri, 1999).” Spatial heterogeneity challenges the assumption of identical rate 
of convergence for all regions, on which the traditional cross sectional convergence models 
are based. Recent developments in spatial econometrics have made it possible to incorporate 
the spatial effects mentioned above in convergence studies by suggesting new estimators for 
models that explicitly take spatial effects in account. 
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3. Spatial Analysis of ߚ-Convergence  
As noted in our discussion above, spatial effects can significantly affect any possible regional 
income convergence estimates. To analyze regional growth and income inequality in a spatial 
econometric framework, the unconditional model as seen in equation (1) is utilized as a 
starting point: 
 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,்ି௧ =  ߙ +  ߚ logݕ௜,௧ + ݑ௜,௧                            (5)                                  
However as previously argued, ignoring spatial effects when they actually exist may lead to 
serious econometric misspecification reflected in auto-correlated residuals which violate the 
OLS assumption of uncorrelated error terms.  Hence specification (4) is modified to 
incorporate spatial effects in order to examine whether spatial autocorrelation takes the form 
of spatial dependence or of nuisance dependence. 
 
3.1 The spatial lag model (SLM) 
The following spatial lag model has been estimated in this chapter: 
 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,்ି௧ =  ߙ + ߚ  log(ݕ௜,௧) +  ߩܹ݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,்ି௧ + ߛ ௜ܺ,௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧                                       (6)      
 
where ܹ݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,்ି௧ is the spatially lagged dependent variable for a given spatial weights 
matrix W, ߩ denotes the spatial autoregressive parameter which reflects the spatial 
dependence in the data being used ( Le Sage, 1999; Yildirim et al.,2009), and ߝ௜,௧  is a vector 
of error terms. The spatially lagged dependent variable is always correlated with ߝ௜, not just at 
location i but also with the error terms at other locations.  
The SLM model also known as spatial auroregressive model (SAR) can be interpreted 
in various ways (see Rey and Montouri, 1999; Anselin and Bera, 1998). From a strictly 
technical perspective and in the context of convergence, it can be used to investigate whether 
spatial dependence of regional growth is a by product of convergence or spatial clustering of 
initial income (AnneKatrin, 2001). Hence the SAR model can highlight whether the negative 
relationship between growth and initial income remains robust after controlling for spatial 
dependence or not. Another interpretation of the SAR model emphasizes the spatial 
interaction in the data generating process.  
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The spatial lag model in our case, quantifies how the growth rate in a region is 
affected by the growth rate of its neighbouring regions. For instance, a ߩ of 0.5 would means 
that GDP growth rate in a given district would increase by 1 percent for every 2 percent 
increase in the GDP growth rate of its neighbouring districts regardless of the values of the 
independent variables contained in the X vector (Bernatt, 1996).   
When the ignored spatial effects take the form of spatial dependence, the OLS 
estimation of a spatial lag model would yield biased and inconsistent estimates for the 
coefficients due to the simultaneity introduced through the spatial lag.  Moreover, inference 
based on the estimated coefficients will become inaccurate. As a remedy, estimators based on 
maximum likelihood (ML) and instrumental variables (IV) have been suggested as consistent 
estimators (Anselin 1998; Kelejian and Robinson, 1993; Anselin and Bera, 1998; Kelejian 
and Prucha 1998; Conley, 1999; Canadas, 2008). 
3.2 The spatial error model (SEM) 
The spatial error specification—also referred to as nuisance spatial autocorrelation—assumes 
that spatial dependence operates through the error process. The error term in equation (5) in 
this case may reveal spatial covariance which can be expressed as:      
                             
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,்ି௧ =  ߙ + ߚ  log(ݕ௜,௧) + ߛ ௜ܺ,௧ + ߝ௧,௜                                           (7)                                                                            
ߝ௧,௜ =  ܹ߬ߝ௧,௜+ ߤ௜ 
ߝ௜ ,௧ =  (ܫ − ܹ߬)ିଵߤ௜,௧                                                                         (8) 
 
where ߬ is a scalar spatial error coefficient or a nuisance parameter in the sense that it is not 
assigned any meaningful economic interpretation;  ߤ ~ܰ (0,ߪଶI), and W is a spatial weights 
matrix.  
Under such circumstances, the original error term has a non-spherical covariance 
matrix, and in the presence of non-spherical errors, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
of the parameters are inefficient (yet unbiased) estimates of the parameters but give biased 
estimates of the parameter variances. As a solution, spatial econometric literature suggests the 
estimation of this model by Maximum Likelihood (ML) or by Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) (Anselin 1998; Kelejian and Robinson 1993, Anselin and Bera 1998; 
Kelejian and Prucha 1998; Conley 1999; Rey and Montouri, 1999; Canadas,2008). As a 
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spatial process, when a spatial error specification is applied to test for convergence equation 
(7) takes the following form: 
 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,்ି௧ =  ߙ+ ߚଵ  ݈݊ݕ௜,௧ + ߚଶ  ௜ܺ,௧ + (ܫ − ܹ߬)ିଵߤ௜,௧                                                    (9) 
 
From the above model it can be observed that through the spatial transformation (ܫ − ܹ߬)ିଵ, 
a random shock introduced in one district will not only affect its own growth rate but will 
also influence the growth rates of other districts. This model implies that a districts’ growth 
rate is affected by the growth rate of its neighbouring districts “only to the extent that the 
neighbours have above or below ‘normal’ growth rate, where normal is defined as growth 
rate predicted by equation” (Bernatt, 1996:7). 
 
3.3 Spatial specification tests 
Several tests can be utilized as robustness measures for our specifications and in order to 
endorse which model should be used. The first used in this study is the Moran’s I test which 
is applied to the residuals of the OLS specification (see chapter 2 for details): 
 
ܫ = (ܰ/ܵ଴)[݁ᇱܹ݁/(݁ᇱ݁/ܰ)]                                                                                                 (10) 
 
where e is the nx1 vector of residuals in the OLS specification, W is the weights matrix, and 
ܵ଴ =  ∑ ∑ ݓ௜ ,௝௝௜  is a standardisation factor. Moran’s I statistic is sensitive to both types of 
spatial autocorrelation, and does not assist in distinguishing between which specification is 
more appropriate. Being able to differentiate between the two forms of spatial dependence is 
crucial because of different interpretations of the nature of spatial effects.  
As a remedy the simple and robust versions of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test have 
been employed (Anselin and Rey, 1991). The LM test is based on Maximum Likelihood 
function, under which the unrestricted and the restricted models are compared. In the 
restricted model, the spatial parameters rho and lamda are set equal to 0, while in the 
unrestricted version rho and lamda are equal to their respective coefficients.  For the test to be 
carried out, it is enough to estimate the restricted model and verify whether the slope of the 
likelihood function at that point equals 0. The restriction can be considered to be valid if the 
slope is equal to 0, since it implies that the value of the function will approximately be close 
to the maximum likelihood (Costa et al, 2009).  
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Following Anselin (1991:21), the LM test can be specified as:        
 
ܮܯாோோைோ =  [݁ᇱܹ݁/(݁ᇱ݁/ܰ)]ଶ/[ݐݎ(ܹଶ + ܹᇱܹ)]                                                             (11) 
 
ܮܯ௅஺ீ =  [݁ᇱܹݕ/(݁ᇱ݁/ܰ)]ଶ/ܦ                                                                                            (12) 
 
where y is the logarithm of real per capita district GDP, and D = [(ܹܺߚ)ᇱ (ܫ − ܺ(ܺᇱܺ)ିଵ(ܹܺߚ)/ߪଶ] +  ݐݎ( ܹଶܹᇱܹ). Under the lag and error versions, the 
test statistic is asymptotically distributed as ߯ଶ with one degree of freedom. Finally, the 
details on the construction of the weights matrix can be found in Section 4.3 of Chapter 3. 
 
Table 1. Decision rule for the LM tests 
LM-lag 
LM-error 
Do not reject Ho 
Do not reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
Do not reject 
Ho 
Do not reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
LM-lag robust -- -- -- Do not reject 
Ho 
Reject Ho 
LM-error 
robust 
-- -- -- Reject Ho Do not reject 
Ho 
Decision No spatial 
effects 
Lag Error Error Lag 
Source: Costa et al (2003) 
 
4. Data and Variable Construction 
Real GDP data is not available at a district level in Pakistan. The limited amount of research 
that has investigated socio-economic issues requiring the estimation of district incomes have 
utilized district wise cash value of agriculture produce and manufacturing value added as 
proxies to compute district incomes (National Human Development Report (NHDR), 2003; 
Jamal and Khan, 2007)55. Income data used in this chapter has been obtained from Jamal and 
Khan (2007). Further technical estimation details can be found in NHDR, 2003: Annex 1(b) 
and in Jamal and Khan (2007). All income data from 2005-06 was deflated using the 
Pakistani Consumer Price Index (CPI) of 1998. 
                                                        
55 District wise crop statistics and Census of manufacturing Industries (CMI) of relevant years close to 1998 and 
2005 have been utilized by these studies to estimate district wise cash value of agriculture produce and 
manufacturing value added as proxies to compute district incomes (Jamal and Khan, 2007). 
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In order to investigate conditional convergence following Barro (1992) and Trivedi 
(2002), this chapter has selected the following variables as proxies for human and physical 
capital that can affect growth: district wise population density, district wise percentage of 
vaccinated children below 10, district wise percentage of adults having completed at least 10 
years of education and district wise percentage of households that consume electricity as the 
main source of energy. The data on these variables has been obtained from four provincial 
reports (for the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pahktoonkhwa, and Balochistan) known 
as ‘Socio-economic Indicators at District Level’ and District Census Reports (1998), both of 
which have been published by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan.  
Finally in order to incorporate spatial effects into the growth models estimated in this chapter, 
two weights matrices have been utilized.  The first matrix is a simple binary contiguity W 
matrix (BC matrix from now onwards) based on the concept of Queen Contiguity i.e. if a 
district i shares a border or a vertex with another district j, they are considered as neighbours, 
and ݓ௜,௝   takes the value 1 and 0 otherwise. The second weights matrix is based on inverse 
average road distance from the centroid of a district to the centroid of the closest district 
which has a ‘large city’ in it. Details on the constriction of these two matrices have been 
provided in Chapter 3, Section 3. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Absolute convergence analysis 
As the first step, an unconditional beta-convergence model for 98 Pakistani districts between 
1998 and 2005 is estimated by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,଴ହିଽ଼ =  ߙ + ߚ log൫ݕ௜,ଽ଼൯ + ݑ௜                                                                               (13) 
ݑ௜~݅. ݅. ݀ ( 0,ߪ௨ଶ) 
Growth—the dependent variable is the district’s growth rate of real per capita GDP for the 
period. It is measured as: 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜ = log(ீ஽௉ଶ଴଴ହீ஽௉ଵଽଽ଼)                                                                                                   (14) 
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If convergence holds, a negative and a significant coefficient for ߚ (our variable reflecting 
initial income conditions) is expected. As illustrated in Table 2, the regression yields a negative 
coefficient of the initial level of income (log of real per capita GDP in 1998). However, it is not 
significant indicting an absence of absolute convergence amongst Pakistani districts between 
1998 and 2005.  
Table 2 also displays diagnostic results carried out to detect any misspecifications. 
Three diagnostic tests for spatial dependence for this regression—Moran’s I test, and two 
robust Lagrange multiplier tests, have been utilized. Since the Moran’s I does not distinguish 
between the two forms of misspecification (Rey and Montouri, 1999), the robust versions of 
Lagrange Multiplier error (RLME) and lag (RLML) tests have been reported to indicate 
whether the source of spatial dependence is a by-product of measurement errors, or of 
regional interaction56. The RLME and RLML, both reject the null hypothesis of spatial 
randomness (specifically no spatially autocorrelated error terms in the case of robust LM 
error test (RLME) and no omitted spatial lag in the case of robust LM lag test (RLML)). 
However, the robust LM (error) test is slightly more significant than the robust LM (error) 
test i.e the p-value of RLML test is lower than that of the RLME test.  
 
Table 2: Absolute ß-convergence of per capita income in 98 Pakistani districts (1998-2005) 
  Dependent variable: Growth rate of real district per capita income 
  
Log GDP98 -0.0159 
 (0.0106) 
Constant 0.148* 
 (0.0777) 
Goodness of Fit 
R-squared 0.0230 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) -254.0670 
Observations 98 
Regression Diagnostics 
Breusch-Pagan Test 38.79*** 
Jarque-Bera Test 59.39*** 
Moran’s I (error) -1.3620 
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 4.386** 
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (error) 5.167** 
  
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
                                                        
56 “While the robust LM test (error) tests for spatially autocorrelated error terms and the possible presence of a 
missing spatially lagged variable, the robust LM test (lag) does the opposite”(Feldkircher, 2006). 
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The robust tests reveal adequate evidence of spatial autocorrelation implying rejection 
of the null hypothesis of spatial randomness for values of growth of real per capita GDP 
between Pakistani districts. However, extra caution must be exercised in interpreting the 
overall result of divergence because we fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity 
and normality amongst residuals. Long and Ervin (2000) demonstrates via various 
simulations that there exists a very high possibility for the failure of heteroskedasticity 
detection tests. As a result it recommends that “a “test for heteroskedasticity should not be 
used to determine whether (an HC estimator) should be used”. Even on the suspicion of the 
slightest heteroskedasticity, it suggests using an HC estimator. Hence, Col 2 in Table 3, uses 
the HC1 estimator and provides the results with bootstrapped standard errors. 
There still remain other econometric issues that need to be taken into consideration. 
For example, cross-sectional regression results that are based on relatively smaller samples 
can be highly sensitive to outliers. As noted in Trevedi (2003), few influential but atypical 
outliers need to be appropriately accommodated to prevent them from having a distortionary 
effect on the parameter estimates. Under such circumstances, Temple (2000) suggests on 
adopting robust estimation techniques along with OLS estimates for which we compute Re-
weighted Least Squares (RWLS) estimates as well (Table 3, Col 2). RWLS estimates are less 
sensitive to outliers than OLS estimates. To compute RWLS estimates, first OLS regression 
is carried out and the Cooks distance (D) is calculated. This distance (D) can be perceived as 
an index which is influenced by the size of the residuals, outliers, and the size of the 
levearage of each observation57.  It measures the distance between “the coefficient estimates 
when the ith observation is omitted and when it is not” (Trivedi, 2003: 8). An observation for 
which D is greater than 1 is considered as an outlier and is omitted. This initial screening 
process is followed by a series of iteratively performed weighted regressions which 
simultaneously use two types of weight functions—Huber and biweights—to derive the 
weights. Iterations seize when the maximum amount of change in weights drops below a 
level of predetermined level of tolerance. However, even the RWLS estimate of initial 
income (Table 3, Col 2) continues to remain negative and insignificant supporting the 
previous finding of lack of convergence.  
                                                        
57 Large residual and leverage values raise the value of D.  
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It has been noted in Verardi and Croux (2010) that diagnostics such as the Cook’s 
Distance used in RWLS, evaluate each observation individually and there might not be 
adequate pairs or groups of outliers to exert excessive influence. They may conceal the 
influence of each other when testing for a single one, and may not be able to guarantee the 
identification of all leverage points. Hence to bolster our results, Iterative Re-weighted Least 
Squares (IRWLS) technique has been utilized as another robustness measure58. The estimates 
from this technique again support the claim of lack of unconditional convergence (Col 3, 
Table 3). 
Since our measure of GDP per capita has been indirectly calculated by adding the two values 
of value addition (in Rs million) for agriculture and manufacturing for every district , 
separate convergence regressions for the two components have also been estimated to 
confirm the results from Table 1. In both the regressions (see Table 1 and Table 2 in the 
appendix), the coefficient of ߚ is no longer negative and is highly significant suggesting 
absolute divergence of district-wise manufacturing and agriculture income values between 
1998 and 2005. The results after obtaining bootstrapped robust standard errors, and after 
estimating RWLS and IRWLS estimates for the components, still remain unchanged i.e. they 
reject absolute convergence (Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix).  
Table 3: Absolute ߚ-convergence of per capita income in 98 Pakistani districts (1998-2005) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real district per capita income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS ( Robust SE) Robust Reg RWLS IRWLS  
    
Log GDP98 -0.0159 -0.0215 -0.0213 
 (0.0189) (0.0212) (0 .0195) 
Constant 0.1479 0.1959 0.1988 
 (0.1423) (0.1608) (0.1473) 
    
R-squared 0.0227 0.0611 - 
RMSE 0.0655 0.0531 - 
P-subsets   20 
Observations 98 98 98 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
                                                        
58 The IRWLS estimates are obtained using the mmregress command in STATA 10. The initial values for the iteratively 
reweighted least squares algorithm are monotone M-estimators that are not robust to bad leverage points and may lead the 
algorithm to converge to a local instead of a global minimum. 
 
147 
 
 
5.2 Conditional convergence analysis 
For a more accurate idea of which model is more appropriate for the data being utilized, it is 
necessary to investigate the causes that have led to increasing divergence amongst districts 
between 1998 and 2005. In this section, a conditional convergence analysis is carried out to 
take into account the role of some district-specific characteristics and geographical 
interactions in regional growth. The choice of these explanatory variables has been based on 
studies such as Barro (1992) and Trivedi (2003) in such a way so that regional differences in 
social, economic and physical differences can be taken into account. First the following 
growth model has been estimated through least squares: 
݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,଴ହିଽ଼ =  ߙ +  ߚ lnܩܦܲ98 + ߛ ௜ܺ,ଽ଼ + ߝ௜                                                                          (15) 
where growth is an (nx1) vector of district i’s growth rates of real per capita GDP between 
1998 and 2005. The variable ௜ܺ,ଽ଼ represents a vector of control variables in 1998. In 
equation (15), initial values of district specific explanatory variables have been added to the 
log of real per capita GDP for 1998 (initial income of a district) to also investigate their 
impact on the growth rate of district wise real per capita GDP between 1998 and 2005.  
As argued in Partridge (2005), there exist two schools of thought on whether to 
consider the level of initial income as a proxy for the initial level of development in growth 
regressions or not. In the neoclassical growth models, initial levels of income are considered 
as proxies for the initial level of development and inversely related to subsequent growth 
(Canadas, 2008; Barro, 2000)59. These models confirm gradual convergence amongst state 
economies during the 1800s and the 1990s (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991a). This is because 
neoclassical convergence models are based on diminishing marginal returns and differentials 
in returns to capital, implying that factors of production will shift to developing countries 
where returns to them are higher (Ventura, 1997; Partridge, 2005).  
However, the second of school of thought argues that initial income should not be 
included since eventually –as also argued by endogenous and neoclassical growth models—
                                                        
59 Alesina and Perotti (1994), Alesian and Rodrick (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Clarke (1995), Perotti 
(1996), Li and Zou (1998), and Partridge (1997) are examples of other studies which employ the level of 
income. Barro (2000), Rey and Montouri (1999), and Catello and Domenech (2002) are studies which employ 
the log for initial income level. 
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the initial income term drops out when economies approach their steady state growth paths 
(Darlauf and Quah, 1999). As claimed in Partridge (2005), initial income term can be omitted 
when states are close to their steady state levels, because then deviations mainly reflect 
transitory cyclical and structural shocks instead of neoclassical convergence. When cyclical 
conditions are dominant, the inclusion of initial income requires instrumental variable 
techniques to be utilized. In such cases a negative transitory shock at the beginning of the 
time period being considered would reduce the initial level of income and produce a faster 
subsequent growth rate as the economy recovers. Moreover Durlauf and Quah (1999), 
suggests that the convergence effect could just be an example of Galton’s fallacy which 
would just make this effect spurious60. For these reasons Scully (2002) states that the 
inclusion of the initial income would lead to severely biased results. However following 
Canadas (2008), since districts of Pakistan are not close to reaching their steady state levels, I 
include initial income as a proxy for the level of initial development in 1998. 
Furthermore as the size of population is an important determinant of an economy’s 
growth, population density is included as an explanatory variable.  Popdens, is the number of 
inhabitants who lived in each district per squared kilometre in 199861.  Due to lack of data on 
infant mortality rates in Pakistani districts for the years 1998 and 2005, the variable vaccine 
has been utilized as a proxy for non-educational aspect of human capital. Vaccine is 
measured as the percentage of children 10 years or below having been vaccinated against all 
major diseases in each district. The variable matric has been included as a measure of human 
capital in each district. Adults having 10 years of completed education are considered as 
matriculates. It is the minimum level of education required for most entry level jobs in the 
tertiary sector in Pakistan. Matric is calculated as the percentage of adults with matric 
degrees for each district in 1998.  
Another important variable that should be controlled for while studying steady state incomes 
is physical capital. Data for capital formation only exists for a few main districts and that too 
for some selective years. As a result electricity, the percentage of houses pre district which 
have electricity as their main source of energy consumption has been used as a proxy.  The 
electricity consumption per district also highlights how much industry and manufacturing 
activity can it attract.  
                                                        
60 Galton’s Fallacy is used to denote problems encountered during the testing of the neoclassical convergence 
model (see Bliss, 1999 for details). “Generally speaking ... (it could be the case that) ...a negative association 
between growth rates and initial development conditions may be consistent with declining, stationary, and rising 
cross-section income dispersion” (Arbia, 2003:15).  
61 All of the explanatory variables used also appear in the Barro (1992) model and Trivedi (2003). 
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Table 7 (see appendix) provides the results of the long run OLS growth model.  The 
coefficient for initial income still remains negative (although insignificant) implying lack of 
conditional convergence in this case.  The rest of the additional variables are statistically 
insignificant as well. However, with the inclusion of explanatory variables the R-squared 
improves to 20 percent. While the regression diagnostic measures fail to reject the hypothesis 
of homoskedasticity, the null of hypothesis of spatial randomness is rejected since both the 
robust LM (error and lag) tests are significant, with the LM (error) test being more significant 
than the LM(lag) test. Figure 1 (in the Appendix) illustrates the relation between growth and 
initial income level as implied by the regression in Table 7 (in Appendix). It exhibits a lack of 
a clear convergence pattern and also seems to be influenced by a few outliers. As a 
robustness measure, we again produce bootstrapped standard error estimates for the OLS 
model along with the RWLS and IRWLS estimates for the conditional growth convergence 
model to take into account the influence of outliers (see Table 8 in Appendix). Under all 
these three specifications we fail to obtain any solid evidence of conditional convergence 
across districts between 1998 and 2005. 
 
5.3 Spatial econometric analysis of convergence across districts 
As previously discussed, two reasons motivate the inclusion of spatial effects explicitly into 
the OLS convergence model in this chapter: 
1) Assuming spatial independence amongst states in a cross-sectional study of regional 
growth analysis is a highly restrictive assumption. 
2) Ignoring spatial autocorrelation would yield inefficient (yet unbiased) OLS estimates 
for the convergence analysis. 
It should be noted here that this chapter does not address the issue of heteroskedasticity 
encountered in Section 4.1 and assumes that spatial dependence is the only possible source 
[similar to the approach of Anselin and Griffith (1988)].  Since OLS regression diagnostics in 
Table 2 illustrate the presence of spatial interdependence, we incorporate it explicitly in our 
spatial econometric models which are estimated through maximum likelihood estimation. 
5.3.1 Absolute spatial convergence model 
The ߚ-coefficient under spatial specifications is negative for both the SAR and SEM models. 
However since its level of significance in both the cases is very low (about10 percent), these 
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results cannot be confidently treated as an indication of convergence across districts (Table 3 
in Appendix). Moreover, caution must be exercised in their interpretation since the Jarque 
Bera test indicates that the residuals are non-normally distributed. Finally, the spatial 
diagnostics under both the models are insignificant, hence implying spatial randomness for 
the absolute convergence process across Pakistani districts. 
 
5.3.2 Conditional spatial convergence model: A comparison of spatial lag vs. spatial error 
model for convergence analysis in Pakistan 
Under conditional spatial specification, we obtain completely opposite and statistically 
significant results. This section estimates and compares conditional growth models with their 
spatial counterparts. In Table 4, columns 1 and 2 represent the spatial autoregressive (SAR) 
and spatial error models (SER) respectively. Both the models indicate significant 
convergence. The spatial diagnostics for the OLS model indicate towards the presence of 
spatial autocorrelation as shown by statistically significant Moran’s I and Lagrange 
Multiplier tests.  While Rho is not significant, lamda is significant at a 5 percent level 
indicating that the spatial error process may enhance our understanding of the convergence 
process across Pakistani districts between 1998 and 2005.  Finally, the diagnostic tests on the 
spatial coefficients indicate a high significance level of the error coefficient. The LM lag and 
LM err tests demonstrate that the omitted spatial dependence is of the nuisance form, since 
LM err test has a higher level of significance. Moreover, the SEM model also has the lowest 
AIC value62. These results confirm that the spatial error model may be more suitable for 
analysing convergence / growth between 1998 and 200563.  
5.3.3 Robustness of spatial results 
The results of spatial models are sensitive to how spatial proximity has been defined in the 
spatial weight matrix. Hence to confirm whether the results above based on the binary 
contiguity matrix for 98 districts of Pakistan, are sensitive to modified definitions of weights, 
                                                        
62 Since the R-squared measure is not applicable to spatial regression models that are estimated via maximum 
likelihood, the fit of the model can only be compared by the Akaike Information Criterion. 
63 Since the aim of this study is to detect convergence, I have not delved into the discussion on the effects of the 
explanatory variables on growth. However I must mention here that the negative coefficients of education and 
health variables are in line with the empirical estimates and political economy discussions in many similar 
studies for example, Canadas (2008) for Argentina, and Trivedi (2002) for India. 
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I also employ a non binary inverse distance matrix (as discussed in chapter 2) and re-estimate 
the three models contained in Tables 2 and 4. In all three cases, the tests provide the same 
conclusion i.e. spatial autocorrelation mainly takes the nuisance form. 
 
Table 4. Conditional ß-convergence of per capita income in 98 Pakistani districts  
(1998-2005) 
  Spatial Lag and Error Models- Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Spatial Lag Model Spatial Error Model 
   
Log GDP98 -0.0212** -0.0199*** 
 (0.0098) (0.0073) 
Matric -0.0085*** -0.009*** 
 (0.0021) (0.002) 
Vacine -0.00072* -0.0009** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Popden 0.00002 0.00002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Electric 0.0004 0.0004* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.3579*** 0.36587*** 
 (0.0899) (0.0749) 
Tau -- 0.3191** 
Rho (W_growth) 0.1517 -- 
   
Goodness of Fit 
Akaike Information Criterion -263.1373 -266.0148 
Variance ratio 0.207 0.253 
Squared Corr 0.216 0.198 
Log likelihood 139.5687 141.0074 
Observations 98 98 
Regression Diagnostics 
Wald test  
(rho/tau=0) 
1.420 4.320** 
Likelihood ratio test 
(rho/tau=0) 
1.413 4.290** 
Lagrange Multiplier test 
(rho/tau) 
1.401 3.260* 
   
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
In summary, the diagnostic tests for the OLS models in Tables 2 and 7 (see Appendix) point 
towards a spatial dependence of the nuisance form. This is confirmed by the diagnostic 
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results of the spatial error model. These results imply that there exists spatial dependence 
which is not being explained. Hence spatial effects may not be of a substantive form but a by-
product of convergence. These results are in line with the findings of Rey and Montouri 
(1999) that demonstrate how the spatial error model is more appropriate specification for 
explaining the growth process across of the US states. 
Although the SEM model seems to be the best among the alternatives considered to 
examine convergence, it is not enough to eliminate completely the spatial dependence. 
Further possible improvements could include a spatial panel data analysis coupled with a 
stochastic simulation analysis to observe how a shock to a district operates via the error term 
throughout the geographic system. Finally note that there is a possibility for spatial 
heterogeneity in the sample under consideration, however I have not taken it into 
consideration since this chapter focuses on the effects of spatial autocorrelation only. 
 
6. Non-parametric Analysis of Growth and Convergence 
 Intra-distribution dynamics and spatial effects 
As noted in Trivedi (2002), conditional convergence does not necessarily imply that districts 
are actually coming closer in terms of income levels. ß-convergence approach for 
convergence analysis has been criticized for being unable to distinguish between 
convergence, divergence, and stationarity.  This is because “generally speaking a negative 
association between growth rates and initial development conditions may be consistent with a 
declining, stationary, and rising cross-section income dispersion” (Arbia, 2003:15).  This 
failure—as previously mentioned—is referred to as Galton’s Fallacy (Quah, 1993).  
Due to this limitation of the ß-convergence approach along with the caveats of the σ-
convergence, there stemmed a new approach of analysing convergence and growth which 
focuses on estimating the entire income dynamics rather than “just fitting the first two 
moments and thus revealing the evolution of income distribution” (Arbia 2003:15).  As noted 
by Quah (1993, 1996a-b, 1997), convergence analysis should be carried out by evaluating the 
shape and the dynamics of the distribution under study. Under such circumstances, non 
parametric techniques for the estimation of univariate density function can be used.  
The standard deviation of the cross-district income distribution increased by 14.8 
percent between 1998 and 2005, indicating an increase in the overall cross-district income 
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dispersion. To examine closely the districts that have actually driven the increased dispersion 
and whether they are situated at the core or periphery of the cross district income distribution, 
Tukey Box Plots for a sample of normalized GDP of 98 districts have been utilized64.  The 
inter-quartile range (middle 50% of the income distribution) slightly increased between the 
two years as the size of the lower quartile increased by 2005 (see Figure 2 in Appendix). This 
indicates that the districts located at the extremes of the distribution (in this case at the very 
bottom of the distribution) have the highest influence on the distribution (examples include 
districts of Khushab (80), Okara (54), Dadu (90)). These states have driven the increase 
between district income inequality between 1998 and 2005.  
As a next step the chapter analyzes the distribution itself rather than just examining 
the moments of the cross-district income distribution. Figure 1 illustrates kernel-smoothed 
densities of log-relative per capita incomes between 98 districts of Pakistan. The kernel 
densities were estimated for the years 1998 and 2005 to verify the behaviour of per capita 
income. The density of the natural logarithm of ratio between GDP values for each district 
and the national average has been produced. The kernel-smoothed estimates have been 
obtained by using a Gaussian Kernel with normal optimal bandwidths that minimize the 
mean integrated squared error65.  
Another way is to examine the mobility dynamics by quantifying the intra-distribution 
dynamics. This is carried out using bivariate kernel which estimates the joint density of the 
income distribution at two points in time (Figure 3 in Appendix).  From any point on the axis 
marked 1998 extending parallel to the axis marked 2005, the stochastic kernel is a probability 
density function. It describes how the cross sectional distribution of income at one point 
(1998) in time evolves into that in a future time period (2005). In figure 1 and figure 3 (see 
Appendix), the shifting of the kernel density estimate of income distribution has shifted 
towards the right for 2005, implying that on average district incomes have increased over 
time. Moreover 2005 income distribution became more peaked which may indicate a 
decreased dispersion within cross-state income distribution. The mode (peak point) of the 
distribution became larger in 2005 which can again be taken as an evidence of increased 
dispersion or polarization within cross-district income distribution. A longer and a thinner left 
                                                        
64 where ‘normalized’ refers to the log of the ratio between s district’s GDP and the national average. 
65 The kernel estimator is a non parametric technique and a smoothed version of the histogram used to estimate 
the probability density function f of a random variable X (e.g income). The estimator can be written as: 
f(x)= ଵ
௡௛
∑ ܭ௡௜ୀଵ ቀ
௫ି௑೔
௛
ቁ, where n is the number of finite observations in x; h is the smoothing parameter called 
the bandwidth; and K is the kernel function of the variable x which can adopt various functions. 
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tail of the distribution can be taken as an indication that districts at the bottom end of the 
income distribution are pulling away from the rest.  
  
 
 
Figure 1. Kernel density estimates of log relative cross-district per capita income 
distribution 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
This chapter is the first detailed study on Pakistan which has taken into account the role of 
spatial effects in order to empirically assess the convergence process across Pakistani districts 
between 1998 and 2005. At the theoretical level it utilized the convergence hypothesis based 
on the neoclassical growth model. For empirical analysis, the chapter applied Least Squares, 
Re-weighted Least squares (RWLS), and spatial econometric techniques (in particular the 
spatial lag and spatial error models) to investigate the catch-up process between Pakistani 
districts.  
At least three important conclusions emerge from the empirical analysis presented in 
Section 4. First, I find evidence for lack of ߪ-convergence over time as illustrated by 
increasing standard deviation of real per capita district GDPs, and other measures of 
dispersion (e.g the shape of the cross-district income distribution).  This finding is 
corroborated by evidence from Trivedi (2002) for Indian states and Young, Higgins, and 
Levy (2007) for US States. 
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Second, there is no evidence of absolute ߚ-convergence (between 1998 and 2005) 
implying that there is no tendency for initially poorer districts to growth faster. As a 
robustness measure various estimators were used to confirm this finding which is 
corroborated by findings from similar studies that have analysed absolute ߚ-convergence in 
emerging market economies post 1970s (Trivedi, 2002). Some recent examples include 
evidence from Mexcio (Juan-Ramon and Rivera-Batiz, 1996), China (Jian, Sachs and 
Warner, 1996), India (Bajpai and Sachs, 1996; Trivedi, 2002), and Russia (Buccellato, 2007). 
 Third, adding spatial effects increases the precision of our estimates. Without their 
inclusion the detection of spatial autocorrelation in the unconditional and conditional 
convergence models would result in inefficient OLS estimators ad unreliable statistical 
inferences (Magrini, 2004). Most recent studies that have investigated intra-regional 
convergence using spatial econometric techniques have also demonstrated this (for example 
see Baumont, Ertur, and Gallo, 2001; Basile, Nardis, and Mantuan, 2003) for  convergence 
estimates across European regions, Paraguas and Dey, 2006 for evidence from Indian states, 
and Elias and Rey, 2011 for evidence from Peruvian regions.  
Moreover while standard econometric estimation of conditional ߚ-convergence points 
towards lack of convergence, spatial estimates report otherwise. The spatial estimates show 
the inconsistency of the OLS technique since they point towards possible convergence. The 
spatial dimension emerges as non negligible through the error process, highlighting the 
importance of incorporating the role of geographic data while analyzing convergence and 
growth. The robustness tests for OLS (absolute and conditional) and spatial models also 
portray the spatial error model as a more appropriate model for investigating convergence. 
Even with a different criterion for contiguity, the results remained unchanged.  The spatial 
error model has also appeared as an appropriate model specification in various other studies 
that have analysed convergence using spatial econometrics (examples include Rey and 
Montouri, 1999 for US states; Basile, Nardis, and Mantuan, 2003 for European regions). The 
most important economic implication of this result is that the presence of significance spatial 
error dependence implies that a random shock to a specific district would diffuse throughout 
the system’ (Rey and Montouri, 1999; Baumont, Ertur, and Gallo, 2001), however the 
strength of the shock would depend on the distance of districts from the district in which the 
shock is introduced. Moreover, in terms of obtaining policy implications, this model could 
highlight a spatial spillover effect if it is re-estimated using a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) 
specification (Baumont, Ertur, and Gallo, 2001; Ertur and Koch, 2006). This is because SDM 
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is the reduced form of a model with cross-sectional dependence in the errors, yet at the same 
time it can also be perceived as the nesting model in a more ‘general approach of model 
selection’ (Mur and Angulo, 2005). The inclusion of lagged spatial variables (WX) may 
model/capture the spatial correlation and therefore enhance explanatory power. It could even 
be possible that a spatial correlation in the error term no longer exists which would enhance 
our existing interpretations. Since the estimation of a SDM was beyond the scope of this 
chapter, it will be an included in the forthcoming extension of this analysis. Moreover as 
previously noted further possible improvements will also include a stochastic simulation 
analysis to observe how a shock to a district operates via the error term throughout the 
geographic system since the spatial error model emerged to be model with the best fit in this 
chapter.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1. Growth rate versus initial income  
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Table 1. Absolute ß-convergence of per capita agriculture income in 98 Pakistani districts  
(1998-2005) OLS- Estimates 
  
Log GDP Agri 98  0.01574*** 
 (0.0059) 
Constant -0.0880* 
 (0.0457) 
Goodness of Fit 
R-squared 0.068 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) -258.7537 
Observations 98 
Regression Diagnostics 
Breusch -Pagan test 2.20 
Jarque-Bera normality test of residuals 61.95*** 
Moran’s I (error) 0.111 
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1.990* 
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1.843* 
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 2. Absolute  ß -convergence of per capita manufacturing income in 98 Pakistani 
districts                   (1998-2005)  OLS- Estimates 
  
Log GDP Manuf 98 0.0041** 
 (0.0019) 
Constant 0.0122 
 (0.0111) 
Goodness of Fit 
R-squared 0.049 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) -256.7383 
Observations 98 
Regression Diagnostics 
Breusch -Pagan test 0.80 
Jarque-Bera normality test of residuals 34.99* 
Moran’s I (error) 0.108 
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 0.993* 
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (error) 0.961* 
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 3. Absolute  ß -convergence of per capita income in 98 Pakistani districts (1998-2005) 
  Spatial Lag and Error Models- Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Spatial Lag Model Spatial Error Model 
   
Log GDP98 -0.0171* -0.0160* 
 (0.0106) (0.0097) 
Constant 0.1599** 0.1488** 
 (0.0789) (0.0708) 
Tau -- 0.0912 
Rho (W_growth) 0.0871 -- 
   
Goodness of Fit 
Akaike Information Criterion -250.4902 -250.5331 
Variance ratio 0.025 0.023 
Squared Corr 0.029 0.023 
Log likelihood 129.2451 129.2665 
Observations 98 98 
Regression Diagnostics 
Wald test  
(rho/tau=0) 
0.422 0.465 
Likelihood ratio test 
(rho/tau=0) 
0.423 0.466 
Lagrange Multiplier test 
(rho/tau) 
0.424 0.471 
   
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 4. Absolute ߚ-convergence of per capita income in 98 Pakistani districts (1998-2005) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real district per capita income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS ( Robust SE) Robust Reg RWLS IRWLS (mmreg) 
Log GDP98 -0.0159 -0.0215 -0.0213 
 (0.0189) (0.0212) (0 .0195) 
Constant 0.1479 0.1959 0.1988 
 (0.1423) (0.1608) (0.1473) 
    
R-squared 0.0227 0.0611 - 
RMSE 0.0655 0.0531 - 
P-subsets   20 
Observations 98 98 98 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5. Absolute ߚ-convergence of agriculture income (value added) in 98 Pakistani districts 
(1998-2005) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real district per capita income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS ( Robust SE) Robust Reg RWLS IRWLS (mmreg) 
Log Agri 98 0.0157** 0.0239*** 0.0211*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Constant -0.0880 -0.1533*** -0.1307** 
 (0.065) (0.046) (0.067) 
    
R-squared 0.0684 0.2426 - 
RMSE 0.0640 0.0464 - 
P-subsets - - 20 
Observations 98 98 98 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
Table 6.  Absolute ߚ-convergence of manufacturing income (value added) in 98 Pakistani 
districts (1998-2005) 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real district per capita income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS ( Robust SE) Robust Reg RWLS IRWLS (mmreg) 
Log Manuf 98 0.0041** 0.0041** 0.0018 
 (0.004) (0.0018) (0.0022) 
Constant 0.0122 0.0116* 0.02922* 
 (0.0139) (0.0124) (0.0173) 
    
R-squared 0.0490 0.0679 - 
RMSE 0.0646 0.0540 - 
P-subsets - - 20 
Observations 98 98 98 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 7. Conditional ß-convergence of per capita income in 98 Pakistani districts  
(1998-2005) 
  Dependent variable: Growth rate of real district per capita income 
  
Log GDP98 -0.0188 
 (0.0998) 
Matric -0.0083*** 
 (0.0022) 
Vacine -0.0006*** 
 (0.0005) 
Popden 0.0004*** 
 (0.0002) 
Electric 0.00002*** 
 (0.0001) 
Constant 0.3297* 
 (0.0904) 
  
Goodness of Fit 
R-squared 0.2003 
RMSE .06055 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) -265.7243 
Observations 98 
Regression Diagnostics 
Breusch -Pagan Test 7.65 
Jarque-Bera Test 46.25* 
Moran’s I (error) -1.601 
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 2.921* 
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (error) 4.781** 
  
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 8. Conditional  ß -convergence of per capita income in 98 Pakistani districts  
(1998-2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS ( Robust SE) Robust Reg RWLS IRWLS (mmreg) 
  Non boot  
Log GDP98 -0.0188 -0.0136 -0.0164 
 (0.0155) (0.0084) (0.0172) 
Matric -0.0083*** -0.008*** -0.0029*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Vacine -0.0006*** -0.0005*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0009) 
Popden 0.00002*** 0.00001*** 5.93e-06 
 (0.00001) (0.00009) (0.00001) 
Electric 0.0004*** 0.0004*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Constant 0.3297 0.2783* 0.2178* 
 (0.1215) (0.0757) (0.0917) 
    
R-squared 0.2003 -- -- 
RMSE 0.0606 -- -- 
P-subsets na na 20 
Observations 98 98 98 
    
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 2. Tukey box plot: log of district income relative to sample average66 
 
 
Figure 3: Stochastic Kernel Plot for relative per capita GDP in 2005 and 1998 
 
       
 
                                                        
66 Rpc stands for relative per capita GDP 
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   Chapter 5 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Socio-economic inequalities in Pakistan have been consistently high since the 1960s. The 
country is characterised by widespread internal socio-economic disparities as its core areas 
have experienced rapid development while the peripheral areas continue to lag behind. These 
spatial inequalities have become an urgent political issue reflected through public 
dissatisfaction and frequent anti-government demonstrations in lagging areas, and requires 
focused efforts if spatially balanced economic growth is to be achieved. 
Furthermore, Pakistan is also experiencing a demographic transition according to 
which it has been estimated that the number of its potential workforce (15-64 years age 
group) will increase to approximately 221 million by 2050. However, currently out of a 
population of over 170 million, 25 million children do not go to schools. Moreover due to a 
weak education system, the educated class is embracing the phenomenon famously referred 
to as the brain drain, while the uneducated tier of the society is confronting frictional 
unemployment due to changes labour demand patterns (Ahmed, 2005). If Pakistan is unable 
to tackle these issues on a priority basis by increasing investment in its human capital and 
providing employment to its emerging workforce, it will lose its opportunity to take 
advantage of its demographic dividend (Nayab, 2007; Cohen, 2008; 2011).  
Finally, the recently enacted 18th Constitutional Amendment in April 2011 and the 7th 
National Finance Commission Award have allowed the transfer of more funds from the 
federation to the provinces which will now have more authority over the provision of health, 
educational and physical infrastructure facilities67. This fundamental shift towards the 
division of power between the centre and the provinces has significant implications for the 
country’s long term policy planning, management and implementation. Specifically, it has 
made district level research even more important as education and other public services have 
                                                        
67 The 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan (8th April 2010) has removed the power of the President 
of Pakistan to unilaterally dissolve the Parliament, removed the limit on a Prime Minister serving more than two 
terms, renamed the North West Frontier Province to Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa in accordance with the wishes of the 
Pashtun majority of the province, and increased provincial autonomy. 
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become the sole domain of the provinces.  There is a need for increased research and policy 
prescriptions on how will the provinces build their capacities and generate resources for 
efficient public service delivery in social sectors across their districts. 
 This dissertation has addressed the above mentioned issues in three studies based on 
the fields of income and educational inequalities, and regional growth in Pakistan. By 
utilizing recent micro and macro data sets for Pakistan, it re-examined and updated estimates 
of the returns to education and income inequality estimates for Pakistani provinces, shed light 
on the effect of spatial clustering on the income and education inequality in Pakistani 
districts, and finally investigated for the first time the extent to which Pakistani districts are 
catching up in terms of their real per capita GDP (convergence). The next section describes 
and discusses the key findings from the three studies in this dissertation. It is followed by 
Section 3 which highlights the policy implications. Section 4 discusses the key empirical 
contributions of this dissertation followed by a short agenda for future research in this area in 
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses how the output of this research assignment will be 
disseminated.  
 
2.  Summary and Conclusions  
2.1 Can education explain changes in earnings inequality? Decomposition of earnings 
inequality in Pakistan (1993-2006) 
Between 1993 and 2006 earnings inequality in Pakistan rose by approximately 34 percent as 
the proportion of wage earners in its working population increased from 40 to 62 percent68. 
This steady rise in earnings income inequality now dominates the overall inequality pattern 
amongst its total employed population. Since nearly a quarter (22 percent) of the total 
increase in earnings inequality between 1993 and 2006 was due to differences in education 
levels amongst workers, this chapter investigated the extent to which can this observed 
change in earnings inequality be attributed to changes in returns to human capital 
characteristics across Pakistan? It also demonstrated how the dynamics of earnings inequality 
have changed between 1993 and 2006.  
                                                        
68 When this chapter was written, the latest available household data set (PSLM) was used to carry out the 
analysis for the fiscal year 2005-06. The next PSLM survey was carried out in 2007-08 but was not made 
available officially until 2010. 
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 In order to do so this chapter employed various statistical and econometric inequality 
decomposition techniques. First, it analyzed the dynamics of earnings inequality between 
1993 and 2006 by calculating, comparing and decomposing some General Entropy Indices 
and the Gini coefficient of earnings inequality within and across provinces, and over time. 
This descriptive analysis was extended and complemented with the regression based 
approach to inequality decomposition for which this study utilized a relatively recent 
empirical framework similar to that used in Bourguignon et al (2005) to identify the how 
changes in the structure of earnings and socio-demographic characteristics affect the overall 
earnings inequality. It simulated the effect of the observed changes in: returns to education 
and the demographic structure on the distribution of earnings. This decomposition allowed us 
to investigate the effect of unequal human capital characteristics of individuals on their 
earnings over time in Pakistan. 
 Empirical results from this chapter have demonstrated that earnings inequality within 
rural and urban regions has increased much more than earnings inequality between rural and 
urban regions. Moreover, it remained much higher amongst females as compared to earnings 
inequality amongst males. However for the case of educational returns in Pakistan, inequality 
between individuals with different education levels has remained much higher than inequality 
amongst individuals with the same amount of education during 1998 and 2005. With regards 
to the private returns to education in Pakistan, except for primary education, the returns to 
each successive level of education (i.e.  secondary, high school, graduation, post graduation)  
have increased between 1993 and 2006 with females having higher returns as compared to 
males throughout. Although this would imply that parents should favour education amongst 
girls as compared to boys, it is not actually so in reality. Furthermore, the falling returns to 
primary education in Pakistan implies that if earnings-education profile continues to 
disadvantage workers with lower levels of education (i.e. remain convex), increased 
distribution of basic education might not even contribute much towards poverty reduction. 
Finally, the counterfactual analysis highlights the importance of education, in influencing the 
labour market returns and the distribution of earnings income in Pakistan. Most importantly, 
the micro simulations have demonstrated how females in general and rural females in 
particular (due to the high returns to their skills) are most sensitive to changes in policies that 
can affect inequality and labour market outcomes. 
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2.2  Does economic geography matter for Pakistan? A spatial exploratory analysis 
Generally, econometric studies on income and education distribution consider regions and 
provinces as independent entities, ignoring the likely possibility of spatial interaction 
particularly within a country. This interaction may cause spatial dependency or clustering, 
which is referred to as spatial autocorrelation in a spatial econometric framework. Chapter 3 
discussed why there is a need to re-examine previous findings on income and education 
inequalities in the light of recent developments in the field of spatial econometrics for 
Pakistan. It also highlighted why there is a need for increased amount of research on 
geographical levels smaller than the commonly researched provincial level for example 
districts.  
Specifically, it has exploited the geographical characteristics of the latest available 
micro data sets to analyze the spatial clustering of income and education distribution in the 
districts of Pakistan by employing spatial exploratory data analysis (ESDA) techniques. 
Global and local measures of spatial autocorrelation were computed using the Moran’s I and 
Geary’s C index to obtain estimates of the spatial autocorrelation of spatial disparities across 
98 districts between 1998 and 2005. The overall finding is that the distribution of district wise 
income inequality, income, education attainment, growth, and development levels, exhibits a 
significant tendency for inequality and similar levels of education to cluster in Pakistan (i.e. 
the presence of spatial autocorrelation is confirmed). 
Particular findings include the fact that there exists clustering of high and low income 
districts in 1998 and in 2005, with Punjab having the largest cluster of high income districts 
in both the years. District education levels also revealed high spatial associations especially 
when neighbourhood was defined in terms of sharing borders (contiguity). This implies that 
districts that share a border may actually influence each other’s education attainment levels. 
When individual education levels were analysed, the chapter concludes that there exists 
positive spatial autocorrelation dependence for education levels below bachelors (i.e. 
primary, matric i.e. grade 10, and inter i.e. grade 12). As for higher levels of education 
(Bachelors and above), sharing a border with a district with a high percentage of graduates, is 
more influential than the distance from the provincial capital or the nearest large city. Finally, 
an analysis of spatial association of a set of district wise Human Development Indicators 
confirmed that a district’s development levels are associated on the development levels 
prevailing in its neighbouring districts in Pakistan. In summary, the detection of significant 
spatial autocorrelation in income inequality, education and human development levels across 
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districts implies that districts (and regions in general) should not be viewed as independent 
observations in econometric analysis of socio-economic phenomenon. 
 
2.3 Are districts across Pakistan catching up? A spatial econometric analysis of regional 
convergence 
Do initially poorer countries grow faster in terms of per capita income and catch up to those 
that were initially richer? This issue has been referred to as regional’ convergence’ in 
economic theory and has remained an important field of research for economists. While 
Pakistan has been a part of various cross-country convergence studies, a limited amount of 
research has been carried out to study this phenomenon within the country across its districts. 
Building on the results obtained in Chapter 3, this chapter has contributed towards the 
literature on the spatial analysis of regional convergence, by investigating the extent to which 
Pakistani regions are catching up in terms of their income. It has explored convergence of 
GDP across 98 Pakistani districts between 1998 and 2005 using both spatial and non spatial 
econometric techniques. It is the first study of its kind to carry out a convergence analysis 
based on a district level and that too from a spatial econometric perspective for Pakistan. 
The chapter first investigated absolute convergence across Pakistani districts and then 
proceeded to a conditional convergence analysis to take into account the role of some district 
specific socio-economic/ demographic characteristics and geographical interactions in 
regional growth. In order to do so it utilized Ordinary Least Squares, Reweighted Least 
Squares, and Iterative Re-Weighted Least Squares techniques. The empirical results from 
these analyses indicated towards the lack of both, absolute and conditional convergence. 
However, results of district income spatial autocorrelation from chapter 3 and the diagnostic 
tests carried out in this chapter to detect for model misspecifications revealed evidence of 
positive spatial autocorrelation implying that the values for growth of real per capita GDP 
across Pakistani districts are spatially interdependent. This finding implies that assuming 
spatial independence in regional econometric studies for Pakistan would be a highly 
restrictive assumption. 
Hence, after explicitly incorporating spatial interdependence in the model by utilizing 
spatial econometric models, the conditional spatial model revealed the possibility of 
convergence across Pakistani districts between 1998 and 2005. The diagnostics of the models 
suggested that spatial dependence between the districts emerges through the error process, 
highlighting that that there exists unexplained spatial dependence which could just be a by-
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product of the convergence process instead of actually being of a substantive form (i.e. the 
actual existence of spatial interaction effects between districts). Even with a different 
criterion for contiguity, the results remained unchanged.   
Non parametric techniques were also utilized to examine the shape and the dynamics 
of the distribution of GDP per capita in the two years under study.  Results revealed that the 
standard deviation of the cross-district income distribution increased by 14.8 percent between 
1998 and 2005, indicating an overall increase in the cross-district income dispersion. In 
conclusion, empirical findings from Chapter 4 have demonstrated how adding spatial effects 
to econometric analysis can enhance our understanding of the regional convergence process 
across Pakistan. 
 
3. Policy Recommendations 
First, policies seeking to reduce overall income inequality in Pakistan should focus more on 
achieving greater equality in the distribution of the characteristics of paid employees. If 
earnings-education profile continues to disadvantage workers with lower levels of education 
(i.e. be convex), increased distribution of basic education might not even contribute much 
towards poverty reduction as presumed by the Millennium Development Goals. The policy 
implication for this finding lies in targeted government interventions that can facilitate in 
distributing the gains of education across different groups in the Pakistani labour market. In 
other words the government should facilitate the education of more people instead of making 
arrangements to pay less educated people more. 
 Second, about 68% of Pakistan’s current population is below 30 years of age and as 
most of them are entering the labour force, it has been estimated that the total labour force is 
increasing by 3% annually (Planning Commission of Pakistan, 2011). This increasing 
proportion of the working age group implies a decreased dependency ratio which can have an 
extremely beneficial impact on economic growth if Pakistan can capitalize its demographic 
dividend.  However when compared to other emerging market economies, Pakistan has a 
relatively large proportion of uneducated youth (32%) with very little vocational training. 
This group either ends up in elementary occupations or remains unemployed. If unattended 
this youth becomes disconnected with the political problems and may become extremely 
vulnerable to rising extremism in the country. If Pakistan is to take advantage of its 
increasing youth by making them beneficial participants of the economy, it must provide for 
their education, health, and employment. Focused efforts must be carried out such as the 
170 
 
formulation of a National Youth Service Policy as recently suggested by the Planning 
Commission of Pakistan’s Growth Strategy, 2011.  
Third, the education emergency in Pakistan requires immediate attention and remedial 
measures. If Pakistan has to capitalize its demographic dividend, focused effort must be 
directed towards improving its human capital. Policies that promote education attainment, 
creativity, innovation and job creation need to be implemented.  Educational reforms will 
have to cater to both public and private educational institutions in rural and urban areas of 
Pakistan. Moreover while the results (in Chapter2) demonstrate the returns to education have 
been higher for females throughout, it remains true that males continue to earn more in both, 
rural and urban areas. In this background, education can play a crucial role in obtaining 
gender equality in the Pakistani labour market as it has been noted that gender gap in 
earnings in Pakistan is much smaller for those who have obtained higher education (see 
Aslam, 2009).  
Fourth, the empirical results and graphical evidence provided in Chapters 3 and 4 
provide new insights for urban planning and regional development policies. Their results 
have provided sufficient evidence of the fact that districts with similar levels of education and 
other development characteristics, do tend to cluster in Pakistan. From a policy perspective, 
these results have demonstrated how  ‘neighbourhoods matter’ for improving local human 
development conditions since a district’s development levels depend on the development 
levels prevailing in its neighbouring districts in Pakistan. If the existing clusters of commerce 
and development are allowed to flourish and the creation of new ones in other provinces is 
facilitated, they can become suppliers of human capital and centres of trade, recreation, 
knowledge and domestic commerce, and a means of reducing rural urban migration.  
` Finally, chapters 3 and 4 have highlighted the importance of additional data collection 
and research (that takes spatial effects into account) at lower levels of geographical 
aggregation in Pakistan because Pakistani provinces are characterised by extreme within 
diversity in terms of their socio-demographic characteristics such as language and culture, 
and economic conditions.  
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4. Contributions 
This dissertation has contributed towards the literatures and policy debate on economic 
inequalities, convergence and growth in emerging market economies and in particular, in 
Pakistan. Its overall goal has been to reconsider exiting research on socio-economic 
inequalities and regional growth in Pakistan, by taking spatial effects into account to produce 
new insights on how these issues should be tackled while modelling them. The 
methodologies utilized in each of the three main studies of this dissertation have been 
implemented for the first time on Pakistani data. Chapter 2 has utilized regression based 
counterfactual analysis via Bourguignon et al (2005) to identify and analyze how changes in 
the structure of earnings and socio-demographic characteristics affect the overall earnings 
inequality in Pakistan. It has also re-examined the findings of previous studies on human 
capital inequalities in Pakistan and has presented the latest estimates for returns to education 
across Pakistan, taking into account gender and spatial differences. 
Although preliminary in nature, the empirical results from Chapters 3 and 4 have 
provided the first detailed evidence on why spatial effects should be taken into consideration 
for analyzing socio-economic issues in Pakistan by utilizing spatial exploratory and spatial 
econometric techniques. Furthermore this analysis has been carried out at a district level 
which is often neglected in research. While most studies present results on a provincial level 
in Pakistan, the few that have considered districts, only analyse few districts with similar 
characteristics (e.g analyse districts belonging to the same province). Chapter 4, not only uses 
the spatial econometric methodology for the first time on Pakistani data, it is also the first 
study on intra-regional convergence in Pakistan in order to do so.  
Given the recent shift towards increased provincial autonomy in Pakistan, and the 
launch of the ‘Education Emergency Programme’ in March 2011 to tackle the Pakistan’s 
education crisis, the contributions of this dissertation on educational and income inequalities 
make it a timely input in research for enhanced policy making in Pakistan and South Asia.  
 
5. Future possibilities and Next steps 
Testing issues such as socio-economic inequalities and regional income convergence involves 
a number of data issues. Organizing data on a district level aggregation and over time was the 
most demanding task encountered during the compilation of this dissertation. This was 
because, despite its need, there is a lack of data which is representative at the district level. 
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However as of 2007-08, the Federal Bureau of Statistics of Pakistan has regularly started to 
collect district representative data for the Pakistan Living Standards Measurement Survey. 
The official data was not made publically available until the end of 2008, which is why this 
dissertation had to utilize the micro data sets for 1998 and 2005, since they were the only two 
years for which district representative data existed when the chapters of this dissertation were 
being written. The plausible initiative of FBS to collect data at district level now, provides 
new opportunities to richness and detail to the existing analysis by providing various 
opportunities to exploit spatial exploratory and econometric techniques for Pakistani data. It 
also makes it possible to carry out a spatial panel data analysis for socio-economic 
inequalities and regional convergence and offers the possibility to test the effect various other 
explanatory variables besides the ones already used in the convergence analysis carried out in 
Chapter 4.  
Moreover, I plan to extend the results for earnings income inequality in Chapter 2 by 
analyzing overall household income inequality across Pakistan. As for my chapters on spatial 
analysis of socio-economic issues, I first plan to estimate a Spatial Durbin Model for 
analysing regional convergence and carry out a stochastic simulation analysis to observe how 
a shock to a district operates via the error term throughout the geographic system since the 
spatial error model emerged to be model with the best fit in this chapter.   
Finally, another future research possibility involves the investigation of the club 
convergence hypothesis (also known as spatial regimes analysis) using spatial techniques for 
the case of Pakistan. Club convergence occurs when regions with similar socio-economic 
characteristics converge only when their initial conditions are also similar (Cappelen, 2004). 
Increasingly literature in growth economics has demonstrated this tendency for economies to 
‘evolve within groups and not in isolation’ called convergence clubs (Bandyopadhyay, 
2003:3; Bernaud and Durlauf, 1994; Esteban and Ray, 1994). In this context I would like to 
identify and investigate whether high income districts in Pakistan have formed a club and to 
what extent are the low income districts lagging behind.  
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